The Economic Transition in England*
15 September 1925
Great Britain, not less than Russia, is suffering an economic transition in the early stages of which we are now living. An American economist, Professor Commons, one of the first to recognise the nature of this transition, distinguishes three epochs, three economic orders, upon the third of which we are entering.
The
first is the epoch of scarcity, whether due to inefficiency or to violence,
war, custom or superstition. In such a period there is the minimum of
individual liberty and the maximum of communistic, feudalistic or governmental
control through physical coercion. This was, with brief intervals in
exceptional cases, the normal economic state of the world up to (say) the
sixteenth or seventeenth century.
Next
comes the era of abundance. In a period of extreme abundance there is the
maximum of individual liberty and the minimum of coercive control through
government; and individual bargaining takes the place of rationing. During the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Europe won its way out of the bondage
of scarcity into the free air of abundance, and in the latter nineteenth
century this epoch culminated gloriously in England in the victories of laissez‑faire and historic
liberalism. It is not surprising or discreditable that the veterans of the
Liberal Party cast backward glances on that easier age.
But
England is now entering on a third era, which Professor Commons has called the
period of stabilisation and has truly characterised as the actual alternative
to Marx's communism. In this period, he says, there is a diminution of
individual liberty, enforced in part by governmental sanctions, but mainly by
economic sanctions through concerted action, whether secret, semi‑open,
open or arbitrational, of associations, corporations, unions and other
collective movements of manufacturers, merchants, labourers, farmers and
bankers.
The extremes of this epoch in the realm of government are Fascism on
the one side and Leninism on the other. For my part, I accept neither. Yet
state socialism offers no middle course, because it also is sprung from the
presuppositions of the era of abundance, just as much as laissez‑faire individualism and the free play of economic
forces. Therefore I direct all my mind and attention to the development of new
methods and new ideas for effecting the transition from the economic anarchy of
the individualistic capitalism which rules today in Western Europe towards a
regime which will deliberately aim at controlling and directing economic forces
in the interests of social justice and social stability. I still have enough
optimism to believe that to effect this transition may be the true destiny of a
New Liberalism.
It
happens that England has today in the position of her coal industry an object
lesson of the results of the confusion of ideas which now prevails. On the one
side the Conservative Government is pursuing an orthodox nineteenth‑century
policy based on the assumption that economic adjustments can and ought to be brought
about by the free play of the forces of supply and demand. They still assume
that the things, which would follow on the assumption of free competition and
the mobility of capital and labour, actually occur in the economic life of
today.
On
the other side not only the facts, but public opinion also, have moved a long
distance away towards the epoch of stabilisation. The trade unions are strong
enough to interfere with the free play of the forces of supply and demand;
whilst public opinion, albeit with a grumble and with more than a suspicion
that the trade unions are growing dangerous, supports the trade unions in their
main contention that coalminers ought not to be the victims of cruel economic
forces which they never set in motion.
The idea of the Conservatives, that you can, for example, alter the
value of money and then leave the consequential adjustments to be brought about
by the forces of supply and demand, belongs to the days of fifty or a hundred
years ago when trade unions were powerless, and when the economic juggernaut
was allowed to crash along the highway of progress without obstruction and even
with applause.
The
orthodox economics, which we have inherited from the nineteenth century,
assumes a high degree of fluidity of the economic organism. It depends on what
I would term the principle of diffusion‑the
principle that, when any disturbance is introduced at any point in the economic
organism, it diffuses itself fairly rapidly through the whole organism until a
new position of equilibrium has been reached. It has always been admitted that
the economic organism is partly rigid and that friction may delay the process
of diffusion. But it has been supposed that the organism has sufficient
fluidity and mobility to allow the principle of diffusion to be a good working
hypothesis.
That
a great measure of diffusion still takes place, I do not deny. But the ease and
rapidity of diffusion is‑in England at least‑much less than it used
to be. I put this down to three main influences:
1.
A rapidly progressive community possesses much more mobility than a stationary
or slowly progressive community. In the case of the former equilibrium can be
restored by (for example) a particular industry growing more or less fast. It
is much easier to retard the rate of growth than actually to drive capital and
labour, which are already in an industry, out of it. I attach immense
importance to this. I do not think that Englishmen sufficiently realise to
what an extent their nineteenth century methods depended on the fact that the
country was living in a continuing economic crescendo. The orthodox economic
assumptions work much better in the United States than in England precisely
because in the United States the crescendo of progress still continues.
2. The growth in the power and authority of the trade unions both to maintain wages and to exclude the entry of new labourers into a trade.
3.
The growth of a sort of humanitarianism, exemplified in the `dole' to the
unemployed, which interferes with the natural pressure of economic forces on
individuals.
These
influences have, between them, introduced a considerable degree of rigidity
into the British economic system. Yet the authorities still frame their
policies on the assumption that a high degree of mobility and diffusion still
exists. Hence our tears and troubles.
It
is not an accident that our first difficulties, which will last long and take
many different forms, should centre about monetary policy. For no feature of
our pre‑war system depended more fundamentally on the principle of
diffusion than did our pre‑war gold standard regulated by means of Bank
rate. The first and most important step, in my judgement, is to establish a new
monetary system based on a stable level of internal prices, which will not ask
from the principle of diffusion more than it can perform.
But
this is not the only item in my new economic programme. I believe that there
are many other matters, left hitherto to individuals or to chance, which must
become in future the subject of deliberate state policy and centralised state
control. Let me mention two‑‑(I) the size and quality of the
population and (z) the magnitude and direction of employment of the new
national savings year by year.
Some of you in Russia will not agree with me in seeking help in these
matters from a reformed and remodelled Liberalism, which above all, shall not,
if my ideal is realised, be a class party. Leninism‑so it seems to me‑is
at the same [time] a persecuting religion and an experimental technique.
Capitalism too is at the same time a religion, which is much more tolerant,
however, than Leninism is, and a technique which, from having been
experimental, is now perhaps in danger of becoming obsolescent. On the religous
side it is not for me, who am a free‑thinking heretic, to speak. But the
experimental technique is necessarily a matter of most high interest. We in the
West will watch what you do with sympathy and lively attention, in the hope
that we may find something which we can learn from you. For we too have new
problems to solve.
* Second of two lectures
delivered by John Maynard Keynes in Russia as the official representative of
the University of Cambridge at the Bicentennial Celebration of the Academy of
Sciences held in Leningrad and Moscow between 5 and 14 September 1925. Scanned
from Donald Moggridge (ed), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes,
Volume XIX, Activities 1922-1929, The Return to Gold and Industrial Policy, in
Two Volumes, Part I, London: Macmillan (Cambridge University Press) 1981,
pp. 438-442.