§ 2. We have already seen how the citizens of the Middle Ages formed themselves into town gilds, in order to defend themselves against the oppressions of lawless barons. They did many noble and selfsacrificing deeds until they had achieved their freedom: but afterwards they sank into a habit of harsh exclusiveness towards their inferiors. The oppressed craftsmen formed themselves into gilds, which, after a struggle of some centuries, overthrew the old town gilds, took the rule out of their hands, and governed the towns in their place for many generations.

In early times so little capital was required in production that the distinction between the capitalist employer and the hired labourer hardly existed. Each craftsman supplied himself with what little capital he wanted, and worked with his own hands. He was generally aided by an apprentice, who would in due course become a craftsman, and often by his own family and perhaps one or two hired servants. Fashions changed slowly, new inventions were rare; his servants were generally hired by the year, it was to his interest to keep them employed even when there was not a good demand for his wares, so he did not wait for orders but worked steadily, and made things for stock. The even tenour of the craftsman’s life was seldom disturbed save by famines and plagues, by wars and the tyranny of kings or barons. The craft gilds fostered honesty of work and brotherly kindness; they defended the oppressed and relieved the distress of the unfortunate.

As time went on the complexity of trade increased, more capital was required for production; the craftsman became a small master. It was then ordered on the authority, partly of the gild and partly of the state, how many apprentices each master might have; how many hired labourers, and what wages .he should pay them; and how many hours he should work. Gradually as riches increased the masters ceased to work with their own hands and to associate with their hired servants; and in some cases regulations with regard to apprentices made the members of a gild almost an exclusive caste.

§ 3. This social separation between masters and men went on steadily but somewhat slowly until the latter part of last century, when a great impulse was given to it by a series of the most important inventions the world has known. Between the years 1760 and 1770 Roebuck began to smelt iron by coal, Brindley connected the rising seats of manufactures with the sea by canals, Wedgwood discovered the art of making earthenware cheaply and well, Hargreaves invented the spinning jenny, Arkwright utilized Wyatt’s and High’s inventions for spinning by rollers, and applied waterpower to move them; and Watt invented the condensing steamengine. Crompton’s mule and Cartwright’s powerloom came shortly after. These inventions took manufacture away from houses and cottages, and gave it to factories and large workshops. Armies of workmen came together under the management of capitalist employers, and the modern Wagesquestion made its first appearance.

It seems that many of the earlier manufacturers were harsh and uncultivated men, who made a bad use of their newly acquired power. They crowded their factories with apprentices, many of whom they took from the parish with a premium of £5 each. The factories were so unhealthy, and the children worked so hard and for such long hours as to be seriously injured physically and morally. The workmen did not yet know how to protect themselves; and at the beginning of the present century their means were straitened by the great rise to the prices of food and clothing that was caused by an extraordinary series of bad harvests, and by the taxes and restrictions arising from the great French war. A Parliamentary report of 1806 says that “the opulent clothiers make it a rule to have one third more men than they can employ, and thus these have to stand still part of their time.” The working men groped about for a remedy against their adversities. For a long time they could think of no better plan than that of petitioning parliament to enforce some ordinances that were framed by the great statesmen of the times of the later Tudors. In particular they urged the enforcement of two statutes passed in 1555 and 1562*, which limited the number of looms each master weaver might have, which ordered that the number of apprentices in a shop should not exceed by more than three the number of journey men, and which reiterated the injunctions that wages should be periodically fixed by the justices of the peace. The first trades-unions were associations of workmen formed with the purpose of petitioning parliament to enforce these rules, and their efforts met with a partial and temporary success. But though such ordinances probably did more good than harm in the times of the Tudors, they would have imposed unendurable shackles on the growth of modern industry. At length it became evident to the unions that they would look in vain to the government for aid, and that they must rely, as the gilds before them had relied, upon their own energies. From that time they no longer approached government with the purpose of inducing it to interfere in their behalf; but they petitioned and agitated for the cessation of government interference against them. Step by step the combination laws have been repealed: until now nothing is illegal if done by a workman, which would not be illegal if done by anyone else. And nothing is illegal when done by a combination of workmen, which would not be illegal when done by a combination of other people.

* Philip and Mary 2nd and 3rd, cap. 11; and Elizabeth 5th, c. 4. See Brentano on Gilds, pp. 99, 103.

Free to work out their own destinies, the trades-unions have grown very much on the lines laid down by the old gilds. The good and evil of the gilds, their individual self-sacrifice and their class selfishness, are reproduced in modern unions. And even in matters of detail there is scarcely a single regulation of the unions to which a parallel cannot be found in the history of gilds.

