THE CRISIS IN DIPLOMACY

Then, we will look at the upheavals in diplomacy that have accompanied the onset and development of the crisis, from the split between Nixon/Kissinger and the Foreign Affairs Establishment through Carter's Trilateral foreign policy to the Byzantine problems of Reagan and Bush foreign policy. We will discuss the dual aspect of diplomacy: first, what is normally called "diplomacy" -the formal and informal, overt and covert negotiations among nation states for the resolution of interstate conflicts- (processes that almost never formally includes the citizenry of the countries concerned but is carried on by a small elite, mostly operating out of the public eye) and second, what we might call "internal diplomacy" that is to say an informal negotiation between that elite and its own citizenry. Failures of such diplomacy, failures in the "selling" of foreign policy at home, have led to fundamental political crises in various societies, including the United States. The most important example in the post-World War II era, of course, was that of the Vietnam War. The failure of internal diplomacy resulted in massive upheaval at home that undercut foreign policy abroad and contributed to the collapse of the Keynesian period as a whole. The "Vietnam Syndrome" of skepticism and opposition to foreign policy objectives and methods continued in the 1970s and 1980s probably preventing a number of cases of overt American intervention in various parts of the world (e.g. in Southern Africa in the 1970s, in Central America in the 1980s).

The conflicts over Vietnam policy worked their way from the streets into the intersanctums of the foreign policy making elite which became divided over how to get out of the quagmire and social trauma of the war. This led to Lyndon Johnsons resignation and subsequent conflicts between the elite and the Nixon administration whose foreign policies were being mannaged by Henry Kissinger. But the main attacks on Nixon/Kissinger were not based on fundamental disagreement with most of their policies. They originated in the growing isolation and hence inefficiencies of the administration's foreign policy making procedures and approaches to diplomacy, not only around the Vietnam War but also over relations with America's major allies, the Europeans and the Japanese. The diplomatic methods of the Nixon Administration were judged to be threatening the stability of the North Atlantic and North Pacific alliances. The attacks led to the creation of Foreign Policy magazine, the Trilateral Commission and Jimmy Carter's presidency.

During Carter's term in office members of the Trilateral Commission occupied most of the important positions in the State Department and other foreign policy wings of his administration. Despite their critiques of Nixon/Kissinger diplomacy, this new group failed to mend the rifts that had been opened in American relations with its allies and the Third World.

The Reagan Administration repeated some of the unilateralist errors of the Nixon/Kissinger period as well as inventing new ones of its own; partly, as Authur Schlesinger suggests in one of the articles listed below, because its ideological blinders prevented it from recognizing options, partly because of chronic internal discord and infighting within the administration and partly because of a preference for force over diplomacy among many in the administration concerned with foreign affairs. Unlike the Nixon/ Kissinger period, however, the Reagan Administration could draw systematically on a newly constituted "counter-establishment" of Right-wing thinktanks and policy critics. The most dramatic element of Reagan Administration foreign policy making, of course, was the way it circumvented its failure to gain congressional support for its war against Nicaragua by constituting a secret government -whose discovery led to the Irangate scandal and a further delegitimization of the executive branch in the eyes of many citizens.

The Bush Administration’s early foreign diplomatic efforts benefited enormously from the Revolutions of 1989-1990 which were neither of its making nor within its control. Despite the way in which that series of events belied every Right-wing prognostication (e.g., those of Jeanne Kirkpatrick) about the impossibility of change within the communist block, the administration adapted to the new "post-cold war period" by developing new relations with the Soviet Union and the excommunist countries of Eastern Europe -largely by supporting Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and peristroika.

In other parts of the world, especially the Middle East, the Bush Administration, like its predecessors, contributed little or nothing to the resolution of the region’s problems and tensions. American support for the Iraqis in their war with Iran contributed to the stalemate of that situation but did nothing to resolve the long standing Palestinian problem which accentuated with the explosion of the Intifada and a decided shift to the hard-line right in Israeli internal politics.

In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Administration achieved remarkable diplomatic success by forming an anti-Iraqi coallition through the U.N. (especially one that included several Arab countries) and then leading that coallition into the war against Iraq with support from Congress - something the U.S. had not been able to do since the Korean war in the 1950s. On the other hand, its ability to gain support abroad among foreign ruling elites through intimidation (threatening the cut-off of aid) or payoffs (canceling debt or promising more aid) was not replicated at the popular level either at home or abroad, prior to the war. Its refusal to negotiate a settlement with Iraq and its failure to convince vast numbers of the need for war led to the emergence of a world-wide anti-war movement even before the war started. In comparison, in the case of the Vietnam War it took years before such a movement mobilized to the same level of opposition -a mobilization which, it will be remembered, provoked tremendous internal instability in many countries and brought about both an end to the war and a political-military defeat of the U.S. In the case of the Persian Gulf, the much more rapid mobilization provoked a military strategy designed to achieve quick victory that minimized American deaths (air bombardment), slaughtered Iraqi draftees in Kuwait, destroyed Iraqi social infrastructure causing widespread civilian deaths and left Saddam Husein in power. The creation and maintinance of a U.N. blockade and of no-fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq provided the rationale for sustaining the long-desired American policy objective of a continuing military presence throughout the Persian Gulf area.

The Clinton Administration has, to a considerable degree, followed in the steps of its predecessor. The Administration backed the air strikes against Iraq ordered by President Bush in his last days and gives every indication of persuing similar policies in the Middle East. Clinton also successfully continued the Bush push for a new GTT accord and for NAFTA. As Bush backed Gorbachev, so Clinton has backed Yeltsin in the internal conflicts of Russia -but not without growing criticism. Therefore analysis of the Bush record is of immediate interest in assessing the future of Clinton policy. Our examination of the backround and politics of the Persian Gulf War will continue, and deepen, in the subsequent section on the "energy crisis".

I. BACKGROUND ON THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

A. The Structure and its evolution

• *Silvia, "In Praise of Conspiracy Theory" Midnight Notes, #9, May 1988.

  A poem that expresses the anger many feel over the workings of a policy making apparatus that not only excludes most from participating but aims to buttress the power of the few over the needs of the many.

• Kathryn S. Olmstead, Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, World War I to 9/11", New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

  While there are many books about various conspiracies, some real, some not; there are few scholarly works that analyze both. This book by a professor of history at the University of California at Davis assesses and analyzes both, showing that the willingness of many to believe in the existence of unproved conspiracies - especially on the part of the US government - is understandable given the proven existence of previous conspiracies, e.g., various theories of Bush Administration participation in or passive acceptance of the distruction of the world trade towers on 9/ll to justify an invasion of Iraq is understandable given the now known plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out terrorist attacks against Americans to justify an invasion of Cuba. She writes, "for all their seeming outlandishness, the successive generations of antigovernment conspiracy theorists since World War 1 have at least one thing in common: when they charge that the government has plotted, lied, and covered up, they're often right." Unlike Silvia's poem above, however, Olmstead's work is constricted to conspiracies where "two or more people colude to abuse power or break the law" and does not extend to the more general phenomenon of both corporate and government policy making that, as Silvia points out, more often than not takes place in secret.

