This was an indictment for an assault and battery, tried before Dick, J., at
Caswell, on the last Circuit.
On the trial the facts were, that the defendant kept a school for small
children: that upon one occasion, after mild treatment towards a little girl,
of six or seven years of age, had failed, the defendant whipped her with a
switch, so as to cause marks upon her body, which disappeared in a few days.
Two marks were also proved to have existed, one on the arm, and another on the
neck, which were apparently made with a larger instrument, but which also
disappeared in a few days.
His Honor instructed the jury, that the right of the defendant to chastise the
child, was coextensive with that of a parent; and that they should be cautious
in coming to a conclusion, that excessive chastisement had been used. But as
the child was of tender years, if they believed that she had been whipped by
the defendant, with either a switch or other instrument, so as to produce the
marks
described to them, the defendant was guilty. A verdict was found for the state;
and the defendant appealed.
HEADNOTES:
The law confides to schoolmasters and
teachers a discretionary power in the infliction of punishment upon their
pupils, and will not hold them responsible criminally, unless the punishment be such
as to occasion
permanent injury to the child; or be
inflicted merely to
gratify their own evil
passions.
COUNSEL:
No counsel appeared for the defendant in this Court.
The Attorney-General, for the state.
GASTON, Judge: It is not easy to state with precision, the power which the law
grants to
schoolmasters and
teachers, with respect to the
correction of their
pupils. It is analogous to that which belongs to parents, and the authority of the
teacher is regarded as a delegation of parental authority. One of the most sacred
duties of parents, is to train up and qualify their children, for becoming useful and
virtuous members of society; this
duty cannot be effectually performed without the ability to command obedience, to
control
stubbornness, to quicken
diligence, and to reform bad
habits; and to enable him to exercise this salutary sway, he is armed with the power
to administer
moderate
correction, when he shall believe it to be just and necessary. The
teacher is the substitute of the parent; is charged in part with the performance of
his
duties, and in the exercise of these delegated
duties, is
invested with his power.
The law has not undertaken to prescribe stated punishments for particular
offences, but has contented itself with the general grant of the power of
moderate
correction, and has confided the graduation
of
punishments, within the limits of this grant, to the discretion of the
teacher. The line which separates
moderate
correction from
immoderate punishment, can only be ascertained by reference to general principles. The
welfare of the child is the main purpose for which
pain is permitted to be
inflicted. Any punishment, therefore, which may seriously endanger life, limbs or health,
or shall disfigure the child, or cause any other
permanent injury, may be
pronounced in itself
immoderate, as not only being unnecessary for, but inconsistent with, the purpose for
which
correction is authorized. But any
correction, however
severe, which produces
temporary
pain only, and no permanent ill, cannot be so
pronounced, since it may have been necessary for the reformation of the child, and does
not injuriously affect its furture welfare. We hold, therefore, that it may be
laid down as a general rule, that
teachers exceed the limits of their authority when they cause
lasting
mischief; but act within the limits of it, when they inflict
temporary
pain.
When the
correction
administered, is not in itself
immoderate, and therefore beyond the authority of the
teacher, its legality or illegality must
depend entirely, we think, on the
quo animo with which it was
administered. Within the sphere of his authority, the master is the judge when
correction is required, and of the degree of
correction necessary; and like all others intrusted with a discretion, he cannot be made
penally responsible for error of judgment, but only for
wickedness of purpose. The best and the wisest of mortals are weak and erring
creatures, and in the exercise of functions in which their judgment is to be
the guide, cannot be rightfully required to engage for more than honesty of
purpose, and
diligence of exertion. His judgment must be
presumed correct, because he is
the judge, and also because of the difficulty of proving the offence, or accumulation of
offences, that called for
correction; of showing the peculiar temperament, disposition, and
habits, of the individual corrected; and of exhibiting the various milder means, that
may have been ineffectually used, before
correction was resorted to.
But the master
may be punishable when he does not transcend the powers granted, if he grossly
abuse them. If he use his authority as a cover for
malice, and under pretence of administering
correction,
gratify his own bad
passions, the mask of the judge shall be taken off, and he will stand amenable to
justice, as an individual not
invested with judicial power.
We believe that these are the rules applicable to the decision of the case
before us. If they be, there was error in the instruction given to the jury,
that if the child was whipped by the defendant so as to occasion the marks
described by the prosecutor, the defendant had exceeded her authority, and was
guilty as charged. The marks were all
temporary, and in a short time all disappeared. No
permanent injury was done to the child. The only appearances that could warrant the belief or
suspicion that the
correction
threatened
permanent injury, were the bruises on the neck and the arms; and these, to say the least, were
too equivocal to justify the Court in assuming, that they did threaten such
mischief. We think that the instruction on this point should have been, that unless the
jury could clearly
infer from the evidence, that the
correction
inflicted had produced, or was in its nature calculated to produce,
lasting injury to the child, it did not exceed the limits of the power which had been
granted to the
defendant. We think also, that the jury should have been further instructed,
that however
severe the
pain
inflicted, and however in their judgment it might seem disproportionate to the alleged
negligence or offence of so young and tender
a child, yet if it did not produce nor threaten
lasting
mischief, it was their
duty to acquit the defendant; unless the facts testified induced a conviction in
their minds, that the defendant did not act honestly in the performance of
duty, according to her sense of right, but under the pretext of
duty, was gratifying
malice.
We think that rules less liberal towards
teachers, cannot be
laid down without breaking in upon the authority necessary for preserving discipline,
and commanding respect; and that although these rules leave it in their power
to commit acts of indiscreet severity, with legal
impunity, these indiscretions will probably find their check and
correction, in parental affection, and in public opinion; and if they should not, that
they must be tolerated as a part of those imperfections and inconveniences,
which no human laws can wholly remove or redress.
PER CURIAM.
Judgment reversed.