The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America

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Ethnicity and Ethnopopulism in Latin America

It is almost an axiom of politics that ethnicity shapes political participation. In most countries, individuals join political parties, evaluate policies, and vote based in part on their ethnic identification. Political parties, meanwhile, choose candidates, forge alliances, design platforms, and employ certain types of rhetoric and symbols in efforts to attract voters of particular ethnicities.

Latin American countries were traditionally the exception to this rule. Not only were there no important ethnic parties in Latin America, but the dominant non-ethnic parties largely avoided ethnic themes in their campaigns and platforms. Latin American citizens, meanwhile, generally did not vote along ethnic lines. Indigenous people, for example, often split their votes among various parties or voted in ways that were indistinguishable from the rest of the population (Birnir and Van Cott 2007; Madrid 2005a, 2005c; Van Cott 2005).¹

In the last couple of decades, however, the region has begun to change. Indigenous people have taken to the streets to protest government policy, topple presidents, and demand economic, political, and social reforms. Non-ethnic parties, especially populist parties, have increasingly embraced indigenous peoples’ demands, recruited indigenous candidates, and employed indigenous symbols. Perhaps most important, in a number of countries, the indigenous movement has formed parties aimed specifically at representing indigenous interests.

Some of these indigenous parties have been quite successful. In this study, I define success as winning at least ten percent of the vote in presidential or legislative elections. Obtaining ten percent or more of the vote is a significant achievement in Latin America’s often fragmented party systems, and it frequently leads to appreciable policy influence. Parties that gain ten percent or more of the vote typically have considerable legislative representation and at

¹ There were exceptions. In the 1950s and early 1960s, for example, the indigenous population in Bolivia voted overwhelmingly for the ruling Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR). Similarly, in Mexico, indigenous voters traditionally voted en masse for the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional. Neither of these parties were indigenous parties, however, and their leadership was almost exclusively white or mestizo.
times are asked to join the government and granted control of certain ministries. They also are usually guaranteed state funding and a place on the ballot in subsequent legislative elections.

As Figure 1.1 indicates, the most successful indigenous party in Latin America to date has been the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), which won a majority of the vote and captured the presidency in Bolivia in 2005 and again in 2009. The Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País (MUPP-NP), which I will refer to as Pachakutik, was also initially successful: In alliance with other parties and movements it won fifteen to twenty percent of the presidential vote and approximately ten percent of the legislative vote in the 1996, 1998, and 2002 elections in Ecuador. Other indigenous parties have fared poorly, however. Only one of the numerous Indianista and Katarista parties that emerged in Bolivia won more than three percent of the vote, and that party, the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP), did so only once, obtaining six percent of the vote in 2002. Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú and her party, Winaq, won a mere three percent of the vote in Guatemala in 2007 and 2011, and the Alianza Social Indígena (ASI) in Colombia fared even worse.

What explains the recent emergence of indigenous parties in Latin America? Why have some of these parties been successful while others have failed?

This study examines indigenous parties in seven countries – Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Venezuela – focusing mostly on the first three countries. It discusses how these parties arose and explains why some indigenous parties, such as the MAS and Pachakutik, have been successful, while others, like the MIP, Winaq, and the ASI, have fared poorly. It also shows how some mestizo-led parties and politicians, especially in the case of Peru, have employed ethnic appeals to win the support of indigenous voters.
Finally, the book explores what impact indigenous parties, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, have had on democracy in the region. These analyses are carried out using a variety of quantitative and qualitative data, including surveys, elite interviews, newspapers and other archival sources, and municipal and provincial electoral and census data.

Understanding the rise of indigenous parties in Latin America is important because these parties have had an important impact on policy, especially in Bolivia, where an indigenous party has governed at the national level since 2006. Indigenous parties have pushed for the revision of their countries’ constitutions to recognize indigenous peoples’ cultures and rights, and they have helped enact a variety of laws that have benefited the indigenous population, from affirmative action programs to bilingual education. As Chapter 6 discusses, however, some indigenous parties also have taken steps that have undermined democracy. The MAS, in particular, has weakened democracy in Bolivia by concentrating power, undermining horizontal accountability, and harassing the opposition.

The rise of indigenous parties in Latin America is also interesting from a theoretical perspective. We still know relatively little about why some ethnic parties flourish while others do not. Nor is there much consensus about why ethnic parties vary significantly in terms of the types of appeals that they employ and the impact they have on democracy. This study seeks to contribute to theories of ethnic parties by shedding light on these important questions.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

Existing studies have provided several different explanations for the rise of indigenous parties in Latin America (Beck and Mijeski 2001, 2006; Collins 2006; Durand Guevara 2006; Huber 2008; Laurent 2009; Madrid 2008; Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008; Rice 2006; Van Cott 2005, 2003b). Some studies have attributed the emergence of indigenous parties to institutional reforms that Latin American countries carried out during the 1990s, which made it easier to create new parties. Other studies have attributed their rise to the decline of the traditional parties, particularly left-of-center parties, which opened space in the political system for new parties. Finally, some scholars have suggested that powerful indigenous social movements have played a key role in fostering indigenous parties.

Although these arguments are quite helpful in explaining why and how indigenous parties were formed, they are less useful in explaining their electoral performance. In particular, they cannot easily explain why, within the same countries, some indigenous parties were successful while others were not. Nor can they readily explain why some of these parties have managed to win the support of many white and mestizo as well as indigenous voters.

This study argues that the type of appeals used by indigenous parties explains to a large degree their electoral performance. Indigenous parties – and some mestizo-led parties – have succeeded where they have used a combination of
inclusive ethnic and populist appeals. The astounding rise of Evo Morales and the MAS in Bolivia, for example, was due in large part to the party’s decision to embrace populist strategies and reach out to non-indigenous organizations and leaders, while still maintaining its close ties to the indigenous movement. Similarly, Pachakutik in Ecuador enjoyed success in the late 1990s and early 2000s by maintaining cross-ethnic alliances and balancing ethnic and traditional populist appeals.

Indigenous parties have used a variety of ethnic appeals to woo indigenous voters. They have nominated numerous indigenous candidates, maintained close links with indigenous organizations, invoked traditional indigenous symbols, and embraced many of the longstanding demands of the indigenous movement. In contrast to traditional ethnic parties, however, the successful indigenous parties in Latin America have also sought to attract non-indigenous voters. Thus, they have eschewed exclusionary rhetoric; developed a broad and inclusive platform; and recruited many white and mestizo candidates, leaders, and organizations to their side.

Populist strategies have been a key component of the efforts of the successful indigenous parties to attract voters of all ethnic backgrounds. Both the MAS and Pachakutik have focused their campaigns on the poorer sectors of the population, relentlessly attacked the political establishment, and used a variety of personalistic appeals. Like traditional populist parties, they also have denounced foreign intervention in their countries and called for income redistribution and a greater role for the state in the economy.

Indigenous parties are not the only parties that have successfully employed ethnopolitical appeals. Some mestizo-led parties, such as Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA) in Bolivia, and Perú Posible and the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP) in Peru, have also used a combination of inclusive ethnic and populist appeals to assemble broad multi-ethnic coalitions. These mestizo-led parties have focused mostly on populist appeals, but they have recruited indigenous candidates and organizations and embraced ethnic demands and symbols in order to reach out to voters in indigenous areas.

These inclusive ethnic appeals have been successful in large part because of the long history of mestizaje (ethnic or racial mixing) in the region. Mestizaje has not eliminated ethnic attachments or ethnic discrimination, but it has blurred ethnic boundaries and reduced ethnic polarization. The fluidity of ethnic boundaries and the low level of ethnic polarization in the region have enabled indigenous parties to win the support of many whites and mestizos. Nevertheless, ethnic proximity has shaped voting patterns in the region. People who self-identify as indigenous or who come from an indigenous background have supported the indigenous parties in the greatest numbers because they have sympathized with their ethnic demands and proposals to combat ethnic discrimination and marginalization.

This study has important implications for the literature on ethnic parties. The literature on ethnic parties would not expect such parties to be inclusive or to win support across ethnic lines (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle
Much of the existing literature on ethnic parties has argued that such parties will use exclusionary appeals to mobilize co-ethnics, which will promote ethnic conflict and undermine democracy. This study, however, shows that where ethnic identities are fluid and ethnic polarization is low, as in ethnically mixed societies, ethnic parties are much more likely to employ inclusive appeals and to woo support across ethnic lines. Inclusive ethnic appeals, moreover, are unlikely to promote ethnic conflict in the way that exclusionary ethnic appeals often do. These findings suggest that the literature on ethnic parties needs to take into account the nature of ethnic identification and inter-ethnic relations in order to predict what sorts of appeals ethnic parties are likely to use and what their impact will be.

This study also has important implications for the literature on populism. The Latin American literature on populism would hardly expect populist parties to embrace ethnic appeals or to emerge from rural indigenous movements (Conniff 1982; Kaufman and Stallings 1991; Weyland 1999). This book, however, demonstrates that ethnic and populist appeals can be effectively combined to win the support of members of marginalized ethnic groups.

This study focuses on Latin America, but the arguments made in it should apply more broadly. Specifically, I would expect inclusive ethnic appeals to be effective anywhere ethnic identities are relatively fluid and ethnic polarization is low, but especially in those societies that have undergone considerable ethnic mixing. Populist appeals, meanwhile, should attract voters in those countries where parties are weak, political disenchantment is high, and large sectors of the population suffer from marginality and exclusion.

This chapter begins by defining the key terms that are employed in this book. It then evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of some existing explanations for the rise of indigenous parties in the region. It also examines the literature on ethnic parties in other regions and shows how, contrary to the expectations of this literature, indigenous parties in Latin America have won votes across ethnic lines by using inclusive appeals. Ethnic mixing in Latin America, it argues, has encouraged this inclusive approach. The chapter subsequently examines the literature on populism. It demonstrates that contrary to the expectations of the Latin America literature, ethnic and populist appeals may be effectively combined to win support from the marginalized sectors of the population. It shows how those parties that have combined ethnic and populist appeals have fared much better than those parties that have focused mostly on ethnic appeals or that have ignored ethnic demands altogether. The concluding sections of this chapter lay out the research design, methods, and organization of the book.