• *William Domhoff, "How the Power Elite Make Foreign Policy," The Higher Circles, 1970. Available through ERes (Student Summary).

  Short overview, by a sociologist, of the foreign policy establishment: who is in it and how it operates. This book was written before the rise of the Right-wing "counter-establishment" and therefore does not take it into account. Nevertheless many of the characteristics of the old establishment which Domhoff delineates, especially its modes of operation (out of the public eye and among a self-reproducing elite) also apply to new Right-wing groups. The article begins: "This essay will attempt to show that American foreign policy is initiated, planned, and carried out by members and organizations of a power elite that is rooted in and serves the interests of an upper class of rich businessmen and their descendents." He goes on to study the functioning of such elite private institutions as: The Council on Foreign Relations (which publishes Foreign Affairs magazine), the Committee for Economic Development, and the RAND Corporation - all financed by private corporate money, either directly or through corporate foundations (e.g., Rockefeller, Ford). He also examines the key government units (all in the executive branch): the National Security Council, the CIA, the State and Defence Departments, and special government appointed committees (e.g., the Gaither Committee and the Clay Committee). He shows the processes through which these public and private institutions define the problems and the range of discussable solutions, delegate research responsibility and funding, asesses and discuss the results of research and make policy recommentations to the president. The then makes the case that neither the Congress nor the public are generally included in any of these processes. His analysis, being published in 1970 obviously predates the devisive splits in the establishment and Watergate which led to Congressional constraints on Presidential latitude in policy making and thus augmented the role of Congress somewhat. However, despite the duplication of the private institutions by the Right Wing, the basic fabric of discussion and decisionmaking he describes still holds, even today - although for a discussion of the implications of the splits see: Destler, Gelb and Lake below.

• N. Chomsky, "Foreign Policy and the Intelligentsia," from Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How we Got There. (Student Summary

  Whereas Domhoff touches on the role of intellectuals in foreign policy making, Chomsky is more interested in their role in justifying and white washing the process ex-post. This is their "ideological" role in the most pejorative sense and different (though not unrelated) to the role Domhoff focuses on: that of confronting real problems of governance and coming up with solutions.

• *G. Hodgson, "The Establishment," Foreign Policy, #10, Spring 1973. Available through ERes, (Student Summary)

  In case you think radicals are paranoid and guilty of "conspiracy analysis," check out this discussion of the split within the establishment over Vietnam and between the Nixon White House and everyone else, written by and published in a major establishment journal. Interestingly, spokespersons for the establishment have only begun to recognize its very existence as it has been thrown into crisis.

• *Thomas L. Hughes, "The Twilight of Internationalism," Foreign Policy, 61, Winter 1985-86. Available through ERes, (Student Summary)

  Partly a critique of current conservative foreign policy, but mainly of interest here for the pessimistic description of the decline of the liberal establishment's monopoly on foreign policy. Hughes is President of the Carnegie Endowment, a major institution of the liberal establishment.

• *I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, Chapter II: "From Establishment to Professional Elite" [pdf version], (Student summary).

  An interesting account of the "crisis" of the old elite and an assertion that it has been replaced by a newer, younger, more fragmented one--written by members of the latter. Compare with Hodgson and Hughes, both of whom are cited in this chapter. Contrast with the lecture covering this material that will argue that what has emerged is not a "professional elite" but counter-establishments.

• *I.M. Destler, "The Power Brokers", Foreign Affairs, September - October, 2005. [pdf version],

  This article is a review of David Rothkopf's book Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, 2005. Destler, one of the authors of Our Own Worst Enemy cited above, is now Director of the Program on International Security and Economic Policy at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. This piece (and Rothkopf's book if you have the time) provides useful detail beyond Domhoff's cursory discussion of the National Security Council and its evolving role within the executive center of foreign policy decision making and execution.

• Chris Mooney, "Good Company: It's time for the CIA and scholars to work together. Again." The American Prospect, Vol. 13, No. 21, November 18, 2002.

  Mooney lays out the conservative case for collaboration between university scholars and the CIA. He argues that the CIA needs academic expertise and should be willing to be less secretive to get it. He recognizes how past CIA actions - such as overthrowing democratically elected governments - has alienated many academics but argues that as the nation comes closer to "facing war or collective danger" it is "positively desirable for academics to work for the government." He does not, however, deal with the way such reasoning has been used in the past to draw academics into activities that many have judged "undesirable" for the nation as a whole. Some bio-info on Mooney.

• David N. Gibbs, "The CIA is Back on Campus: Spying, Secrecy and the University", Counterpunch, April 7, 2003.

  Gibbs, a political science professor, lays out the case against academic collaboration with the CIA and other US intelligence agencies. After sketching the history he points to five "problems" to support his case. First, the idea that academic researchers should be autonomous from the state in order to be able to "present critical analyses of official policy." (See Emmanual Kant's essay making this case in more detail.) Second, he points to the CIA's history of overthrowing governments, assassinations and gross human rights abuses as activities with which academics should not associate themselves. Third, he points out that while university scholars are, in principle, seeking "truth", the CIA et al regularly engage in "black propaganda" or disinformation and taking part would compromise scholars' objectivity and integrity. Fourth, he argues that the CIA's habitual practices of secrecy with no accountability contradicts academic standards of "open inquiry and research". Fifth, he argues that working with the CIA et al would create conflicts of interest, e.g., create a bias in research and writing away from dealing with various CIA and other US government nefarious activities.

B. Some Academic Case Studies

1. Sinews of Empire: the founding

• David Horowitz, "Sinews of Empire," Ramparts, 8, 1969, pp. 33-41. [pdf version], Student Summary

  An article exploring capitalist investment and shaping of higher education for policy research. The article focuses on how the foreign policy elite, through the Ford and other Foundations, created "area studies" to gather and process information necessary to foreign policy making while producing experts able to help the state assess problems and formulate solutions. In short, how whole new branches of scholarship were bought and paid for by supporting scholars whose work was judged useful and marginalizing those whose work was not. As Horowitz writes: "In the control of scholarship by wealth, it is neither necessary nor desirable that professors hold a certain orientation because they receive a grant. The important thing is that they receive the grant because they hold the orientation." Such is the limited scope for "academic freedom". not.