Two generations ago unions were chiefly managed by ignorant, rude men. The law had made a crime of what was no crime, the agreement to refuse to work in order to obtain higher wages; and “men who know that they are criminals by the mere object which they have in view, care little for the additional criminality involved in the means they adopt.” They knew that the law was full of class injustice: destruction of life and property, when it was wrought for the purpose of enforcing what they thought justice, seemed to them to have a higher sanction than that of the law; and their moral sense became in a measure reconciled to crimes of brutal violence.

In many of the smaller unions there remains to the present day much of the folly and ignorance and selfishness, and a little of the violence of earlier times. But we may trust that those faults which are not now found in the largest and best managed unions, will, with the course of time and the diffusion of knowledge, disappear altogether. It is true that even the best unions do not always act up to the principles of unionism as they are expounded by their most enlightened members. But as when dealing with the economics of trade we do not trouble ourselves to discuss at length the guiles of dishonest merchants; so when dealing with the economics of unionism, we may accept its principles as they are put into practice by the most enlightened unionists. Let us then enquire into the constitution, the resources, the aims and the methods of action of the best unions of the present time.

§ 4. A union is an association of workmen in the same trade. Its principal objects are “(1) to procure for their members the best return for their labour in the shape of higher wages, shorter hours of labour, and the enforcement of certain restrictions as to the conditions of employment, which could not be accomplished except by means of combination; (2) to provide mutual assurance for the members by means of, pecuniary assistance in case of sickness, accident, death, out of work, superannuation when disabled by old age, loss of tools by fire, and emigration*.”

* The Conflicts of Capital and Labour, by George Howell, ch. III. 45•

Every member of a trade is invited to join its union provided he can shew that he has complied with its regulations as to apprenticeship, where such exist; that he is fairly steady in his habits, and that he is capable of earning the current wages of the district where he seeks admission. The ceremony of initiation retains much of the dignity and solemn courtesy, and some even of the forms which it had among the old gilds.

§ 5. Originally unions were confined to single towns or small districts, and many are so still; but there is a strong tendency towards uniting local unions belonging to the same trade. Sometimes, particularly in the case of miners, the bond of connexion is a slight one; the local unions form themselves into an Associated or Federated union. That is, each local society remains “self-governing, self-supporting, keeping its own funds, controlled by its own rules, directed by its own officers and committees, and fixing its own payments and benefits, but in other respects acting in concert, especially in all matters affecting time, wages, conditions of labour, security of life and limb, and supporting each other in all cases of strikes, lockouts, or disputes with their employers*.”

* Ib.§36.

More commonly different unions in the same trade join to form an Amalgamated union, which has a central committee of management, or executive, elected by the whole body. On all matters for which the rules of the union do not make clear provision, the executive give decisions which are binding till the next general meeting of delegates from the local branches. When a union has several branches the ordinary expenditure of each is governed by the general rules of the society, which prescribe what payments are to be made as “donation” to those out of work, though not on strike; as help to those who are travelling in search of work; as superannuation allowance; or in case of sickness, accidents, or death. A branch may not make any payment out of the general funds on its own responsibility for the purpose of supporting a strike. “The method of procedure with a view to obtain an advance of wages, a reduction of the working hours, or any other special benefit sought by the members of a given union, or branch of a union, the refusal of which by the employers may lead to a strike, is as follows:  The movement originates with the workmen in some particular shop, firm, or place; the proposal has then to be submitted to the local branch or lodge, where it is discussed in all its details; if the motion be carried by the members of the local branch, it has to be sent to the executive of the union*” It must be accompanied by full details as to the numbers of unionists and nonunionists affected, the state of trade and of feeling in the district, and the chance of success. If the executive approves the proposal, it circulates this full statement, with comments of its own, to every branch; and all members of the society have equal votes in deciding on it. Thus it is voted on by those who will derive no direct benefit from the success of the strike; but who will have to pay a share of the strike allowance. Consequently many such applications are refused every year.

* Ib. § 26, and Appendix VI.

Once a quarter there is a general audit and “equalization” of funds among the different branches. That is to say, the balance of the income of each branch over its authorized expenditure is added into the general reserve of the society, and this reserve is divided out among the different branches in proportion to their numbers; so that, with the exception of a few extraordinary local levies, all the income of each branch is paid into the common purse, and no payments can be made from this purse except by the authority of the whole union. Thus a large union has all the strength of an organized republic, in, which the most intelligent members are sure of having their opinions heard, but in which every important step is ruled by the votes of the whole body. It is daily becoming more true. that the “higgling and bargaining” which determine market fluctuations of wages, are not between individual employers and individual men, but between a group of employers and a group of men.