DEFINITIONS
Following Chandra and Wilkinson (2008, 517), this book defines ethnicity and ethnic groups as categories “in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership.” Ethnic groups are typically organized around characteristics that
are identifiable and difficult to change, such as race, phenotypes, and language (Birnin 2007, 3–4; Chandra 2006). Nevertheless, this book employs constructivist assumptions about ethnicity and ethnic identification. It assumes that people often belong to multiple ethnic categories, and that the category they choose to identify with may vary over time depending on the circumstances.

Following Van Cott (2005, 2), I employ the definition of indigenous peoples developed by the United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, considered themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them (United Nations 1986, para. 379).

As discussed later in this chapter, I define the indigenous population to include not just those people who self-identify as indigenous (or with some indigenous category such as Aymara or Quechua), but all people who grew up speaking an indigenous language, regardless of how they self-identify. I employ the term Indian as a synonym for indigenous.

I use the term mestizo to refer to people of mixed European and indigenous ancestry. An indigenous mestizo is someone who self-identifies as mestizo, but who comes from an indigenous background and typically maintains some indigenous customs (de la Cadena 2000; Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004). In the Andean nations, people of mostly indigenous descent and appearance who have adopted mestizo identities are often popularly referred to as cholos, but relatively few people self-identify as cholo in part because the term sometimes has pejorative connotations.

Throughout this book I use the term party to refer to any movements or organizations that participate in elections, regardless of how they describe themselves or their degree of organization and institutionalization. I define an ethnic party as an organization that prioritizes the interests of a particular ethnic group or set of ethnic groups and seeks to appeal to them as members of that ethnic group. A non-ethnic party, by contrast, does not prioritize the interests of any single ethnic group. Ethnic parties may be inclusive or exclusionary and in this sense my definition differs from those of other scholars such as Horowitz (1985, 291–3) and Chandra (2004, 2011). Inclusive ethnic parties prioritize the interests of a particular ethnic group or cluster of ethnic groups, but they seek to appeal across ethnic lines and do not exclude any groups. Exclusionary ethnic parties, by contrast, do not seek to appeal across ethnic lines.

Horowitz (1985, 291) defines ethnic parties as organizations that receive their support exclusively from a single ethnic group (or cluster of ethnic groups) and serve the interests of that group, and Chandra (2011, 155) defines ethnic parties as organizations that champion the interests of certain ethnic groups while seeking to exclude others. Their definitions of an ethnic party thus resemble what I refer to as an exclusionary ethnic party, and their definitions of a multi-ethnic party correspond more closely to what I refer to as an inclusive ethnic party.
I use the term *indigenous party* to refer to those electoral organizations that prioritize the interests of the indigenous population regardless of whether they are inclusive or exclusionary. Indigenous parties are therefore a particular type of ethnic party.

I define *mestizo-led parties* as parties whose leadership is mostly mestizo. This includes the vast majority of parties in Latin America. Mestizo-led parties in Latin America do not explicitly prioritize the interests of the mestizo population, the indigenous population, or any other ethnic group and they are therefore not ethnic parties. As noted, however, some mestizo-led parties such as CONDEPA, Perú Posible, and the PNP, have made ethnic appeals to indigenous people in order to try to win their support.

*Populism* is a notoriously slippery concept and its meaning has been the subject of a great deal of debate. Some scholars have identified it as a set of economic policies, specifically deficit spending, income redistribution, and widespread state intervention in the economy (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Sachs 1989). Other scholars have focused on the social base of populism, identifying it as a multi-class movement rooted in the urban popular sectors (Conniff 1982; Ianni 1975). Still other scholars have focused on populism as a discourse that presents politics as a Manichean struggle between the masses and the corrupt elites (de la Torre 2000; Hawkins 2010; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005). Finally, some scholars have characterized populism as a form of personalistic rule involving mass mobilization. Weyland (2001, 144), for example, defines it as “a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.”

In this study, I opt for a multidimensional definition that combines several of the attributes of populism stressed by different scholars. I define *populism* as a campaign and governing strategy in which a personalistic leader seeks to mobilize the masses in opposition to the elites. This implies three core attributes. First, populist movements are personalistic. They revolve around a dominant personality or *caudillo*, and these leaders tend to concentrate power in themselves rather than in a party bureaucracy. Second, populist leaders campaign and govern in the name of the masses and they seek to mobilize them to achieve their electoral and policy aims. The leaders of populist movements may come from the middle classes or elites and they may enjoy broad multi-class support, but they nevertheless focus their appeals on the common people and they typically employ popular language, style, and dress in their efforts to mobilize them. Third and finally, populist movements are anti-establishment. Populist leaders frequently criticize the political and economic elites and employ often incendiary language in doing so.

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3 It is often difficult to distinguish between whites and mestizos in Latin America and I make no effort to do so with respect to the leadership of parties.
### Table 1.1. Key Distinguishing Characteristics of Different Types of Populism

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<th>Ethnopolitism</th>
<th>Traditional populism</th>
<th>Neoliberal populism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employs personalistic appeals?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focuses appeals on lower classes?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Makes anti-establishment appeals?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Makes extensive ethnic appeals?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopts nationalist and state interventionist rhetoric and policies?</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates neoliberal policies?</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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I also identify several secondary or subordinate categories of populism, namely traditional populism, neoliberal populism, and ethnopolitism. As Table 1.1 indicates, these secondary categories have the core properties of populism, plus one or more additional characteristics. *Traditional populism* I define as a campaign and governing strategy that includes nationalist, state interventionist, and redistributive policies and appeals in addition to the aforementioned characteristics. *Neoliberal populism*, by contrast, is a strategy that eschews statist and nationalist appeals and policies in favor of market-oriented measures.

*Ethnopolitism* refers to a campaign and governing strategy in which politicians or parties combine ethnic and populist appeals or policies. Ethnopolitism can be exclusionary as well as inclusive. In Latin America, the parties that have employed widespread ethnopolitist appeals have been inclusive, but in Europe the most prominent parties that have employed ethnopolitist appeals have been exclusionary, right-wing, anti-immigrant parties (Betz 2001, 1994; Mudde 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2010). Ethnopolitism can also involve different types of economic policies and appeals. In Latin America, indigenous parties have typically employed the nationalist and state interventionist appeals that are characteristic of traditional populism, but some populist politicians, such as Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo, have combined ethnic and neoliberal populist appeals.

As mentioned previously, a variety of politicians and parties has successfully employed ethnopolitist appeals in Latin America in recent decades, including indigenous parties such as the MAS and Pachakutik and mestizo-led movements such as CONDEPA, Perú Posible, and the PNP. This study classifies both of these types of parties as ethnopolitist. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there are important differences between these two types of parties. The indigenous parties, unlike the mestizo-led parties, have prioritized the demands of the indigenous population and they have had a much greater percentage of

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4 On categories and concepts, see Sartori (1970), Collier and Mahon (1993), and Weyland (2001).
indigenous people in leadership positions. The indigenous parties also have focused to a greater extent on ethnic appeals than have the mestizo-led parties, whereas the mestizo-led parties have focused on populist appeals to a larger degree than have the indigenous parties. Finally, the two types of parties also differ in terms of their organization. Whereas the mestizo-led parties that I focus on are top-down, personalistic organizations, most of the indigenous parties have important social movement bases.¹

EXISTING EXPLANATIONS

To date, most of the literature on indigenous politics in Latin America has focused on indigenous movements rather than indigenous parties per se (Albó 1991; Andolina 1999; Becker 2008; Brysk 2000; Dary 1998; Lucero 2008; Maybury-Lewis 2002; Pajuelo Teves 2007; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Selverston-Scher 2001; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 2005). Nevertheless, a growing number of studies has examined indigenous parties in the region (Beck and Mijeski 2001, 2006; Collins 2006; Durand Guevara 2006; Huber 2008; Laurent 2009; Madrid 2008; Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007; Mijeski and Beck 2011; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008; Rice 2006; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Van Cott 2005, 2003). The literature on indigenous parties has typically sought to explain how these parties were formed as well as why some of them have enjoyed a great deal of success. In this study, however, I focus mostly on performance, rather than formation, because the indigenous parties have only had an important impact to the extent that they have been successful. Moreover, it is the success of some of these parties that is truly surprising. In most Latin American countries, it is relatively easy to create a new party, but it is quite difficult to build a successful one. Indeed in the last couple of decades, numerous indigenous groups have formed parties, but the vast majority of these parties have fared poorly.

The emerging literature on indigenous parties has concentrated on three types of explanatory variables: institutional factors; social movement variables; and party system factors. Some studies have ascribed explanatory weight to all three types of variables. Indeed, the most prominent study of indigenous parties to date, Van Cott’s (2005, 48) book, argues that: “[I]nstitutional changes, party system changes, and social movement factors were important in encouraging or discouraging the formation of ethnic parties, and in influencing their relative success, in all six countries [that the book examines].”