2. Economists and the Indonesian Massacre

• David Ransom, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre," Ramparts, Vol. 9, No. 4, October 1970, pp. 26-28, 40-49. [pdf version], Student Summary; David Ransom, "Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia," in Steve Weissman, ed., The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid, Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1975 (revised edition), pp. 93-116. "Rumors, Plots, and Conspiracies: The Ramparts Article, in Ford Foundation, Celebrating Indonesia: Fifty Years with the Ford Foundation, 1953-2003 , New York: Ford Foundation, 2003.

  Case study of elite building - in this case the creation of a team of elite economic policy makers. How the US trained and prepared the elite which took over Indonesia during and after the largest massacre in post-WWII history at that time. (The subsequent massacres in Cambodia were perhaps larger.) The "Berkeley Mafia" was the description given by that elite to themselves - many of whom had been trained at Berkeley. The first article was published in Ramparts Magazine and caused a furor in Indonesia and with the Ford Foundation. The second -"Ford Country" - is a revised, footnoted version published in a collection of articles on foreign aid. Thirty-three years after Ransom's article was first published it was still being denounced by the Ford Foundation in a history of its involvement in Indonesia called Celebrating Indonesia.

3. Vietnam and the University of Michigan

• Warren Hinckle, Robert Scheer and Sol Stern, "The University on the Make [or, How MSU helped arm Madame Nhu"], Ramparts, April 1966. [pdf version].

  A critical account of Michigan State University's "Vietnam Project" in which it contracted to train the police forces of the American-constructed new South Vietnam government, provided cover for CIA operatives and later tried to deny the whole thing. This story has particular salience at a time (2006-2007) when the United States is scrambling, once again, to train the police (and army) of another self-constructed government; this time in Iraq. An introduction by economist, and participant, Stanley Sheinbaum laments the readiness of both MSU and its professors to sell their souls for big bucks, prestige and promotions.

4. Anthropology and Counterinsurgency

• David Price, "Anthropologists as Spies", The Nation, November 20, 2000.

  Short account of history of anthropologists acting as spies for the government and private corporations from WWI to the first Gulf War. Price recalls Franz Boas' condemnation of such practices and traces the evolution of the American Anthropological Associations ethical position from avoidance to condemnation to current tolerance. He calls for a return to condemnation.

• David Price, The American Anthropological Association and the CIA?", Anthropology News, November 2000, pp. 13-14.

  Two page sketch of a secret AAA agreement with the CIA in the early 1950s to create a roster-data base of AAA members and their areas of expertise for the Company's use. Price would go on to write a book: Threatening Anthropology: McCarthyism and the FBI's Surveillance of Activist Anthropologists, Duke University Press, 2004, about the flip side of these kinds of relationships, i.e., where anthropologists who refused to work for the state and acted autonomously were spied on and persecuted by the state.

• Eric R. Wolf, Joseph G. Jorgensen, "Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand," The New York Review of Books, Vol. 15, No. 9, November 19, 1970.

  This coverstory and special supplement was based on secret documents liberated from complicit professors' files by students seeking to expose and rupture links between their universities and the US government's counterinsurgency efforts in Thailand during the Vietnam War.

• Delmos J. Jones, Peter Hinton, Reply by Wolf and Jorgensen, Anthropology on the Warpath: An Exchange, New York Review of Books, Vol. 17, No. 1, July 22, 1971.

  Two comments by two individuals mentioned in the original article with a reply by the authors.

• "CIA Seeks Anthropologists", Anthropology Today, Vol. 20, No. 4, August 2004.

  Half page notice in Anthropology Today about CIA trying to recruit anthopologists and a new program ([Republican Senator]Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars) to fund graduate students - who must promise to go to work for the Company upon graduation.

• David Glenn, "Cloak and Classroom", Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 51, No. 29, March 25, 2005.

  Fairly detailed account of the conflict over the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP)presenting the arguments of both its creators-supporters and its critics.

• "Anthropologists as Spies: A response to 'CIA seeks anthropologists', Anthropology Today, Vol. 21, No. 3, June 2005.

  First, Felix Moos - the original source of PRISP - argues for closer collaboration between academia, themilitary and the intelligence community. Second, Richard Fardon, outgoing Chair of the [British] Association of Social Anthropologists, warns that the kind of closer connections between American anthropologists and the CIA, e.g., PRISP, would lead non-American anthropologists to distance themselves from their US counterparts. "Internaional networks," he argues are vital, and "their promotion relies upon trust that we all enjoy some distance from our home states." Third, Hugh Gusterson of MIT argues that PRISP secrecy violates academic norms of openness and anthropological ethics that not only demand openness but the protection of studied subjects - given the proclivity of the CIA and other intelligence agencies to use information against anyone opposed to US policies.

• "The Ethics of Spying", Anthropology Today, Vol. 21, No. 4, August 2005.

  Laszlo Kurti, Secretary of the European Association of Anthopologists, points out that while anthopologists have often worked for governments, this does not mean "they must blindly follow the conservative ideology or political aspirations of the government of the day". He also points out that in the EAA, spying is in conflict with its stated principles of informed consent and members can be expelled for doing so. Peter Nau of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Studies, argues that in general covert spying would violate existing ethical rules but also says situations might be "so urgent that covert operation is justified." Bartholomew Dean embraces a "partisan anthropology" that coludes witht he state and claims that PRISP does NOT involve "the covert placing of CIA trainees in anthropological undergraduate programs", that "PRISP students are not required to keep their participation secret." Richard Fardon responds that just because they are not "required" to keep participation secret does NOT mean that they will invariably disclose that participation.

• David H. Price, "Quietly selling anthropology to the CIA", Anthropology Today, Vol. 21, No. 5, December 2005.

  Price points out that PRISP is only one of a number of programs through which the CIA and other US intelligence agencies are seeking to "harvest" young anthropologists and track them into working for the state. He suggests that the AAA's membership's passivity in the face of these efforts involves "overlooking the CIA's history of torture, terror and covert global support for anti-democratic movements." "Do anthropologists," he asks, "really want to collaborate in conquest and occupation?"

• Heike Schaumberg, "Colonialism in the 21st Century" , Anthropology Today, Vol. 22, No. 5, October 2006.

  Heike Schaumberg of the University of Manchester (UK) recalls all the anthropological studies that have revealed the roles of US intelligence agencies in supporting repressive governments, e.g., the "Dirty War" in Argentina, and calls for a "concerted international campaign" against PRISP and any other efforts to subvert anthropological work away from the protection of the subjects of study and toward their repression.

• David H. Price, "American Anthropologists Stand Up Against Torture and the Occupation of Iraq", Counterpunch, November 20, 2006.