§ 6. The total number of unionists is about 1,250,000; and more than half of these are represented at the Tradesunion Congress that is now held every year in some large town. The discussions at these Congresses have a very wide range; but their action is almost confined to pursuing the original aim of the union, that of influencing legislation in matters that specially affect working men.

A proposal has been made to organize a general federation of unions for active purposes: but there seems to be no probability of this being done, unless as a defensive measure in case the “National Federation of Employers” should become strong. In almost every large town there is a Trades Council elected by the local unions and branches of unions. They have little power, but they take action in some matters of general interest; and they sometimes arbitrate between different unions. When one union wants aid from others in carrying on a strike, the local Trades Council generally investigate the case; and either collect subscriptions for the strikers, or recommend them to close the strike on the best terms that can be got.

§ 7. Though unions do not yet contain nearly half the working men in the country, they do contain more than half of the most skilful and intelligent and steady workers in. almost every skilled trade. There are no doubt some energetic men, anxious to raise themselves in life, who find the rules of a union burdensome. But more are excluded from unions because they are below the union’s standard of efficiency as workmen, or because they are unwilling to subscribe to its funds.

It may be well to inquire how it is that unions have so strong a hold on the best workmen. Firstly, as in the days of the old gilds, men delight in the notion of self-help and self-defense by union. The best employers admit that if the unions never allowed their policy to be influenced by mean men and shirks, they would do very little harm: and the best unionists admit that if there were no unjust or harsh employers, unions might become mere benefit-societies; as it is, many feel their duty to their union to be a kind of patriotism. Again, non-unionists very often enter into a strike as heartily as unionists; but having no resources of their own, consent to be supported by the union: and when the strike is over those of them who have any honourable. feeling join the union. Lastly, unions get a powerful hold on those working men who dread nothing so much as becoming dependent on the parish. For it can promise to maintain a man comfortably whenever he is out of work. But any provident society which did not consist of men in the same trade with himself, would fail if it attempted to do this: for it could not test the truth of his statement when he said that he could not get work at a reasonable wage.

§ 8. Next with regard to the cost of strikes. We may add together into one sum all the expenses incurred by working men in strikes, including the wages lost while they were idle. We may add together into another sum all the wages they have gained directly by strikes, whenever these have been successful in obtaining a rise and preventing a fall of wages. We shall then certainly find that the former sum is very much larger than the latter. But this does not prove that strikes cost more to working men than the benefits gained by them are worth. It would be as reasonable to argue that the £16,000,000 which England spent on the Abyssinian war was badly spent, because we brought back from it very little booty except King Theodore’s umbrella. Whether the expenditure was prudent or not, depends on the very difficult question whether it was worth £16,000,000 to give one more hint that other nations may not illtreat a British subject with impunity. And the unionists maintain that their expenditure is prudent because it makes employers feel that they cannot lower wages or harass their men wantonly without a risk of suffering for it. The function of an army is not to make war, but to preserve a satisfactory peace; war is a proof that the army has failed of its first object. And though there is always a war party in a union, its cooler and abler members know that to declare a strike is to confess failure. The number of strikes would be diminished if all unionists reflected that six years’ work at a rise of a shilling a week is, required to balance the loss of ten weeks’ wages at thirty shillings a week.

But many strikes are not part of a deliberate policy; and in fact the trade quarrels of the smaller unions, as of the gilds of old days, have been far more often caused by irritated personal or class feelings, than by disputes about wages. The organization of the larger unions generally enables them to prevent a personal quarrel from maturing into a strike.

§ 9. Let us next look at the chief rules in which the policy of the unions is embodied. The restless changes of modern industry make it very difficult to enforce strict regulations as to apprentices. This is perhaps the most important matter which most unions find it best to leave to be decided by local trade custom. No doubt a system of apprenticeships supplemented by a good system of technical schools, may greatly promote the education of the country; provided that the apprentice is put to work under a man who is paid to teach him, or who is in some way interested in making him a good workman, and that the apprenticeship rules are not used as a means of artificially limiting the numbers of those who are brought up to skilled occupations. We have seen that one of the chief causes of ‘the origin of unions was the belief that the masters were flooding their factories with apprentices, who, when their service was over, could not get employment at any reasonable wage; and perhaps a few cases of the kind now exist. But there can be no justification for such rules as that which the boiler-makers profess to enforce, viz. that there shall be only one apprentice to every five journeymen, or the still severer rules of the hatters. If such a rule were acted on generally by the skilled trades of England, the proportion of skilled labourers to unskilled would steadily grow less. In spite of the improvements in the arts of production, the total produce of industry would increase but slowly or would diminish; the improvement in the intelligence and the income of the average English workman would be stopped; and compared with other countries, where such restrictions were not known, England would become poor and ignorant. It seems however that a candidate for admission to a union is seldom asked for his indentures, even where they might be called for under the rules; and that scarcely 10 per cent. of those now admitted as members of trades unions have been properly apprenticed*.