¹ Some scholars would not characterize either the MAS or Pachakutik as populist parties on the grounds that they have important social movement bases and are not purely personalistic movements (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Roberts 2007). My definition of populism, however, focuses on the types of appeals that the parties make rather than on their organizational structure. Both the MAS (beginning in 2002) and Pachakutik (between 1996 and 2002) made extensive populist appeals, including personalistic appeals, in their presidential campaigns.
Perhaps the most common approach attributes the rise of indigenous parties to various institutional reforms that Latin American countries carried out in the 1990s (Birnir 2004; Collins 2006; Marenghi and ALCANTARA SÁEZ 2007; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008; Rice 2006; Van Cott 2003c, 2005). These arguments build on a large literature that has found that the formation of new parties is favored by certain institutional factors (Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Harmel and Robertson 1985; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Shugart and Carey 1992). This literature suggests that new parties are more likely to form and succeed where there are few barriers to having them on the ballot, where electoral rules grant legislative representation to small parties, and where such parties may gain access to important local-level offices before seeking power at the national level. Other scholars have argued that certain types of electoral rules, such as proportional representation and high district magnitude, encourage the formation of ethnic parties, in particular, by allowing ethnic groups to gain representation without reaching across ethnic lines (Horowitz 1991; Lijphart 1977; Norris 2004; Reilly 2001; Sisk 1996).6

The literature on indigenous parties maintains that institutional reforms not only facilitated the formation of these parties, but also helped lead to their success in some countries. According to this literature, a number of different types of reforms have played a role in the rise of these parties. In the case of Bolivia, scholars have focused on two main reforms: the 1994 law that created municipalities throughout the country and called for the direct election of their mayors and councilors, and the 1994 constitutional reform that established single-member districts for electing more than half of the members of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies (Collins 2006; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008; Stefanoni 2004; Urioste 2004; Van Cott 2005). In the case of Ecuador, scholars have focused on changes in ballot access requirements, specifically a 1995 law that allowed independent movements to participate in national elections (Birnir 2004; Macdonald Jr. 2002; Van Cott 2005). Some analysts have also argued that the creation of national legislative seats reserved for indigenous people spurred the rise of indigenous parties in Colombia and Venezuela (Rice 2006; Van Cott 2005). Conversely, the case has been made that other institutional factors, namely strict ballot access requirements and the centralization of political power, have impeded the emergence of indigenous parties in Peru (Rice 2006; Van Cott 2005, 163–6).

Institutional explanations are not without merit. Registration requirements clearly have impeded the formation of indigenous parties in some instances, and the loosening of those requirements may have played a role in the creation of Pachakutik in Ecuador. The 1994 decentralization law in Bolivia, meanwhile, stimulated the formation of the predecessor of the MAS, the Asamblea Soberanía de los Pueblos, which was created in part to compete in the 1995

6 Conversely, some studies have argued that single-member districts can favor ethnic parties where these parties draw their support from geographically concentrated minority groups (Meguid 2008; Rae 1971; Sartori 1976).
municipal elections in Bolivia. And the establishment of reserved legislative seats encouraged indigenous organizations in Colombia and Venezuela to form parties in order to compete for those seats.

Although institutional reforms can help explain the formation of indigenous parties in some countries, they are less useful in explaining the success of these parties. Because these reforms are national-level measures that affect all parties, institutional reforms are ill-suited to explaining the varying performance of different parties within the same countries. For example, they cannot easily explain why the MAS succeeded in Bolivia, while other indigenous parties that emerged in Bolivia about the same time, such as the MIP, failed. Moreover, some of the institutional reforms, such as changes in registration requirements, are only said to explain party formation, not party success.

In addition, there is only limited empirical evidence linking the success of indigenous parties to institutional reforms. Van Cott (2003c, 16; 2005, 23–32) examined how various types of institutional reforms affected indigenous party formation and success in six countries, but she found only mixed support for her hypotheses. Indeed, she concludes that “Given the multiplicity and diversity of institutional changes in the six cases studied, it is difficult to discern a systematic causal effect attributable to any one particular law or regulation” (Van Cott 2005, 31). In a valuable study of voting at the district level in six Latin American countries, Rice and Van Cott (2006, 724–5) did find that district magnitude was positively correlated with indigenous party formation and indigenous parties’ share of the total vote. This interesting finding, however, would seem to contradict Van Cott’s own claims that the creation of single-member districts in Bolivia stimulated the rise of the MAS.

Institutional theorists have also misinterpreted the significance of some of the reforms. Party registration requirements in Peru, for example, have not traditionally been very demanding, nor were they particularly strict in Ecuador prior to the 1995 law. Moreover, contrary to the arguments of institutional theorists, the creation of single-member districts in Bolivia did not lead to the election of significantly more indigenous party legislators than would have been elected under the previous system. And the establishment of a few reserved seats was not enough to bring about the success of indigenous parties in Colombia and Venezuela. Indeed, indigenous parties in these countries never managed to win more than a tiny fraction of the national vote.

Thus, the jury is still out on what role institutional factors have played in the rise of indigenous parties in the region. Certain institutional reforms, such as the establishment of reserved seats and the loosening of registration

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7 Nevertheless, some prominent leaders of the indigenous parties in Bolivia and Ecuador have questioned whether the institutional reforms played a key role in the formation of indigenous parties, arguing that they would have created the parties even in the absence of the reforms (interviews with Cahascango 2005 and Pacari 2005). See also the 2007 interview with Bolivian indigenous leader Alejo Véliz, cited in Van Cott (2005c, 22).

8 Institutional theorists tend to focus on different types of reforms in different countries, which complicates any effort to test these explanations cross-nationally.
requirements, appear to have stimulated the creation of indigenous parties, but there is not much hard evidence to suggest that these reforms have played a major role in the performance of indigenous parties in elections.

Changes in Latin American party systems represent another potential explanation for the recent emergence and success of some indigenous parties. The parties literature has long argued that the nature of the existing party system may encourage or discourage the formation of new parties. Various scholars have argued that new parties are more likely to emerge and thrive in weakly institutionalized or decaying party systems in which voters do not have strong attachments to the existing parties (Bruhn 1997; Dalton et al. 1984; Kitschelt 1988; Lago and Martínez 2011; López 2005). Other scholars have argued that new parties are more likely to rise in party systems that have important unoccupied areas of issue or policy space (Hug 2001; Kitschelt 1988; Lawson and Merkl 1988). According to this logic, new parties fare well where they are able to stake out unclaimed policy territory, exploit un tapped social cleavages, or embrace important demands of the electorate that the traditional parties have failed to address.9

Studies of indigenous parties have argued that the decay and fragmentation of party systems in the region helped give birth to the indigenous parties (Rice 2006; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Van Cott 2005). According to these scholars, indigenous parties were able to win the support of many of the voters who had become disaffected with the traditional parties. Van Cott (2005, 37) argues that the decline of the left, in particular, helped indigenous parties because it “opened space in the political system for indigenous movements accustomed to participating in politics through leftist parties.”10 She maintains that the decline of the left enabled indigenous parties to draw on “cadres from defunkt or diminished leftist parties, organized labor, and leftist intellectuals searching for a viable alternative political project …” (Van Cott 2005, 38).

There is some truth to the argument that the decline of traditional and leftist parties facilitated the rise of indigenous parties in the region. As we shall see, the traditional parties did encounter problems beginning in the 1990s in part because of corruption scandals and failures of governance, but also because voters became increasingly disenchanted with the market-oriented economic policies that they had embraced. The decline of the traditional parties and in some cases, leftist parties, freed up many voters and activists, and some of these individuals ended up supporting indigenous parties.

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9 Mustillo (2007) points out that this logic applies mostly to programmatic party systems, not systems in which people cast their votes based on clientelist or personal linkages.

10 In some cases, leftist parties, such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario in Bolivia, did not decline as much as shift to the center. In the wake of the debt crisis, many leftist, as well as populist, parties embraced market-oriented policies, abandoning the nationalist and state interventionist policies they had traditionally advocated (Madrid 2010). This shift created opportunities for indigenous parties because many traditionally leftist voters and activists grew increasingly disenchanted with the market-oriented policies.
Nevertheless, this explanation, too, has a number of shortcomings. To begin with, there is a limited amount of statistical evidence in support of it.\textsuperscript{11} Van Cott (2005, 34–5) finds no correlation between low levels of party system institutionalization or fragmentation and the emergence of indigenous parties in the six countries she examines. Similarly, Rice and Van Cott’s (2006) subnational analysis finds that neither party system fragmentation nor the left’s share of the vote is a statistically significant predictor of indigenous party emergence, although their analysis does find that the left’s share of the vote is negatively associated with the share of the vote won by indigenous parties in each district. In addition, a party systems explanation raises troubling issues of endogeneity. There is ample evidence to suggest that the rise of indigenous parties is a cause, not just a consequence, of the decline of the traditional parties, including left-of-center parties.

Moreover, a party systems explanation is necessarily incomplete because it cannot explain why the voters and cadres that had formerly supported the traditional parties shifted their support to the indigenous parties instead of other parties or movements. Nor can it explain why some indigenous parties succeeded in winning the support of these voters and activists while other indigenous parties failed to do so. To explain this, we must turn our attention away from the characteristics of the existing party systems and toward the indigenous parties themselves. As we shall see, some indigenous parties were able to win the support of large numbers of voters and activists because of the content of their appeals. Although the decline of the traditional parties, especially leftist parties, created the conditions that enabled some indigenous parties to flourish, only those indigenous parties that embraced inclusive ethnopolitical appeals were able to take full advantage of this decline. The indigenous parties that fared best not only put new issues, such as ethnic demands, on the agenda, they also occupied the nationalist and state interventionist policy space that had been largely abandoned by the traditional parties, including many left-of-center parties.

Another explanation for the rise of indigenous parties has focused on the role played by the indigenous movement. As a variety of studies have shown, social movements may provide crucial human and material resources to incipient parties (Kalyvas 1996; Keck 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 2003). According to some scholars, indigenous parties thrived in Bolivia and Ecuador because of the support that these parties received from the countries’ powerful indigenous movements (Andolina 1999; Collins 2006; Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007; Van Cott 2005). Conversely, indigenous parties failed to emerge in Peru owing to the weakness of the indigenous movement in that country (Rice 2006; Van Cott 2005).

As we shall see, this explanation has a great deal of merit. Indigenous movements have played a key role in the formation of indigenous parties throughout

\textsuperscript{11} The low level of statistical support for these variables may stem from the fact that party system decay and fragmentation was widespread in Latin America during the 1990s.
Latin America. They have also contributed to their electoral success. Powerful indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, have supplied a variety of resources to these parties' campaigns, including activists, candidates, and even some material contributions. Perhaps even more important, Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous movements provided legitimacy to the parties they founded and used their considerable influence in indigenous areas to help the parties build ties to voters.