  Price reports on the November 2006 meeting of the AAA's business meeting where resolutions against the US occupation of Iraq and condemning the Bush administrations use of torture and the use of anthropological knowledge to design torture. He also reports movement towards the re-democratization of the Association's own organization.

• Roberto J. Gonzalez, "We Must Fight the Militarization of Anthropology", The Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 53, No. 22, February 2, 2007.

  Roberto Gonzales, one of the authors of the anti-torture resolutions presented to the November 2006 business meeting of the AAA (see above), argues that current US military and intelligence use of anthopology in devising new methods of torture should be opposed. "We also hope that [discussion of the use of the social sciences in torture] will prompt us to directly confront - and resist- the militarization of the social sciences at the critical juncture in the history of the American Academy."

II. CRITIQUE OF NIXON/KISSINGER DIPLOMACY

George Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World, (1976), Part 1 on "Cleaning up the abberations," especially chapter 1.

An attack on Nixon/Kissinger diplomacy from a foremost member of the old East Coast U.S. foreign policy establishment. Kissinger, himself a part of that establishment, is criticized for trying to go-it-alone and failing to draw on the resourses of the insitutions created in the post-WWII period. The result, Ball argues, is an inability to do the job right, no matter how brillant and individual Kissinger may be.

J. P. Leacacos, "Kissingers' Apparat," and J. M. Destler "Can One Man Do?" Foreign Policy, #5, Winter 1971-72.

Two articles that analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the Nixon Kissinger foreign policy apparatus--with largely negative conclusions.

F. Duchene, et. al., The Crisis of International Cooperation, 1974.

Trilateral Commission overview of the breakdown in international diplomacy -specially in American - West European and American - Japanese relations- which led to the creation of the Comission. The crisis is partly attributed to overall international crisis, partly to Nixon/Kissinger diplomatic failures. The thrust of the article is the call for the reparation of diplomacy within the framework of a new era.



*Christopher Hitchens, "The Case Against Henry Kissinger, Part I, Part II " Harper's Magazine, February and March 2001.

Synopsis of Hitchen's book, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, delineating Kissinger's role in various crimes. Hitchens was going to title the book Henry: Portrait of a Serial Killer but decided it might alienate some potential readers.

Christopher Hitchens et al, "Regarding Henry Kissinger: A Panel Discussion on the making of a war criminal," Harper's Magazine Online, February 22, 2001.

Hitchens is the author of a recent book The Trial of Henry Kissinger, that lays out the case for indicting Kissiner for war crimes.

*The Trial of Henry Kissinger, a film.

Peter Kornbluth (ed) The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New York: New Press, 2003, 528pp.

This dossier is made up, mostly, of documents, often top-secret, released at the order of President Clinton in 1999 and 2000. They document in much greater detail than Hitchen's book, "The Case Against Henry Kissinger" and against Richard Nixon and the United States government as well. Also see Kenneth Maxwell's commentary on the Kornbluth collection: "The Other 9/11, The United States and Chile, 1973", Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003.

*Henry Kissinger, "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction," Foreign Affairs, July - August 2001. Available through ERes

Kissinger's attack on legal innovations that many want to use against him.

*Kenneth Roth, "The Case for Universal Jurisdiction," Foreign Affairs, September - October 2001.Available through ERes

A critical response to Kissinger's attack by the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, a major international human rights organization.

III. CRITIQUE OF CARTER/TRILATERAL DIPLOMACY

George Ball, "Reflections on a Heavy Year," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59(3), 1981.

A critical appraisal of the shortcomings of Carter's diplomacy. The failure of this Trilateral Administration to live up to its promises.

L. R. Morris, "Jimmy Carter's Ruling Class," Harpers, October 1977.

A series of articles on the emergence of the Trilateral Commission and Jimmy Carter. Also see the last chapter in Shoup and Minter.

Holly Sklar, ed. Trilateralism; The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management (Boston, South End Press, 1980)

Collection of articles analysing the creation, activities and policies of the Trilateral Commission from a radical left perspective. The only book on the subject.

IV. CRITIQUE OF REAGAN/RIGHT-WING DIPLOMACY

A. The Right Spokesmen

• Norman Podhoretz, "The Future Danger," Commentary, April 1981.

  Important, widely discussed, neoconservative statement of the nature of the world and how to deal with it. Podhoretz, the editor of Commentary, is, along with Irving Kristol, the editor of The Public Interest and Melvin Lasky, the editor of Encounter, a central spokesman for that neoconservative approach to policy which has been so influential in the Reagan Administration.

• Michael Ledeen, "How to Support the Democratic Revolution," Commentary, V.79, No. 3, March 1985.

  Ledeen, a fellow at Georgetown's conservative Center for Strategic and International Studies, spells out one of the themes of conservative foreign policy which is currently under attack by much of the liberal establishment: the ideology of "the democratic revolution."

B. The Critics

Thomas L. Hughes, "Up From Reaganism," and C. Fred Bergsten, "The Costs of Reaganomics," both in Foreign Policy, 44, Fall 1981.

These two articles, by the president of the Carnegie Endowment and the head of the IIE respectively, are early efforts to point out the errors of Reagan foreign policy. Hughes attacks Reagan's ineptitude in dealing with American allies and Bergsten shows how Reagan's economic policies, by being concerned only with domestic issues to the neglect of their impact on the rest of the world (especially Western Europe), are undermining out foreign relations as well as the world economy.

• *Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No.1, Fall 1983.Available through ERes

  The author examines the history of American foreign policy in terms of a dichotomy between empirical/pragmatic approaches and dogmatic/ideological approaches. He sees Reagan diplomacy as wholeheartedly ideological and therefore subject to all the perils and pitfalls such a perspective can bring.

• Alan Tonelson, "The Real National Interest," Foreign Policy, 61, Winter 1985-86, pp.49-72.

  Tonelson, editor of Foreign Policy, blasts Reagan diplomacy for its reactivation of a second cold war that fails to set priorities in American "vital interests."

• Christopher Layne, "The Real Conservative Agenda," Foreign Policy , 61, Winter 1985-86, pp. 73-93.

  A "conservative" critique from the right wing of the liberal establishment. Layne echos Tonelson's complaint about lack of priorities and calls for limitations on American interventions abroad, for both political and economic reasons.

• Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert Gould, Rollback! Right-wing Power in the U.S. Foreign Policy, Boston: South End Press, 1989. Especially, Chapters 3: "The Global Rollback Network," and 4: "The Reagan Doctrine: Third World Rollback."

  Left-wing analysis of the rise, motives and policies of the new Right-wing "counterestablishment" that put Reagan in the White House and managed his foreign policy. Chapter 3 gives a useful overview of the historical origins -going back to the China Lobby- and scope of this new organizational network. Chapter 4 spells out the ideology which played so central a role in Reagan policy.