* Howell, ch. v. § 7 1.

§ 10. Trades-unions aim at enabling the men in the trade to bargain as one compact body with their employers. They have generally decided that this end cannot be attained, without their insisting that, if wages are paid by time, there must be in each district a minimum rate of wage, that is a rate below which no member of the union may work till the rule is altered; and that if wages are paid by the piece, a detailed tariff for such payments must be agreed upon.

Firstly with regard to payment by time. Beginners, sick men, and old men are often allowed to work for less than the fixed rate: but if the union as a body is to make any bargain about the day’s wages, there must be some rate fixed for the time as a minimum rate for those who cannot shew that they are an exceptional case. Of course a specially able man may earn more than this rate. This minimum is not the same in all parts of the country; and some unions publish in their annual reports a statement of the current rate of wages in every district in which they have a lodge. For instance, the carpenters in 1873 report 20s. a week at Barnstaple and Taunton, about 28s. at Bristol, 28s. or 30s. at various northern towns and 37s. at London. Where the wages are high, the standard of efficiency which a man must attain in order to earn the current wages of the district is high. If then a member of the union at Bristol cannot get 28s. a week, he will be forbidden to work for less there, but the union will pay the expense of his going, say, to Taunton where he will be able to get employment at the current wages. On the other hand an exceptionally able carpenter in Taunton is likely to migrate to Bristol or London to get higher wages. By thus sending inefficient men to places where the standard of efficiency is low, and indirectly at least helping efficient men to go to places where it is high, unions help to perpetuate, if not to intensify, local inequalities of efficiency and therefore local inequalities of Time-wages.

Secondly with regard to piece-work. Where the work varies in character from day to day, so that no tariff can be agreed upon for it, the unions object to the system of piece-work. For under it the workman must be left unaided to make his bargain with his employer for each separate job : unless indeed he has to bargain with a piece-master who contracts with the employer to find the labour for doing a certain job*. Of the two the latter plan is the more distasteful to the unions; but they object to both. However even where no tariff can be fixed, the system of piece-work is making its way in spite of the opposition of the unions. For the ablest and strongest masters generally insist on it as necessary to enable them to carry out their plans freely, and to get their men to use their best energies; and such employers naturally beat in the race those who yield to the unions on this and other points. Where a tariff can be agreed upon, the unions do not generally oppose the system of piece-work. Piece-work is adopted almost universally in trades that make goods for exportation, partly because in many of them tariffs tan easily be framed, partly because the stress of competition is severest in these trades.

*This plan must not be confounded with the system under which a subcontract is taken by a gang of workmen with one of their members to act as spokesman. This system is a form of co-operation, and is not objected to by unions. See Book in. ch. ix.

Unionists however maintain that the system of piece-work sometimes makes men overwork and become prematurely old, and that it causes work to be done badly. These disadvantages really exist in a few trades, though seldom to any great extent. They say further that by increasing the amount of work done by each man it decreases the demand for labour, and so lowers wages. If the resistance to piece-work on this ground extends to all trades, it is an attempt to diminish production, and therefore to diminish the Wages-and-profits Fund, and therefore it can have no other end than that of diminishing wages generally: for there is no such thing as general overproduction*. If however it is confined to one trade, the temporary scarcity of labour in that trade may in a few cases cause it to gain at the expense of others. But this gain can only be temporary and must involve a greater injury to others**.

* See Book iii. ch. i. $ 4.
** See Book iii. ch. vii.

§ 11. Exactly the same three disadvantages are said to be inherent in long hours of labour. A man who labours habitually twelve or fourteen hours a day at work from which he gets no enjoyment might almost as well not live; it is better that he should work less and earn less. Unions desire that the Normal day’s work should be short; and that when a man works overtime he should be paid at a higher rate than for his Normal day. This plan would contribute much to the moral and social progress of the world. But its general adoption is hindered by the fact that where it has been introduced, the best workmen often insist on working overtime in order to earn high wages; so that an employer who does not habitually work overtime, loses his best men. This is a case in which the collective will of the union is overridden by the individual wills of its members.