Indigenous parties have fared less well outside of Bolivia and Ecuador in part because they have received less assistance from indigenous movements elsewhere. The weakness and fragmentation of indigenous movements in Guatemala and Peru have meant that they had limited organizational resources to supply to indigenous parties in those countries. Partly as a result, no national-level indigenous parties have emerged in Peru, and the only national-level indigenous party that has risen in Guatemala to date has fared poorly. Similarly, the poor performance of indigenous parties in Colombia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela stems partly from the small size and limited influence of the indigenous movements in those countries. Thus, the strength of the indigenous movement helps explain the varying performance of indigenous parties across Latin America.

Nevertheless, an explanation that focuses on the indigenous movement also has its shortcomings. To begin with, the strength of the indigenous movement cannot account for the sharp variation in support for indigenous parties over time since the strength of the indigenous movement has not varied dramatically from election to election. Nor can it explain why certain parties, such as the MIP in Bolivia or the Movimiento Independiente Amauta Jatari (MIAJ) in Ecuador, failed in spite of being backed by important sectors of the indigenous movement. Finally, this approach does not explain why some indigenous parties, such as the MAS and Pachakutik, have won large numbers of votes in urban areas where the indigenous movement has little influence.

This study argues that the most important indigenous parties have succeeded by going beyond the indigenous movement. It shows how the MAS and Pachakutik forged ties with numerous non-indigenous leaders and organizations and developed an inclusive populist platform that took advantage of growing disenchantment with the traditional parties and their market-oriented policies. This approach enabled these parties to fuse traditional populist constituencies – lower and middle class urban mestizos – to their rural, largely indigenous bases. This book also shows how some parties that originated outside of the indigenous movement, such as CONDEPA, Cambio 90, Perú Posible, and the Partido Nacionalista Peruano, used a similar strategy to forge coalitions of indigenous and non-indigenous voters.

THEORIES OF ETHNIC PARTIES

The general literature on ethnic parties cannot easily explain the success of some indigenous parties in Latin America either. Much of this literature
suggests that such parties win by mobilizing co-ethnics. A central claim of these studies is that ethnic parties do not behave according to standard Downsian electoral logic (Downs 1957). Instead of moderating their platforms and rhetoric in order to pursue the support of the median voter, leaders of ethnic parties focus their campaigns on one segment of the electorate: members of their own ethnic group (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2001; Sisk 1996). Leaders of ethnic parties are typically interested in maximizing the number of votes they receive, but they recognize that reaching out to members of other ethnic groups would be futile. Horowitz (1985, 346) writes that “because ethnicity is a largely ascriptive affiliation, the boundaries of party support stop at the boundaries of ethnic groups. ... In an ascriptive system, it is far more important to take effective steps to reassure ethnic supporters than to pursue will-o’-the-wisps by courting imaginary voters across ethnic lines.” Similarly, Reilly (2001, 9–10) argues that “political parties in divided societies are normally ethnic parties, and voters are normally ethnic voters, who are no more likely to cast their vote for a member of a rival group than rival ethnic parties are to court their support.”

According to this literature, leaders of ethnic parties mobilize members of their own group by exaggerating the threat posed by members of other ethnic groups and adopting exclusionary rhetoric and platforms. Party leaders have little incentive to moderate their pronouncements on ethnic issues since they have few prospects of winning support from members of other ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985, 346). Instead, they denounce conspiracies against their own ethnic group while systematically excluding members of other ethnic groups. As ethnic tensions worsen, more moderate leaders of ethnic parties are frequently replaced by radicals in a process that has become known as outbidding. Sisk (1996, 17) writes that “extremist leaders, seeking to capitalize on mass resentment, outbid moderates by decrying acts of accommodation as a sellout of group interests, citing collective betrayal and humiliation.” Similarly, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, 86) suggest that:

Moderation on the ethnic issue is a viable strategy only if ethnicity is not salient. Once ethnicity becomes salient and as a consequence, all issues are interpreted in communal terms, the rhetoric of cooperation and mutual trust sounds painfully weak.

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11 As we have seen, some of this literature defines ethnic parties as exclusionary or as organizations that draw their support from a single ethnic group or cluster of ethnic groups (Chandra 2004, 2011; Gunther and Diamond 2003, 183; Horowitz 1985, 291).
13 As Downs (1957) and others have made clear, the expectation that parties will move toward the center in pursuit of the median voter depends on various assumptions that often do not hold in the real world, including the assumptions that there are only two parties and that there is only one dimension of party competition.
14 Horowitz (1985, 318) also writes that an ethnic party “recognizing that it cannot count on defections from members of the other ethnic group, has the incentive to solidify the support of its own group.”
More importantly, it is strategically vulnerable to flame fanning and the politics of outbidding.\footnote{Nonetheless, Horowitz (1991) maintains that certain electoral systems do provide ethnic parties with incentives to moderate and court support across ethnic lines. Specifically, he advocates the adoption of preferential voting systems in which voters rank order candidates, thereby providing parties with incentives to seek second-place (or third-place) votes. See also Reilly (2001).}

The ethnic polarization of the electoral campaign often leads to an ethnic polarization of the vote. Indeed, elections may become so polarized that they resemble an ethnic census in which each party’s share of the vote is roughly the same as the corresponding ethnic group’s share of the population (Horowitz 1985, 326–30). Under these circumstances, ethnic parties will be successful only if the targeted ethnic group represents a significant percentage of the electorate. Surprisingly, however, ethnic parties may limit their appeals to members of their own ethnic group even when this group represents a small minority of the population. Horowitz (1985, 307–8) acknowledges that it may seem irrational for a party leader to “pursue a course foreseeable leading to a permanent minority position for his party,” but he maintains there is an electoral logic to doing so.\footnote{Horowitz (1985, 308) notes that leaders may occasionally be motivated by “a conviction that the political cause of the ethnic group is so just that it is worth risking permanent opposition for its sake,” but in most cases, he suggests, the actions of politicians are driven by an electoral logic.} In ethnically polarized societies, he suggests, leaders of minority ethnic groups that try to reach out to members of other ethnic groups will not succeed and will potentially alienate members of their own ethnic group, leaving them with no support whatsoever (Horowitz 1985, 306–11).

The dominant literature on ethnic parties would therefore not expect indigenous parties to be inclusive, and it would predict that any efforts to reach out to members of other ethnic groups would fail. This literature, however, focuses on ethnically divided countries. In these societies, politics, in the words of Horowitz (1985, 304), are “unidimensional – along an ethnic axis.” In societies that are not ethnically polarized, ethnic issues would typically be of lesser salience, and ethnicity would presumably be only one of a number of dimensions that shape voting behavior. Thus, a party based in one ethnic group might be able to attract support from members of other ethnic groups by appealing to them on these other dimensions. As a result, ethnic parties in nonpolarized societies have greater incentives to eschew exclusionary appeals and instead reach out to members of other ethnic groups, as some indigenous parties in Latin America have done.

The arguments of Horowitz and others assume that individuals have a single ethnic identity and that the boundaries dividing ethnic groups are clear and relatively stable. These assumptions, which are typically referred to as primordialist assumptions, are deeply problematic, however (Chandra 2001, 2004). Indeed, most scholars of ethnic politics now subscribe to what has become known as a constructivist approach. Constructivists maintain that individuals
typically have multiple and fluid ethnic identities (Barth 1969; Chandra 2001, 2004; Laitin 1998; Posner 2005; Wilkinson 2006). Multiple identities, especially where they crosscut each other, can reduce the salience of any single identity and defuse social and political conflict (Goodin 1975; Lipset 1959; Powell 1976). When individuals have multiple, crosscutting identities, their interests stemming from one identity may conflict with their interests stemming from another, thereby leading them to compromise or moderate their views. Parties and politicians in societies with crosscutting cleavages, meanwhile, may be forced to moderate their positions in order not to alienate any of their constituencies. Thus, where the population has multiple, crosscutting identities, ethnic parties may be less likely to engage in exclusionary appeals and voters may be less likely to respond favorably to such appeals (Chandra 2005; Dunning and Harrison 2010; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Constructivist scholars have offered their own theories about the performance of ethnic parties, of which perhaps the most prominent is by Chandra (2004). Chandra maintains that in developing democracies with large public sectors, parties and politicians woo support by delivering clientelistic benefits, such as jobs and state resources, to citizens. Voters, meanwhile, cast their votes for whichever parties or politicians they believe will deliver the most patronage to them. Given the limited information available to them, voters typically assume that politicians will favor co-ethnics in the delivery of goods and services. Voters will therefore tend to support the party that has the most leaders of their same ethnicity as long as the party has a reasonable chance of winning the election or at least gaining representation. Ethnic parties, meanwhile, will seek to attract the leading politicians of the targeted ethnic group, but Chandra argues they will only be able to do so if they have rules that enable these elites to advance through the party hierarchy. Ethnic parties will therefore tend to succeed where they have competitive rules for intraparty advancement and the groups they seek to mobilize are of sufficient size.

Chandra's theory cannot account for the success of some indigenous parties in Latin America, however. To begin with, it does not explain why successful indigenous parties in Latin America reached out to whites and mestizos, even in those countries, such as Bolivia, where they could have won significant legislative seats, and perhaps even the presidency, with indigenous votes alone. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that indigenous voters have supported indigenous parties in order to obtain access to state patronage. Indeed, the most successful indigenous parties, the MAS and Pachakutik, denounced the clientelistic tendencies of the traditional parties and vowed to create more transparent and honest governments, although they, too, have engaged in patronage politics once in power (Van Cott 2005, 2009). Nor is there much

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17 Van Evera (2001) argues that primordialist assumptions may be tenable in ethnically polarized societies since ethnic conflict can harden ethnic identities and elevate certain identities to the exclusion of others. Where ethnic polarization is low, however, it is more reasonable to assume that individuals have multiple ethnic identities and that these identities can change.
evidence to suggest that successful indigenous parties have employed competitive rules for intraparty advancement. Indigenous parties have recruited indigenous elites as candidates in order to attract indigenous voters, but these candidates have typically been chosen by the social movements, the party hierarchy, or, in the case of the MAS, often by Morales himself, rather than through party primaries. Thus, neither the traditional literature on ethnic parties nor the most prominent constructivist alternative offers an adequate explanation for the performance of indigenous parties in the region.