• Joel Brinkley and Stephen Engelberg (eds) Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran Contra Affair, New York, Times Books, 1988.

  The executive summary of the majority report condemns the Reagan adminstration's actions. The minority statement downplays the seriousness of the charges.

• Douglas Kellner, Television and the Crisis of Democracy, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. Especially the appendices on "The October Surprise," "The Iran/Contra Scandal" and "The Big Coverup: Bush and the 1988 Elections."

  Detailed critique of mainstream media’s lack of coverage of the dirtiest details of Reagan-Bush foreign policy and domestic coverups.

V. CRITIQUE OF BUSH DIPLOMACY IN THE GULF CRISIS

A. The Political Economics and Power Politics of the Gulf Crisis

*Joe Stork and Ann M. Lesch, "Why War? Background to Crisis," Middle East Report, November-December 1990, pp. 11-18. Summary Available through ERes

Sketch of regional historical background to the Persian Gulf War: the colonial heritage, imperialism and oil, the social character of Kuwait, the political dynamics of Iraq and the events and conflicts that led to war.

*Joe Stork and Martha Wenger, "The U.S. in the Persian Gulf: From Rapid Deployment to Massive Deployment," Middle East Report, January-February 1991, pp. 22-26. Summary Please note the box on "further resources on the Persian Gulf Crisis" at the end of this article. Available through ERes

Outline of the build up in U.S. military intervention in the Gulf area before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Sketch of history of efforts to directly or indirectly manage the region and protect American and Western control over oil. Information provided makes clear how rapid build-up after August 2, 1990 was made possible by previous construction and positioning of military capability with just such intervention in mind.

Fouad Ajami, "The Summer of Arab Discontent," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990-1991, pp. 1-20.

Johns Hopkins professor and CBS commentator, Ajami sketches, for the influential readers of Foreign Affairs, the background to the conflicts within which Iraq’s takeover of Kuwait occurred. He points out the widespread and deep Arab resentments of the oil states’ wealth (backed by Western supporters) but argues that after Iraq is contained "a buffer must be established between the dynastic states of the gulf and the Iraqi predators . . . that buffer wil have to be provided by American power, or by a multinational force centered around an essentially American core."

*Harry Cleaver, The Political Economics of the Gulf War, (pamphlet)January 1991.
(A version of this piece was published in the Polemist, December 1990 and in Austin Peace and Justice Coallition Newsletter, January 1991.)

Article sketching the political and political economic issues at stake in Bush’s drive to intervention and war in the Gulf.



Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, America & the World 1990-91, pp. 5-22.

Charles William Maynes, "A Necessary War?" Foreign Policy, No. 82, Spring 1991, pp. 159-177.

Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck (eds.) Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991.

This is an extremely useful collection of materials that includes a detailed chronology and several key documents, including the Glaspie-Hussein transcript where Hussein speaks of a $25/barrel oil price and Glaspie responds "We have many Americans who would like to see the price go above $25 because they come from oil-producing states." [Such as George Bush.] It also contains the infamous Glaspie to Hussein "But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait" (p. 395).

*On the U.S. diplomatic management of the war through the United Nations see chapter 9: Phyllis Bennis, "False Consensus: George Bush's United Nations", pp. 112-125.

*Midnight Notes Collective, Midnight Oil: Work, Energy, War, 1973-1992, New York: Autonomedia, 1992, "Introduction", "1. Oil, Guns and Money", "To Saudi with Love: Working Class Class Composition", 3. Recolonizing the Oil Fields."

Midnight Notes analysis of the sources and meaning of the Gulf War -an analysis arguing that behind the "oil war" lies a deeper crisis: that of control over the oil producing proletariat.

B. Language, Media and Domestic Diplomacy of the Gulf War

Noam Chomsky, "Letter From Lexington [On Media Forgetfulness of Past U.S. Subversion of U.N. Peacekeeping], Lies of Our Times, November 1990.

A short piece mocking the New York Times and other mainstream media for convienently forgetting everything it has known about U.S. efforts to prevent the U.N. from intervening against international aggressions supported by the U.S.

Edward Herman, "GulfSpeak," Z-Magazine, January 1991, pp. 46-48.

Account of Orwellian character of Bush Administration and Mass Media propaganda.

Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Book analysing in considerable detail the manner in which the Mainstream did, and did not, report and analyze the emergence and prosecution of the Gulf Crisis from the Iraqi invasion through the U.S. led war. Kellner, a philosophy professor at UT, continuously taped all network coverage of the crisis starting with the Iraqi invasion and used those tapes, as well as other sources as the point of departure of his analysis.

VI. CLINTON AND POST-COLD WAR DIPLOMACY

John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 102-122.

Gaddis, well-known for his historical studies of the origins of the cold war, suggests that the cold war tensions between "democracy" [western capitalism, USA] versus totalitarianism [soviet- style capitalism, USSR] is being replaced by tensions between the contradictory forces of "integration" and those of "fragmentation". What is required therefore, is the development of new ways of thinking and acting so as to balance these forces in ways conducive to peace and the welfare of all. In other words, if either force becomes dominant there can be significant negative consequences, e.g., unlimited international markets can have harmful local effects (deindustrialization and falling standards of living), unconstrained ethnic hostitlities can be murderous (Yugoslavia).

Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Presidency and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991-92, pp. 120-137.

Ambrose, History Professor at the University of New Orleans, assesses the foreign policy successes and failures, strengths and weaknesses of all presidents since 1941. He begins by noting that the "commitments made by Roosevelt and Truman in the 1940s [to Western Europe and to Japan] remain the bedrock of American foreign policy." (p. 121) After sketching the history [which those unfamiliar with the history might find useful] , he concludes: "the great lesson is that secrecy and surprise are the enemies of democracy; open and prolonged debate are the great power of democracy. The policies that have failed have tended to be those adopted by presidents without meaningful debate . . . The policies that have succeeded have been adopted by Congress and the people after meaningful debate." (p. 136)

Martin Walker, "The Establishment Reports", Foreign Policy, No.89, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 82-95.

An overview and evaluation of a series of articles and reports from the "establishment" about the future direction of American foreign policy. Walker, editor of the English Guardian, finds current foreign policy reassessments in America beset by hypochonria.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute for International Economics, "Special Report: Policymaking for a New Era", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 175-189.