Another obstacle to its adoption is that a continually increasing part of the outlay of the employer consists of interest on Fixed capital, and a sinking fund to replace such machinery as is superseded by new inventions. This part of his outlay is independent of the number of hours in the day’s work. It is to be feared that English workmen will not succeed in obtaining more rest and recreation without a great sacrifice of their incomes, unless they overcome their repugnance to one heroic remedy. That remedy is the gradual adoption of double shifts in trades in which much Fixed capital is employed. Many w manufacturers admit that if they could get two sets of men to work their machinery for eight hours a day each, they could afford to pay the men as high daily wages for the eight hours work as they now pay for ten hours, and yet make a better profit. No doubt certain practical objections can be urged against the plan: for instance, a machine is not so well cared for when two men share the responsibility of keeping it in order as when one man has the whole management of it; again, there would be a little difficulty in readjusting the office arrangements to suit a day of sixteen hours. But employers and their foremen do not seem to regard these difficulties as insuperable; and experience shews that workmen soon overcome the repugnance which they feel at first to double shifts. One set might end its work at noon, and the other begin then; or what would perhaps be better, one shift might work, say, from 5 a. m. to 11 a. m. and from 1.30 p.m. to 3.30 p.m.) the second set working from 11.15 a.m. to 1.15 p.m. and from 3.45 p.m. to 9.45 p.m.; the two sets might change places at the end of each week or month. There is not enough labour in England to allow such a plan to be adopted at once in all the workshops and factories for which it is suited : but as machinery is gradually worn out or antiquated, it might be replaced on a smaller scale. On the other hand, much new machinery that cannot be profitably introduced for a ten hours’ day, would be introduced for a sixteen hours’ day: being once introduced it would be improved on: the art of production would progress more rapidly; the Wages-and-profits Fund would increase; working men would be able to earn higher wages without tempting capital to migrate to countries where wages are lower, and all classes of society would reap benefit from the change.

§ 12. There seem to be very few unions that try to control the amount of work that each man does. But in many workshops social pressure is brought to bear on any one who works so hard as to set a standard of work higher than the others like; and no doubt the organization of unions often increases this social pressure. Again a foreman, if a member of the union, is apt to conceal the faults of the unionist workman, and to give them an undue preference over abler non-unionists. The control of a branch of a union has sometimes got into the hands of men who have used its machinery to obtain full wages for very little work; and though such cases are rare, the mischief which they cause is perhaps greater than that due to other kinds of union action which have attracted a larger share of public attention.

§ 13. Unions are rapidly growing out of the habit of rattening; that is of hiding, stealing or destroying the tools of an employer or a workman who offends against their rules. There is no sign of the disuse of the habit of picketing a place where the men have struck; that is of surrounding all entrances to it with men appointed to represent the interests of the union; but cases of intimidation on the part of these pickets are become rarer: they now confine themselves almost entirely to explaining to workmen who may be seeking employment, the nature and cause of the strike. The pickets appeal to their feelings of class patriotism, and endeavour to dissuade them from siding with the employers against the employed; offering them on the part of the union the repayment of all the expenses to which they may be put by abandoning their purpose.

The leaders of the unions have done good service in dissuading their followers from resisting the introduction of improved processes and machinery in many trades, particularly in those which are subject to foreign competition. When an employer displaces by a machine the special skill which men have spent their lifetime in acquiring, and which constitutes their whole capital, he generally exerts himself to prevent their sinking down to the level of unskilled labourers : if this were universally done the last plea for resistance to machinery would be removed. It is said that a union as intelligent as that of the compositors is inclined to resist the introduction of type-setting machines. And it is said that lawyers, who though not formally organized, are yet a more powerful body than any trades union, are not as energetic as they might be in the endeavour to simplify legal processes.

So far nothing has been said of the ambition which some unionists have to regulate trade so as to make it less liable to extreme fluctuations. It is quite true that if a plan for doing this can be discovered, working men are more likely to exert themselves to carry it through than employers are. For employers are very unwilling to submit to the restraint and control that would be necessary for carrying out such a plan; and, while vicissitudes of trade bring nothing but evil to working men, the excitements and the chances of sudden gains which they afford have an attraction for some employers. But no such plan has yet been proposed which seems to have any chance of success.