ETHNIC MIXING AND ETHNIC PARTIES

Constructivists nevertheless provide many insights that can help us understand the behavior and performance of indigenous parties in the region. Constructivists point out not only that ethnic identification is often fluid and multiple, but also that the degree of ethnic identification and ethnic polarization varies cross-nationally and that all of these factors have important implications for ethnic politics. This study draws on these insights in developing an explanation for the performance of indigenous parties in Latin America. It argues that the kinds of appeals that ethnic parties can use effectively will vary depending on the nature of ethnic identification and polarization in a society. In societies in which ethnic polarization is high and ethnic identification is singular and stable, ethnic parties are more likely to succeed with exclusionary appeals. But where ethnic polarization is low and ethnic identification is fluid, inclusive appeals are more likely to be effective. Latin American countries, as we shall see, fall in the latter category.

This study argues that ethnic mixing reduces ethnic polarization and increases ethnic fluidity. Ethnic mixing is commonplace throughout much of the world, but it is particularly prevalent in Latin America. Nevertheless, it has received insufficient attention in the comparative ethnic politics literature to date. Constructivists often discuss how people have multiple ethnic identities, but they are typically referring to the fact that people have identities that correspond to different cleavages or category sets, such as language, religion, or race (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Posner 2005). For example, an individual may be black, Catholic, and Spanish-speaking. Where ethnic mixing occurs, however, people may identity with both sides of the same cleavage or category set or at least have sympathies toward both groups. Thus an individual of mixed ancestry may identify as Serb and Croat, Hindu and Muslim, or indigenous and Spanish, although he or she will frequently have stronger attachments to one group than another. Ethnically mixed individuals may also identify partly or solely with a mixed category, such as mestizo.

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18 In some countries the state has encouraged people of mixed origin to identify with a particular group. In the United States, for example, the government traditionally classified people who had only a small amount of African ancestry as black and encouraged them to identify as such. In twentieth-century Latin America, the state encouraged people who were mostly or even completely of indigenous ancestry to classify themselves as mestizo.
Other things being equal, individuals who have roots on both sides of an ethnic cleavage are more likely to have sympathies toward both sides than are individuals who only have roots on one side of a cleavage. Ethnic mixing should thus reduce ethnic polarization even more than the existence of cross-cutting ethnic cleavages. Ethnic mixing will also increase the potential costs for parties of being exclusionary and increase the potential gains of being inclusive. Where considerable ethnic mixing has taken place, it would be counter-productive for ethnic parties to use exclusionary appeals because many people will identify with both sides of any given cleavage or at least empathize with people on both sides. Exclusionary appeals would alienate those people whose ethnic identities or sympathies comprise the included as well as the excluded group. A party that adopts an inclusive strategy, by contrast, might appeal to all people who share a given ethnic identity without alienating those who also have other ethnic identities. Thus, where considerable ethnic mixing has taken place, even ethnic parties have incentives to try to appeal across ethnic lines.

Ethnic mixing does not eliminate ethnic attachments, however. Nor does it bring an end to ethnic prejudice and discrimination. Nevertheless, widespread ethnic mixing blurs the boundaries between ethnic groups and often produces a plethora of intermediate ethnic categories used to describe ethnically mixed individuals. Ethnicity may thus come to represent a continuum rather than a small number of discrete categories, and the precise ethnicity of individuals may become ambiguous.

By blurring the boundaries between ethnic groups and multiplying the number of ethnic categories and attachments, ethnic mixing makes ethnic voting much more complex. Voters may be uncertain as to the precise ethnic identity of the candidates or parties because of the uncertainty over where ethnic boundaries begin and end in ethnically mixed societies. Nevertheless, voters will typically recognize certain candidates or parties as being more ethnically proximate than others. Members of ethnically proximate groups share certain phenotypes or have a similar language, religion, or culture. These cultural and phenotypical similarities may lead voters to identify with and feel a sense of ethnic solidarity with candidates or parties from ethnically proximate groups. They may also believe that ethnically proximate candidates or parties are more likely to support their interests and demands.

To be sure, ethnic proximity does not always lead to ethnic or political solidarity. In some cases, high levels of antagonism have existed between ethnically proximate groups, such as that experienced by Serbs and Croats in the wake of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The argument here is only that voters are more likely to feel ethnic solidarity toward ethnically proximate

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9 If ethnic mixing eliminated ethnic attachments and ethnic discrimination altogether, ethnic appeals would be ineffective and ethnic parties would disappear.

10 It is important to remember, however, that ethnic identification is shaped not just by genetics, but also by culture and society. Individuals may identify with an ethnic group, not just because of their genetic inheritance, but also because of their cultural backgrounds and the social, economic, and political pressures they face.
groups, not that they will always do so. Although one would expect voters to have lower levels of ethnic attachment to candidates and parties of proximate ethnic groups than to their own ethnic group, we would still expect them to feel a greater sense of ethnic solidarity with proximate ethnic groups than with distant ones. In addition, people might also be more likely to vote for parties or candidates of ethnically proximate groups because they know or assume that these parties or candidates have policy positions closer to their own preferences than do the parties or candidates identified with ethnically distant groups. Thus, in ethnically mixed societies, ethnic proximity will frequently shape ethnic voting behavior (Madrid 2011).

**Mestizaje and Indigenous Parties in Latin America**

Since the colonial era, Latin America has experienced widespread mestizaje or ethnic/racial mixing, which has profoundly shaped ethnic relations in the region. Mestizaje refers to two related phenomena: a process of biological mixing in which people of indigenous and European descent (and sometimes people of African descent or other backgrounds) produce children of mixed race or ancestry; and a process of cultural assimilation in which indigenous people abandon many of their traditional customs and begin to identify as mestizos.

Mestizaje has had important consequences for ethnic politics in Latin America. First, as a result of mestizaje, mestizos gradually came to represent a large majority of the population in most Latin American countries. This has meant that in order to win national-level elections, political parties, including indigenous parties, must typically obtain mestizo votes. Second, mestizaje has blurred ethnic boundaries and reduced ethnic polarization in the region. As a result, there have been far fewer incidents of ethnic conflict in Latin America in recent decades than in most other regions of the world (Cleary 2000; Gurr 1993). Rather than hardening ethnic identities and dividing ethnic groups into opposing camps, mestizaje has softened the boundaries between members of different ethnic groups. This has made it easier for parties, including indigenous parties, to win support across ethnic lines.

Nevertheless, mestizaje has not eliminated ethnic attachments altogether, nor has it gotten rid of ethnic discrimination. Indigenous parties have used these lingering ethnic attachments and grievances to establish strong ties to indigenous voters. Indeed, ethnic consciousness and prejudice have enabled indigenous parties to be successful in Latin America. If mestizaje had gradually brought an end to ethnic identification and discrimination in Latin America as some proponents of the racial democracy thesis suggest, then ethnic parties and ethnic appeals would not have resonated among sectors of the population (Degler 1971; Freyre 1959; Tannenbaum 1947).

Mestizaje took place from the earliest days of the Spanish conquest and accelerated over time. By the end of the colonial period, mestizos already represented more than one quarter of the population of Spanish America, and their numbers continued to grow after independence (Mörner 1967, 98; Rosenblat
Esteva Fabregat (1995, 38) reports that in 1810 there were three times as many Indians as mestizos in Mexico, but by 1900, there were twice as many mestizos as Indians.

From the outset, the *mestizaje* process in Latin America was characterized by a great deal of prejudice and exploitation. *Mestizaje* was driven initially by the shortage of Spanish women in the Americas and the privileged position of the Spaniards and the *criollo* in the economic and social hierarchy of the Americas (Mörner 1967; Esteva-Fabregat 1995, 33). This encouraged often exploitative sexual relationships between men of Spanish descent and indigenous women. Both the church and the state actively discouraged interracial marriage during the colonial era and, as a result, it was relatively rare. Interracial concubinage was widespread, but the church and the state disapproved of it as well, and the mestizo (and mulatto) offspring of these relationships had only limited rights.

After independence, the state adopted a more tolerant view of *mestizaje* and it eliminated legal restrictions on mestizos but not initially on indigenous people and Afro-Latinos. In some Latin American countries, the state actually encouraged *mestizaje* as part of its efforts to whiten the population and build more unified nations. Nevertheless, widespread social discrimination against indigenous people and Afro-Latinos and, to a lesser extent, mestizos remained. Far from being a racial democracy, Latin America after independence continued to resemble a pigmentocracy in which light-skinned individuals occupied the highest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder and dark-skinned people clustered at the bottom (Hanchard 1999; Mörner 1967; Nobles 2000; Sidanius et al. 2001; Wade 1997).

In the twentieth century, many Latin American governments implemented assimilationist projects intended to promote Spanish literacy among the indigenous population, to develop indigenous communities, and to bring indigenous people into the mainstream. Some Latin American governments also sought to recast the rural indigenous population as peasants, even banning the use of the term *Indian* in official discourse (Dary 1998; Yashar 2005). Widespread social discrimination, meanwhile, led many indigenous people to seek to assimilate, abandoning indigenous names, dress, and customs. Numerous people of indigenous descent opted to identify themselves as mestizos rather than as Indian or indigenous because they viewed the latter terms as pejorative and associated them with backwardness. Pressures to assimilate were particularly intense in the cities to which many indigenous people migrated in search of economic opportunities. In urban areas, indigenous people came into contact and intermarried with members of other ethnic groups, and many of the indigenous

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11 These population shifts stemmed not just from *mestizaje*, but also from the dramatic decline in the size of indigenous population owing to the spread of diseases and other factors associated with the conquest.

12 During the colonial era, the term *criollo* referred to a person of European descent born in the Americas.
migrants and their children embraced mestizo identities. People of indigenous
descent also had to use Spanish to a much greater extent in urban areas and,
partly as a result, the percentage of indigenous language speakers in Latin
America declined steadily in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, the assimilation process was far from complete. Ethnic
inequality and prejudice remained deeply entrenched, and much of the indige-
nous population remained mired in poverty. Recent surveys and censuses show
that self-identified indigenous people and indigenous language speakers con-
tinue to be much poorer and less educated than non-indigenous people on
average, and they typically have much less access to quality housing and health
care (Buvinić and Mazza 2004; Hall and Patrinos 2006; Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos 1994).