Adapted from a memorandum to President-elect Clinton, this article proposes a variety of changes in the organization of the White House, and executive branch more generally, to improve the efficiency of policy making. Central to these suggestions is the perception of the need to refocus foreign policy on economic issues and away from traditional, narrow, notions of "national security". Central to the recommendations is the creation of two separate Councils, Economic and Domestic, to balance out the National Security Council. The head of these three councils would be the president's "work horses, the senior team through which to forge and coordinate new policies" (p. 179) and "would largely supplant formal cabinet sessions". (p. 182) The report goes on to recommend a strong chief of staff, an available (i.e., untied to any one assignment) vice-president, and the reorganization of responsibility for trade, competitiveness and environment in the executive branch. Trade should be in the hands of the U.S. trade representative, The Department of Commerce should be given responsibility for competitiveness (and stripped of some other roles) and the president should request Congress to create a Department of the Environment. The State Department should be reorganized to make it more efficient and the Defense Department should develop a dedicated capability to support U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking actions. Finally, special commission should be set up to study the reorganization of intelligence (CIA, etc.), foreign aid (AID) and federal nuclear laboratories (some 700 of them).

Alan Tonelson, "Clinton's World", The Atlantic Monthly, February 1993, pp. 71-74. Summary Available through ERes

Tonelson, now research director of the Economic Strategy Institute, suggests the need to abandon the assumptions of the Cold War and reorient foreign policy thinking in terms of "a world of multiple soverign political units" which "cannot be led or stabilized or organized or managed in any meaningful sense of those words". Along the way, he calls for the elimination of excessive secrecy, elite contempt for the man in the street and the illusion that the U.S. can do everything, everywhere.

Mark M. Nelson, "Transatlantic Travails", Foreign Policy, #92, Fall 1993, pp. 75-91.

An overview of the tensions and conflicts in North Atlantic diplomacy, the problem whose deepening provoked the formation of the Trilateral Commission almost 20 years ago. Nelson, a Berlin-based correspondent for the Wall Street Journal wrote this examination which is particularly interesting for rooting diplomatic problems in contradictory internal pressures.

Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz, "American Hegemony -Without an Enemy", Foreign Policy, #92, Fall 1993, pp. 5-23.

Layne from the Cato Institute (a conservative think-tank) and Schwartz from RAND (see notes on Domhoff above) sketch the problems of reformulating American foreign policy and diplomatic efforts for a new world order.

Charles William Maynes, "A Workable Clinton Doctrine", Foreign Policy , #93, Winter 1993-94, pp.3-20.

Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, January - February 1994, pp. 28-43.

Currently Dean at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, earlier Ambassador and Defense Undersecretary in the Reagan and Bush administrations, Wolfowitz compares Clinton with Warren Harding and Harry Truman, two presidents who got off to weak starts in foreign policy. He querries whether Clinton will wind up like Truman (strongly) or like Harding (poorly). He examines the strengths of Clinton's efforts (NAFTA, GATT) and the weaknesses (especially failure to develop adequate policies for the use of force). " . . . the ability of the United States to use force effectively -wherever it decides to do so- is itself a major interest of this country and is the foundatin of the substantial military stability among the major powers that th world enjoys today. This ability to use force has been jeopardized . . . " (p. 35)

VII. THE DIFUSION OF GRASSROOTS DIPLOMACY

A. Top-down Views of Grassroots Initiatives

*Michael H. Shuman, "Local Foreign Policies," Foreign Policy, 65 Winter 1986-87.Available through ERes

In the absence of a strong diplomacy in Washington, or in opposition to particular policies, local groups have pressured states and municipalities to take the initiative to develop foreign policy initiatives that bypass traditional channels.

*Cathryn Thorup, "The Politics of Free Trade and the Dynamics of Cross-Border Coalitions in U.S. Mexican Relations," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XXVI, No. 11, Summer 1991, pp. 12-26. Summary Available through ERes

At the time she wrote this article Thorup worked at the US-Mexican Center at the University of California at San Diego. Her primary focus was on the actions and impact of the anti-NAFTA network. She traced the development of opposition to and lobbying against the governments' "fast-track" approach to railroading NAFTA through Congress as well as elite efforts to divide and conquer those efforts. While calling the debate forced by grassroots opposition "healthy for both societies" (the U.S. and Mexico), she also highlighted the "tremendous vulnerability" of the state to such organizing and discussed how state policy makers might seek to convert such opposition into "valuable political allies" by consulting with them and cutting deals. Her vision of how the political system might deal with the emergence of these new rogue networks lay clearly in the tradition of "pluralism", i.e., integrate and co-opt the new forces into the existing fabric of "democracy".

*John Arguilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming!" Originally published in Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1993, pp. 141-165.

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt formulate two related concepts: cyberwar and netwar --in both of which the role of information is central and critical. The former refers to military war making while the latter refers to "societal-level ideational conflicts waged in part through internetted modes of communication", "most often associated with low intensity conflict". Their examples of cyberwar range from the Mongols to the Gulf War. One of their primary examples of netwar is how "advocacy movements" are "increasingly organizing into cross-border networks and coalitions, identifying more with the development of civil society (even global civil society) than with nation-states and using advanced information and communications technologies to strengthen their activities". While Arquilla and Ronfeldt cite movements concerned with environmental, human-rights and religious issues, the pro-Zapatista movement is clearly another example of the kind of activity they are conerned with. In their discussion the "other side" of such "netwar" is the state and its traditional hierarchical institutions of governance. With their writing directed primarily at the U.S. government --with which they clearly identify-- they warn that new forms of warfare must be developed appropriate to this new arena of power.

B. Bottom-up Views of Grassroots Diplomatic Initiatives

Howard Frederick, "Computer Networks and the Emergence of Global Civil Society," in Linda M. Harasim (ed) Global Networks: Computers And International Communication, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993. Available through ERes

Then director of PeaceNet, a computer network within the Net, Frederick draws on his experience within that grassroot network to discuss how the elaboration of these new organizational efforts constitute the emergence of a new kind of "global civil society" --a realm of active political life that lies outside both the formal political sphere of electoral politics and the private sphere of capitalist markets.

Harry Cleaver, "The Zapatistas and the Electronic Fabric of Struggle" in John Holloway and Eloina Pelaez (eds), Zapatista! Reinventinjg Revolution in Mexico, London: Pluto Press, 1998, pp. 81-103. Available at: .

Written from within the grassroots network of solidarity that has organized itself in support of democratic change in Mexico, and the transcendence of neoliberal capitalism more generally, this article assesses the bases for the emergence of this new terrain of struggle, both within the computer industry and within the mountains of Chiapas, Mexico. The asssessment includes not only a discussion of how the self-organization proceeded but also an evaluation of top-down views of this process including those in section VII/A above.

Harry Cleaver, "The Zapatista Effect: The Internet and the Rise of An Alternative Political Fabric," Journal of International Affairs, Spring 1998.