Particularly in rural areas, many indigenous people continued to speak
indigenous languages, maintain traditional customs, and identify with their
indigenous communities. According to recent census data, thirty-five percent of
the population in Bolivia, thirty-one percent of the population in Guatemala,
and eighteen percent of the population in Peru reported that an indigenous
tongue was the first language they learned in their childhood. Many indigenous
language speakers self-identify as mestizo rather than as indigenous, but they
often retain some indigenous practices and traditions. These people, whom
some scholars call indigenous mestizos, outnumber the population who openly
self-identify as indigenous in some areas (de la Cadena 2000; Programa de
las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004). Regardless of how they self-
identify, people of indigenous descent are often perceived by others as Indians
and they frequently experience discrimination and marginalization. As a result,
many of these so-called indigenous mestizos have been sympathetic to the eth-
nic demands and symbols of the indigenous movement and its efforts to redress
inequality and discrimination.

Although mestizaje has not eliminated ethnic differences, it has blurred
the boundaries between members of different racial and ethnic groups, creat-
ing multiple, fluid, and ambiguous ethnic identities. Numerous surveys in the
region have found that which ethnic group people identify with depends in
part on what choices they are offered. In Bolivia, for example, the percentage
of the population that self-identifies as indigenous has varied from less than

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33 Numerous other terms have been used to describe people of different skin colors, phenotypes,
or admixtures of Indian, black, and white heritage, although some of these terms are no longer
common currency. Mörner (1967, 58–9) provides a list of racial terminology used in Peru
during the eighteenth century: “1. Spaniard and Indian woman beget mestizo; 2. Spaniard and mes-
tizo woman beget cuartrón de mestizo; 3. Spaniard and cuartrona de mestizo beget quinterón;
4. Spaniard and cuarterona de mestizo beget Spaniard or requinterón de mestizo; 5. Spaniard
and Negress beget mulatto; 6. Spaniard and mulatto woman beget cuartrón de mulato; 7.
Spaniard and cuarterona de mulato beget quinterón; 8. Spaniard and cuarterona de mulato
beget requinterón; 9. Spaniard and requinterona de mulato beget white people; 10. Mestizo and
Indian woman beget cholo; 11. Mulatto and Indian woman beget chino; 12. Spaniard and china
beget cuarterón de chino; 13. Negro and Indian woman beget sambo de Indio; 14 Negro and
mulatto woman beget zambo.”
twenty percent in some surveys to more than sixty percent in others, depending on the precise phrasing of the question.\textsuperscript{44} Surveys in Peru also have identified dramatic variation in the percentage of people willing to identify as indigenous from approximately six percent in a 2006 survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project to more than twenty-five percent in the 2006 census. Similar variation exists in the willingness of people to identify with other ethnic or racial categories, such as white. These fluctuations occur in large part because many Latin Americans have multiple ethnic attachments and feel considerable ethnic ambiguity. How people identify themselves ethnically (and are identified by others) depends not just on their ancestry, but also on various other factors such as their name, skin color, phenotypes, and social class, as well as their cultural traditions. Indeed, it is frequently argued that culture rather than ancestry is what distinguishes Indians from non-Indians in Latin American society (de la Cadena 2000 and 2001).

Some scholars have described Latin America as having an ethnic or racial continuum, ranging from indigenous (or black) on one side to white on the other, with mestizos in the middle (Mörner 1967; Wade 1997).\textsuperscript{45} The continuum model has been criticized on the grounds that it does not adequately represent how certain minority ethnic or racial groups, such as Asians, Jews, and Arabs, are incorporated in Latin American societies (Sue 2009, 1062). Moreover, as some scholars have pointed out, in many communities in Latin America, race or ethnicity is fundamentally binary: there are whites and non-whites, Indians and non-Indians (Sheriff 2001; Weismantel 2001). Nevertheless, the continuum model is useful in that it highlights the importance of intermediate or mixed ethnic categories and the low level of ethnic polarization. Indeed, repeated surveys have found that in most countries the majority of the population will identify themselves as mestizo when provided with that option. The continuum model is also helpful in that it indicates that certain individuals and groups are more ethnically proximate than others. Although some mestizos identify more with whites and European traditions, others identify more with indigenous people and customs. As we shall see, these ethnic sympathies often affect voting behavior.

Ethnic mixing in Latin America has traditionally made it an inhospitable environment for ethnic parties and exclusionary appeals. Prior to the 1990s, only a few ethnic parties emerged in the region, and these parties failed to win many votes. As Chapter 2 discusses, the exclusionary rhetoric and platforms of so-called Indianista parties, which rose in Bolivia during the 1970s and 1980s, not only alienated whites, but many indigenous people and mestizos as well. Even the less radical Katarista parties, which generally avoided exclusionary

\textsuperscript{44} In surveys Latin Americans are typically more willing to identify with an indigenous ethnolinguistic group such as Aymara or Quechua than they are with the term \textit{indigenous}.

\textsuperscript{45} In the Andean countries, Mexico, and Guatemala, the dominant racial/ethnic cleavage is between whites and indigenous people with mestizos in the middle. In Brazil and many of the Caribbean countries, the dominant racial/ethnic cleavage is between blacks and whites with mulattos in the middle.
rhetoric, fared poorly in part because of their failure to reach out beyond their base in the Aymara population. None of these parties ever won more than three percent of the national vote, although they fared somewhat better in Aymara areas.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the indigenous population typically supported white- and mestizo-led parties, such as the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario and the Unión Democrática y Popular in Bolivia; the Con- centración de Fuerzas Populares and Izquierda Democrática in Ecuador; Acción Popular, the Partido Aprista Peruano, and Izquierda Unida in Peru; and the Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca in Guatemala. These parties wooed indigenous voters through a combination of programmatic, personalistic, and clientelist strategies, but they largely eschewed ethnic appeals. The parties did not recruit many indigenous leaders as candidates, nor did they establish close ties to indigenous organizations or embrace many of their traditional demands. Leftist parties, which had a long history of organizing among the indigenous peasantry, were often more willing to espouse indigenous demands. Nevertheless, even these parties focused mostly on economic issues and class-based themes and their leadership was almost exclusively white or mestizo.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, a new, much broader, wave of indigenous parties emerged. This new wave of indigenous parties was a direct outgrowth of the resurgence of indigenous movements and identities in the region. Indigenous movements grew increasingly active during the 1990s, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, and they carried out numerous marches and protests in order to try to influence government policies. The indigenous movements also stepped up their grassroots organizing during this period, and expanded and strengthened their membership base. The growing strength and influence of the indigenous movements encouraged them to venture into the electoral arena. As a result, various indigenous organizations founded parties during this period and devoted substantial human and material resources to their campaigns (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). Indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, used their dense networks of organizational affiliates in the rural highlands to support the new parties they created.

Indigenous movements also helped the indigenous parties by contributing to the process of reindigenization in the region. Indigenous organizations have encouraged Latin Americans to embrace their indigenous heritage by promoting indigenous pride and traditions. In their book on the Ecuadorian indigenous movement, Guerrero Cazar and Ospina Peralta (2003, 164) discuss how a talk by Ecuadorian indigenous leader Luis Macas led one young man to reclaim his indigenous identity and join the indigenous movement:

26 In the Andean countries, indigenous people did not participate extensively in electoral politics until the return to democracy in the region. Much of the indigenous population in Ecuador and Peru could not vote until the late 1970s owing to literacy restrictions on the franchise. Illiterates gained the right to vote in Bolivia following the 1952 Bolivian revolution, but Bolivia was governed by a series of military regimes throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, even Bolivia's indigenous population had limited experience with voting prior to the late 1970s.
In his speech, Macas had mentioned that it wasn’t possible to cease to be an Indian. You could cut off your braid and change your dress, but you would continue to be indigenous inside. And furthermore, to try to abandon what you were and what your parents had been was a mistake. You had to be proud of your origins, of your culture, of your way of living.

The reinindigenization process has provided indigenous parties with a growing base of potential supporters on which they can draw. According to LAPOP surveys, the percentage of the population that self-identifies as indigenous in Bolivia climbed by more than ten percentage points between 2000 and 2008 (Moreno Morales et al. 2008, xxxiii). Indigenous parties have benefited considerably from the increase in indigenous identification in Latin America because indigenous people with a strong ethnic consciousness are more likely to embrace the parties’ ethnic claims, more inclined to identify with the parties’ indigenous leadership and symbols, and more likely to have ties to the parties’ organizational allies.

The new indigenous parties have won support among indigenous voters in part by prioritizing the interests of the indigenous population. They have recruited numerous indigenous candidates, they have maintained close ties to indigenous organizations, and they have invoked numerous indigenous symbols in their campaigns. They have also embraced many of the traditional demands of the indigenous movement from agrarian reform to indigenous autonomy. And they have vowed to combat discrimination against indigenous people and to address ethnic inequalities.

The most successful of the indigenous parties, the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia and the Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik in Ecuador, have also made great efforts to be inclusive. They have sought not just to win the support of indigenous people, but to capture the votes of whites and mestizos as well. Thus, they have recruited numerous whites and mestizos as candidates or for leadership positions within the parties. They have forged close ties with numerous urban mestizo-dominated organizations and middle class groups. And they have adopted broad and inclusive platforms.

The inclusive strategies of some indigenous parties have paid off because of the region’s fluid ethnic boundaries and low levels of ethnic polarization. Indigenous parties have won the support not only of self-identified indigenous people, but also of many self-identified mestizos who are of indigenous descent and identify with indigenous culture. Some indigenous parties have even won support from whites and non-indigenous mestizos thanks in part to the low level of ethnic polarization prevailing in the region. As we shall see, whites and non-indigenous mestizos have supported the indigenous parties at times because

37 A similar increase has occurred in Brazil and a recent study by Perz, Warren, and Kennedy (2008) found that reclassifying as indigenous played a more important role than demographic trends in explaining the increase in the size of the self-identified indigenous population in that country.
they have sympathized with their ethnic demands, but, even more important, because they have supported the parties' populist rhetoric and policies.