Written within the grassroots network of solidarity, but for a foreign affairs journal, this paper discusses the issues of this section of the course, namely how the Internet has played a role in the grassroots subversion of the nationstate monopoly of foreign policy and arranging international affairs. It discusses how the Zapatista network, analyzed in the previous article has reached beyond Mexican issues to inspire and organize a much wider challenging of mainstream economic and foreign policy in this period.

*Harry Cleaver, "Deep Currents Rising: Notes on the Global Threat to Capitalism," 2006 [pdf version] in Subverting the Present, Imagining the Future: Insurrection, Movement, Commons, New York: Autonomedia, 2007. (ISBN: 1570271844)

An essay on the international circulation of grassroots struggles against neoliberalism and against capitalism more generally that discusses both the phenomenon and various attempts to grasp its character.

C. One case: Local Laws against Corporations that do Business with Burma

All the following articles are available in an text file or a pdf file.

"Trade War over Burma," In These Times, February 17, 1997.

Report on EU and Japanese threats to go to the WTO over a Massachusetts ordinance baring state agencies from contracting with companies that do business with the vicious military junta in Burma.

Massachusetts Burma roundtable, "Cambridge Passes Burma Selective Purchasing Law," June 8, 1998.

Report on Cambridge City Council passing a "Burma selective purchasing resolution" and the text of the resolution.

"Burma: American Unions Call for Sanctions," ICEM Update, February 24, 1997.

Resolution by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) which is affiliated with the 20-million strong International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Union (ICEM) calling on Clinton to enact sanctions and American corporations to withdraw from Burmese investments. The resolution also supports local selective purchasing laws.

"Burma Sanctions: U.S. Union Action," ICEM Update, April 9, 1997.

Report on "3 Days for Burma" campaign organized by OCAW April 22-24 in conjunction with the United Mine Workers and the Free Burma Coalition (on 130 college campuses).

'U.S. Union Hails Burma Sanctions Victory," ICEM Update, April 23, 1997.

US limited sanctions were announced on eve of "3 Days for Burma" Campaign.

"European Parliament condemns WTO Complaint on Burma Law by European Commission," June 13, 1997.

Report on the European Parliament resolving that the Commission should "not take action against the Massachusetts selective purchasing law". Instead the Parliament urged European-side sanctions against the regime and those who do business with it. (The EU had withdrawn trade preferences from Burma in March 1997.)

"Letter from Union Presidents Defending Massachusetts Law on Burma," August 7, 1997.

Detailed letter to U.S. Representative Charlene Barshefsky about EU and Japanese attacks on Massachusetts law. Letter points out US sanctions recognize the illegitimacy of the Burmese military dictatorship and affirms the rights of the citizens of Massachusetts to decide criteria on how they spend their money.

"Free Trade" Challenge to Burma Sanctions: US, ICEM Update, August 8, 1997.

Report on Union letter and discussion of how "free trade" arguments are being used to undermine local democracy.

"Trade Unions say that EU trade action condones Burma's pariah state," International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) Online, Sept 21, 1998.

Report on European trade union attacks on EU efforts to use a WTO Disputes Panel against Massachusetts law.

"USA: Judge Strikes Down Burma Sanctions," ICFTU Online. November 5, 1998.

Report on Chief U.S.Districk Judge Joseph L.Tauro's ruling that the Massachusetts law is unconstitutional by infringing on federal government's power to regulate foreign affairs.

"ICEM North America Praises Los Angeles City Council for Passing Burma Selective Purchasing Law," , December 17, 1998.

Coming AFTER the federal court ruling against the Massachusetts ordinance, this decision can be seen as a defiance of the court and was celebrated by union and pro-Burma activists. Los Angeles also moved to draft an amicus brief in support of the Massachusetts law.

Michael Lelyveld, "Ruling on Sanctions Proves no Deterrent," Journal of Commerce Top News (On-line),

Report on LA decision to ban contracts with businesses that operate in Burma.

Ben Geman, "Supreme Challenge," The Boston Phoenix, July 15-16, 1999.

Report on Massachusetts appeal of Federal Court ruling on Burma Law to the Supreme Court of the United States.

New England Burma Roundtable, "Action Alert! Write Your State Attorney General and Member of Congress," September 21, 1999.

Call for mobilization of widespread support for Massachusetts Appeal.

Harrison Institute for Public Law, "Call for Amicus Support of Massachusetts," September 24, 1999.

Detailed analysis of case, appeals procedure, amicus briefs, examples of letters.

Leslie Miller, "Burma Law Supporters Stretch from Coast to Coast," AP, Oct 20, 1999

AP wire story on widespread support for banning trade with Burma, even beyond the US.

New England Burma Roundtable,"Final Tally on the Amicus Briefs, October 26, 1999.

List of numbers of various members of Congress, NGOs, state attorney generals, etc who filed amicus briefs.

New England Burma Roundtable, "Supreme Court Takes Massachusetts Burma Law Case," November 29, 1999.

Filing and appeal does not guarantee that the Supreme court will actually hear it. But in this case the Supreme Court did accept the appeal and will review it.

Linda Greenhouse, "Justices to Decide Foreign Policy Question in Massachusetts Boycott of Myanmar," New York Times, November 30, 1999.

Story addressing fundamental issue of distribution of foreign policy making power.

Dennis Berstein and Leslie Kean, "WTO and Forced Labor," San Francisco Bay Guardian, December 22, 1999.

Report on WTO/ILO manoeuverings on the subject of forced labor, including that in Burma.

VIII. CRITIQUE OF BUSH JR's DIPLOMACY


*Carnegie Endowment, Reconstructing Iraq Webpage.
Once called "Crisis in Iraq" this webpage was created by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to "help media, policy makers, scholars and the public better follow the complicated issues surrounding the situation in Iraq." The website is updated regularly. It also contains a link to the Endowment's report Iraq: A New Approach that contains the proposal for "coercive inspections" that was being applied by the UN in Iraq.

Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000.

More than a report outlining how to strengthen the US military, this book-length conservative essay bases its discusion of military needs on the premise that the "grand strategy" of the United States should be the maintenance and extension of what it frankly calls Pax Americana - global American dominance. This essay - that has reportedly played a key role in the formulation of Bush Jr. foreign policy - calls for the United States to create, and base throughout the world, the military muscle to manage multiple, simultaneous interventions, including both large-scale wars [such as an invasion of Iraq] and smaller "constabulary" actions [such as imposing "nation-building" order after such an invasion].

*Sebastian Mallaby, "Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire," Foreign Affairs, March-April 2002. Available through ERes

Washington Post editor on how the US should assert global leadership, although not entirely unilaterally.