The inclusive appeals of some indigenous parties have also helped unify the indigenous population. Throughout much of the region, indigenous people are divided into communities with distinct languages, traditions, leaders, and organizations. The inclusive strategies adopted by some indigenous parties, like the MAS and Pachakutik, have helped overcome intra-indigenous divisions and unite these disparate communities behind a single party. By contrast, the exclusionary rhetoric adopted by some other indigenous parties, such as the MIP in Bolivia, divided the indigenous population in addition to alienating whites and mestizos. Thus, the ethnic landscape in Latin America has helped make inclusive ethnic appeals more effective than exclusionary ones.

Support for indigenous parties has not been distributed evenly across the ethnic spectrum, however. Rather, individuals who self-identify as indigenous or are ethnically proximate to the indigenous population, such as indigenous mestizos or cholos, have been most likely to vote for indigenous parties. Many of these people have suffered from ethnic discrimination and marginalization and are more likely to sympathize with the indigenous parties' ethnic demands. Ethnically distant groups, such as whites and non-indigenous mestizos, have been the least likely to support indigenous parties in Latin America, although even members of these groups have voted for them in large numbers in some cases. The indigenous parties have therefore tended to fare better in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador where the indigenous and indigenous mestizo population is relatively large. They have performed less well in countries such as Colombia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela where only a small portion of the population self-identifies as indigenous or speaks an indigenous language. Within each country, the indigenous parties also have had the most success in the more indigenous departments, provinces, and municipalities. The MAS and Pachakutik, for example, have fared much better in the largely indigenous highlands of their countries than in the largely white and mestizo lowlands. Thus, in spite of the inclusive nature of these parties, ethnicity has profoundly shaped their electoral performance.

POPULIST APPEALS

Populist appeals have been a crucial part of the efforts of some indigenous parties to win support from voters of all ethnic backgrounds in recent elections. As noted previously, I define populism as a personalistic campaign and governing strategy that seeks to mobilize the masses in opposition to the elites. Some indigenous parties have been populist in that they have adopted a highly personalistic and anti-establishment campaign strategy that has focused on mobilizing the lower classes. They have also employed the nationalist and state interventionist rhetoric and proposals typical of traditional populism.

These appeals have worked well in recent years because of the high levels of political disenchantment that have gripped the region. Many Latin American
governments implemented market-oriented reforms beginning in the late 1980s and these policies initially generated some positive results, bringing down inflation and for a time producing strong economic growth as well. In the late 1990s, however, the economies of many Latin American nations began to stagnate, which undermined support for the traditional parties and their market-oriented policies (Madrid 2010). High levels of crime, corruption, and other governance failures also exacerbated political disenchantment in the region (Mainwaring 2006; Mainwaring et al. 2006). Populist leaders from Argentina to Venezuela have fed on this disenchantment by attacking the political establishment, denouncing neoliberal policies, and portraying themselves as the saviors of their countries.

Not all indigenous parties have used populist appeals, however. Many indigenous parties such as the Pueblo Unido Multiétnico de Amazonas in Venezuela, the Alianza Social Indígena in Colombia, Winaq in Guatemala, the Movimiento Independiente Aymara Jatari in Ecuador, and the MIP in Bolivia, have focused mostly on ethnic appeals and have largely eschewed populist strategies. As a consequence, these parties have held little attraction for self-identified mestizo and white voters, who constitute a large majority of the electorate in most of these countries. Moreover, some of these parties, like the MIP in Bolivia, have used exclusionary appeals, which have antagonized not only whites and mestizos, but many self-identified indigenous people as well.

By contrast, the successful indigenous parties, namely the MAS and Pachakutik, have wooed voters with a combination of ethnic and traditional populist appeals. As we have seen, the MAS and Pachakutik have used ethnic appeals to establish identity-based ties with indigenous voters. They have invoked indigenous symbols, they have recruited numerous indigenous leaders as candidates, they have made ethnic demands a centerpiece of their campaigns, and they have maintained strong ties to the indigenous movement. But the MAS and Pachakutik have also reached out to whites and mestizos through populist strategies, including personalistic, anti-establishment, and lower class focused appeals. Neither the MAS nor Pachakutik are personalistic parties to the same degree as many other populist movements. Indeed, they both have strong grassroots bases that help shape the parties’ platforms and policies. Nevertheless, they have both run personalistic electoral campaigns that have revolved around the charismatic personalities of their presidential candidates. The MAS and Pachakutik also have employed extensive anti-establishment rhetoric, aggressively criticizing the traditional parties and politicians. Finally, the MAS and Pachakutik have employed nationalist and state interventionist appeals. They have staunchly opposed market-oriented policies and U.S. intervention in their countries, and they have vowed to assert greater control over their countries’ natural resources.

The degree to which the MAS and Pachakutik have combined ethnic and populist appeals has evolved, however, and this evolution helps explain variation in support for the two parties over time. In its early days the MAS was composed almost entirely of indigenous people and it focused largely on indigenous
issues, particularly coca cultivation. As a result, it won few votes outside of the rural, largely indigenous areas of Cochabamba where it originated. Beginning in 2002, however, the MAS recruited numerous white and mestizo candidates, formed alliances throughout the country with non-indigenous as well as indigenous organizations, and developed a more inclusive and populist discourse. It broadened its anti-establishment and nationalist rhetoric and began to take the forefront in the struggle against market-oriented policies in Bolivia. It also started to center its campaigns on its charismatic leader, Evo Morales, who consolidated his control of the party. This shift helped the MAS win a significantly greater share of the vote beginning in 2002, particularly in urban, mestizo-dominated areas. Indigenous people have continued to represent the most dependable core of the MAS’s support, but since 2002 the MAS has had considerable backing across all ethnic groups. The MAS’s populist rhetoric has helped it fare particularly well among poor, leftist, nationalist, and politically disenchanted voters of all ethnicities.

The Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik in Ecuador similarly enjoyed success in the late 1990s and early 2000s by combining inclusive ethnic and traditional populist appeals, but it became less inclusive and populist beginning in 2006, which had a negative effect on the party’s fortunes. During its first decade, Pachakutik recruited numerous white and mestizo leaders and candidates, and it established close alliances with mestizo-dominated organizations. Indeed, the party declined to put forward its own presidential candidate in the 1996, 1998, and 2002 elections, preferring to support the white or mestizo leaders of allied movements. Pachakutik centered its campaigns on these leaders, Freddy Ehlers and Lucio Gutiérrez, who were both charismatic political outsiders. Pachakutik also employed a great deal of populist discourse in its campaigns between 1996 and 2002. It emphasized its opposition to foreign intervention and market-oriented policies, and it denounced the traditional parties and elites. Partly as a result, the party attracted many politically disenchanted, leftist, and nationalist voters and fared well in mestizo-dominated urban areas as well as in rural indigenous communities.

Pachakutik, however, was hurt by its participation in the government of Lucio Gutiérrez (2003–5), which adopted neoliberal policies and was accused of corruption. Moreover, beginning in 2006, the party increasingly emphasized indigenous issues, abandoning its populist strategy. In the 2006 elections, Pachakutik declined to form alliances with other parties for the first time and opted to run its own candidate, indigenous leader Luis Macas, for president. It also awarded most of the other key candidacies to indigenous leaders rather than whites or mestizos. Many of the mestizo leaders and mestizo-dominated organizations that had supported the party in the past abandoned it because of their concerns about the party’s increasingly ethnonationalist rhetoric and actions. Partly as a result, Pachakutik fared poorly in the 2006 elections, especially in mestizo areas, and it has not been able to recover since.

The MAS and Pachakutik are not the only parties that have successfully combined ethnic and populist appeals. Some mestizo-led parties, such as
Conciencia de Patria in Bolivia, and Perú Posible and the Partido Nacionalista Peruano in Peru, have also used ethnopolitical appeals with considerable success. These parties have not prioritized the demands of the indigenous population in the way that the indigenous parties have, but they have made numerous ethnic appeals. They have invoked indigenous symbols and recruited many indigenous and indigenous mestizos as high-profile candidates, particularly in indigenous areas. They also have forged ties with indigenous organizations and embraced many of the traditional demands of these organizations. As a result, these mestizo-led parties have fared quite well in indigenous areas. CONDEPA, for example, dominated many indigenous areas in the department of La Paz during the 1990s. Perú Posible and the PNP, meanwhile, have swept the indigenous highlands in recent presidential elections in Peru. By contrast, mestizo-led parties that have not embraced ethnic appeals, such as Poder Democrático y Social in Bolivia, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional in Ecuador, and the Partido Aprista Peruano in Peru, have fared poorly in indigenous areas in recent elections.

CONDEPA, Perú Posible, and the PNP have employed populist appeals to an even greater extent than ethnic appeals. They have run campaigns centered on the personal characteristics of their leaders, rather than on the parties or their programs. They have employed anti-establishment messages, presenting their leaders as political outsiders and as honest and grassroots alternatives to the corrupt traditional politicians. And they have focused their appeals primarily on the lower classes. They have forged alliances with numerous working class groups from peasant associations to unions, informal sector organizations, and neighborhood groups. The leaders of these parties have adopted a popular, at times folksy, style of campaigning, and much of their discourse has centered on meeting the needs of disadvantaged and neglected sectors of the population. Some of the mestizo-led parties, such as CONDEPA and the PNP, have also made nationalist and state interventionist appeals, denouncing neoliberal policies and U.S. intervention. Others, such as Perú Posible, have largely avoided this type of rhetoric, however, and have embraced some market-oriented policies.

The Latin American literature on populism would not have predicted that populist parties would employ ethnic appeals. Populist movements in Latin America have not traditionally had an important ethnic component and Weyland (1999, 383) goes so far as to suggest that ethnic appeals might not go together well with populism because populists tend to appeal to “undifferentiated ‘people.’” There is nothing incompatible about populist and ethnic appeals, however. Populism has traditionally been ideologically flexible, and

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18 Studies of populism in other regions have noted the compatibility of ethnic and populist appeals. Subramanian (1999), for example, argues that Dravidian parties in South India have combined populist and ethnic appeals in a fruitful manner. Various scholars, meanwhile, have shown that right-wing populist parties in Europe have frequently used exclusionary ethnic appeals, employing extensive anti-immigrant rhetoric (Betz 2001, 1994; Mudde 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2010).
thus it is not surprising that populist leaders would incorporate ethnic appeals into their repertoire. Moreover, in regions such as Latin America where ethnic polarization is low and ethnic identification is multiple and fluid, ethnic appeals need not be divisive. To the contrary, in countries with large socioeconomically disadvantaged ethnic groups, parties may more effectively woo lower class voters through a combination of populist and ethnic appeals than with populist or ethnic appeals alone. Indeed, indigenous people, who have traditionally been economically and politically marginalized, have been attracted to populism because of its anti-establishment rhetoric, its focus on the poor, and its nationalist and redistributive agenda. By combining populist and ethnic appeals, indigenous and mestizo-led parties and politicians have stitched together broad coalitions of indigenous people and politically disenchanted whites and mestizos, particularly from the lower classes.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This book examines indigenous parties in seven Latin American countries – Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua – focusing mostly on the first three countries. These countries were chosen in part because they have reasonably well-known indigenous parties, but also because these parties have varied considerably in terms of their degree of success. They therefore offer a range of variation on the principal dependent variable in this study, which is indigenous party performance. Various chapters, especially Chapter 4 on Peru, also examine the performance of mestizo-led parties that have employed ethnopolitical appeals.

The book examines the varying performance of these parties over time and across space. I analyze not just how the parties fared on the national level in aggregate, but how they performed in different kinds of provinces and municipalities as well as with various types of individual voters. This strategy enables me to dramatically expand the number of observations under analysis.

This study employs two principal research methods. First, I use qualitative methods to carry out case studies of individual parties. These case studies examine how the appeals of parties, including their platforms, rhetoric, candidate profiles, and campaign strategies, changed over time and how these changes affected their electoral results. Second, I use quantitative methods to examine the determinants of individual-level, municipal-level, and provincial-level voting behavior. I explore what types of individuals, municipalities, and provinces tended to support the parties and under what circumstances they did so.

This study utilizes a range of different types of data. This book is based on extensive field research in Bolivia (2003, 2004, and 2007), Ecuador (2003, 2005, and 2007), Peru (2006 and 2008), and Guatemala (2002 and 2008) that included dozens of interviews with indigenous leaders and government and party officials as well as academics and other political analysts. These interviews have been crucial to identifying the evolving political strategies of the
parties and movements in each country. I also conducted extensive archival research that included examination of newspapers, party documents, and governmental publications as well as the secondary literature on this topic. This research enabled me to trace the content of the appeals that these parties have made over the course of various elections. In addition, I acquired numerous surveys of public opinion in these countries and I use these surveys, particularly those carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), to examine who voted for the parties and why they did so. Finally, I have compiled and merged municipal- and provincial-level census and electoral data from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. These original data sets include a couple of censuses for each country and all presidential and legislative elections held in these countries between 1980 and 2011. I use the data sets to examine shifts in voting patterns across time and space.

Any study that focuses on ethnicity must deal with some tricky measurement issues and this study is no exception. As noted earlier, individuals frequently have fluid, multiple, and/or ambiguous ethnic identities, which complicate the task of identifying ethnicity. The LAPOP survey data fortunately provided a number of questions that can be used to identify ethnicity or indigenous status, including self-identification questions and linguistic questions. (The LAPOP surveys were also useful because they used a national sample and were conducted in indigenous languages as well as in Spanish.) These questions enabled me to pinpoint those individuals who self-identified as indigenous as well as people who had more ambiguous identities, such as those individuals who did not self-identify as indigenous but who had grown up speaking an indigenous language. This was crucial because I expected the latter as well as the former people to respond favorably to ethnopopulist appeals. The LAPOP surveys also at times contained other questions that helped identify the ethnicity of individuals, including questions that allowed individuals to rank the degree to which they felt Aymara or Quechua (on a scale from one to seven) as well as queries about the ethnic identification or linguistic status of an individual’s parents. In the quantitative analyses that employ survey data, I include variables on self-identification as well as variables on linguistic background to measure the independent effects of both of these variables.

For the analyses of municipal- and provincial-level electoral data, I relied mostly on census data on the maternal language of the population to measure the proportion of the population that is indigenous in each province or municipality. The most recent round of censuses in the Andes also contained questions about ethnic self-identification, but the linguistic and ethnic self-identification variables are highly correlated across provinces and municipalities, which precludes including both variables in the quantitative analyses. I opted to use the linguistic variable for Bolivia and Peru because it has been used in previous censuses and it is more consistently worded (and less controversial) than the ethnic self-identification variable. Using the ethnic self-identification variable, however, would not have appreciably changed the results. In the case of
Ecuador, however, I used the ethnic self-identification variable in large part because the percentage of people who speak indigenous languages in Ecuador is quite low. Chapters 2 through 4 discuss both the linguistic and the ethnic self-identification data for each country at some length.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK**

The ensuing chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines the rapid ascent of the MAS in Bolivia. It argues that the MAS has done surprisingly well in Bolivia because it has wooed not only indigenous voters, but also whites and mestizos. It shows how the MAS started out with limited appeal, winning support only in its base in the Quechua-speaking, coca-growing areas of rural Cochabamba. Beginning in the early 2000s, however, the party reached out to members of other ethnic groups, recruiting white and mestizo candidates, forging alliances with numerous urban and mestizo-dominated organizations, and employing traditional populist rhetoric and proposals. These strategies largely succeeded. The MAS finished second in the 2002 presidential and legislative elections, and then triumphed in 2005 and 2009. By contrast, other indigenous parties in Bolivia fared poorly largely because they focused mostly on ethnic appeals and failed to build a base outside of the Aymara population.

Chapter 3 analyzes the rise and decline of Pachakutik in Ecuador. It argues that Pachakutik fared well in the initial elections (1996–2002) in which it competed largely because it combined inclusive ethnic appeals with traditional populist strategies. From the outset, the party forged alliances with non-indigenous parties, recruited charismatic white and mestizo candidates, and developed an anti-establishment and anti-neoliberal platform. These strategies helped the party win the support of numerous politically disenchanted whites and mestizos as well as indigenous voters. In 2006, however, the party began to move in a more ethnonationalist direction, focusing more on ethnic issues and allocating most of the party’s key candidacies to indigenous leaders. In response, a lot of white and mestizo leaders abandoned the party, as did many of the mestizo-dominated unions and civil society organizations that had supported it in the past. As a result, the party fared poorly in the 2006 elections and it has yet to recover.

Chapter 4 explores ethnic politics in Peru. It argues that a national-level indigenous party has failed to emerge in Peru in large part because the country’s indigenous movement is weak and fragmented. Nevertheless, various politicians, especially Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo, and Ollanta Humala, have employed ethnic appeals to win the support of a disproportionate percentage of the country’s indigenous voters. All three of these politicians have embraced some ethnic demands, invoked indigenous symbols, recruited various indigenous candidates, and presented themselves as ethnic outsiders. Ethnic appeals have been less central to their campaigns than populist appeals, however. Fujimori, Toledo, and Humala have all denounced the
political establishment, presented themselves as Peru's savior, and directed their appeals largely at the poorest sectors of the population, but they have differed in the degree to which they have employed nationalist and state interventionist rhetoric. Whereas Humala has extensively criticized neoliberal policies and foreign intervention, Fujimori and Toledo implemented numerous market-oriented reforms and largely avoided nationalistic discourse and proposals.

Chapter 5 examines the failure of indigenous parties in Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. It argues that indigenous parties have had meager results in these countries in part because they have failed to employ many populist appeals. Some of these parties, such as YATAMA in Nicaragua and PUAMA in Venezuela, have focused mostly on ethnic demands and have failed to reach out to the non-indigenous population. Other parties, such as Winay in Guatemala and ASI in Colombia, have reached out to whites and mestizos, but have failed to adopt the populist strategies that proved successful in the central Andes. Indigenous parties in these countries have also fared poorly because of the relative weakness of the indigenous movement in all four countries. Indigenous people only represent a small portion of the population in Colombia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and the indigenous movement's influence in these countries is largely limited to indigenous areas. The indigenous population is considerably larger in Guatemala, but the country's indigenous movement is fragmented and demobilized and did not play a major role in Winay's campaign.

Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of indigenous parties on democracy, focusing on the MAS because it is the only indigenous party with much governing experience at the national level. The chapter argues that the parties' ethnic policies have deepened democracy in some ways. The indigenous parties have increased indigenous representation in the legislature and government ministries, they have boosted voter turnout and satisfaction with democracy in indigenous communities, and they have helped enact policies to improve the socioeconomic standing of indigenous people, which should make the Andean democracies more inclusive. By contrast, the populist tendencies of some indigenous parties, particularly the MAS, have weakened democracy. The chapter shows how the MAS's efforts to concentrate power and its aggressive attacks on the political opposition, the media, and the church have undermined horizontal accountability and weakened the rule of law. As a result, in many respects, democracy in Bolivia is more fragile now than when the MAS took power in 2005.

The conclusion to this book examines the implications of my arguments for theories of ethnic parties and populism. It argues that the literature on ethnic parties needs to take into account the nature of ethnic identification and inter-ethnic relations in developing theories about what sorts of appeals ethnic parties can make effectively. More specifically, it suggests that theories of ethnic parties must consider the level of ethnic polarization and ethnic fluidity, which in turn are shaped by the degree of ethnic mixing in a society. The conclusion
also argues that the Latin American literature on populism needs to recognize the compatibility of populist and ethnic appeals. Populist and ethnic appeals can be effectively combined in part because populism is ideologically flexible, but also because its anti-establishment rhetoric and focus on the lower classes will attract members of marginalized ethnic minorities. The conclusion ends by identifying some promising areas for future research.