Giles Trendle, "The Aftermath of Regime Change," The Middle East, August/September 2003.

Analysis of the results of "nation building" in Afghanistan 18 months after the US overthrow of the Taliban regime. As the opening line of the article suggests: the experience in Afghanistan has sobering implications for Iraq.

Dusko Doder, "How Not to Overthrow Saddam: The Bush Plan and the Alternatives," The American Prospect, July 15, 2002.

*Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Eagle Has Crashed Landed," Foreign Policy, July-Ausgust 2002. Available through ERes

Marina Ottaway, "Nation Building," Foreign Policy, September - October 2002.

*Jay Bookman, "The President's Real Goal in Iraq," The Atlantic Journal-Constitution, September 29, 2002. Available through ERes

Bookman's editorial is based on his reading to two documents: President Bus/h's National Security Strategy statment, and the right-wing document Rebuilding America's Defenses report on which he thinks the former is based. He argues that these documents - which the Bush Jr. adminstration is now trying to implement - lay out plans for a new globe-spanning "American Empire" - a new American imperialism.

*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.

This is the official statement of Bush Jr. foreign policy

*Donald Kagan,"Comparing America to ancient empires is 'ludicrous'," Atlantic Journal-Constitution, October 6, 2002. Available through ERes

Kagan was a director of the "Rebuilding American's Defenses" Project and ofters a rather lame response to Bookman's critique - a response that ignores, and therefore doesn't answer, many of Bookman's points.

John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," Foreign Policy, January - February 2003. Available through ERes

Another interpretation of Bush Jr.'s "National Security Strategy."

*Midnight Notes, Respect your Enemies - The First Rule of Peace: An Essay Addressed to the U.S. Anti-war Movement, 2002.

CNN, Ex-CIA head James Woolsey on Fourth World War, April 2, 2003.

*Subcomandante Marcos, What are the Characteristics of the Fourth World War?, November 20, 1999. Translated from Revista Rebeldia, February 2003.

*John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," Foreign Policy, January - February 2003. Available through ERes

George W. Bush, Jr., "State of the Union Address," January 2003. Also available through ERes

Partially a "state of the union" and partially a statement of the rationale for attacking Iraq. Compare with documents above.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS:

David Horowitz, "Billion Dollar Brains" and "Sinews of Empire," Ramparts, 8, 1969, pp. 33-41.

Two articles exploring capitalist investment and shaping of higher education and policy research. The second article focuses on how the foreign policy elite, through the Ford Foundation, created "area studies" to gather and process information necessary to foreign policy making while producing experts able to help the state assess problems and formulate solutions.

David Ransom, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre," Ramparts, Vol. 9, No. 4, October 1970, pp. 26-28, 40-49.

Case study of elite building -in this case the creation of a team of elite economic policy makers. How the US trained and prepared the elite which took over Indonesia during and after the largest massacre in post-WWII history at that time. (The subsequent massacres in Cambodia were perhaps larger.) The "Berkeley Mafia" was the description given by that elite to themselves -many of whom had been trained at Berkeley.

L. H. Shoup and W. Minter, Imperial Brain Trust, (1977). Especially the introduction and chapters 1-4, 6, 7.

The first book on what has always been, on the whole, the most important private "establishment" institution in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy: the Council on Foreign Relations.

Robert Conquest, Present Danger: Towards a Foreign Policy, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

Contribution to the Right-wing deluge of materials on the "present danger" , i.e., the immanent threat of communist assault by the Soviet Union and its minions. Conquest is an old Right-wing hand who here gathers together and sums up a lot of what he had written elsewhere. The Hoover Institution which published this book and at which Conquest was working is one of the oldest of the Right-wing think tanks, predating such late-comers as the Heritage Foundation.

Norman Podhoretz, The Present Danger, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980.

Sketch of Post-World War II foreign policy by one of the major spokesmen for the Reagan neo-conservative right-wing.

Alan Crawford, Thunder on the Right: The ‘New Right’ and the Politics of Resentment, New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

One of the first books to attempt an overview of the new Right-wing "counter-establishment". Crawford situates the "New Right" with respect both to the "Old Right" and to the American tradition of right-wing populism. He examines the themes of the New Right’s politics, such as home and family, as well as its ability to tap the resentment of the poor and middle class against the power-that-be.

Michael W. Miles, The Odyssey of the American Right, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

An overview of history of the Right Wing in the U.S. from opposition to the New Deal and internationalism through the McCarthy era to the New Right.

C.L.Heatherly (ed.) Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration, Washington D.C., 1981.

This is the huge operating manual delivered to the Reagan Administration by the Right-Wing Heritage Foundation. See the chapters related to foreign policy: 11: "The State Department", 28: "The Intelligence Community," Epilogue: "What the President Can Do by Executive Order."

Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: the Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, South End Press, 1983).

Examination of the right-wing lobby that has pushed for and obtained a major remilitarization under Carter and then Reagan.

Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council of Foreign Relations, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1984).

Mainstream answer to Imperial Brain Trust -- the non-radical interpretation of the history of the CFR and of its role in American policy making.

Robert A. McCaughey, International Studies and Academic Enterprise: A Chapter in the Enclosure of American Learning (Columbia University Press, New York, 1984).

Recent exploration of the elite creation of area studies, compare with Domhoff and Horowitz.

Richard Pipes, Survival is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984).

The Reagan Administrations guru on the Soviet Union. His book exemplifies much that the foreign policy establishment dislikes about the current White House ways of thinking about and dealing with the Soviets. Contrast with Strobe Talbott’s account below.

Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits, (Knopf, New York, 1984).

The "unofficial" history of the Reagan Administration's misdealing with arms control. Talbott's description of internal bickering and divisiveness in the Reagan Administration vividly illustrates the foreign policy elite's worst fears about putting second rate amateurs in charge of an important aspect of American foreign policy.

Stanley Hoffman, "Semi-detached Politics," New York Review of Books, November 8, 1984, pp. 34-36.

Critique of Reagan's "detachment" from foreign policy making and the dangers it implies.

Roy Gutman, "America's Diplomatic Charade," Foreign Policy, 56, Fall 1984, pp. 3-23.

Analysis of the Reagan Administration’s mismanagement or lack of seriousness with respect to Central American diplomacy as opposed to the use of force.

Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Guns of July," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 4, Spring 1986.

By the editor of the Washington Post, an article critiquing the Reagan "Doctrine" of "roll-back" and recent Congressional capitulation to that approach to dealing with the Soviets and with the Third World.

Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of how Terrorists, Nazis and Latin American Death Squads have Infiltrated the World Anti-communist League, New York: Dood, Mead & Co., 1986.

Despite the sensationalist sub-title, this is a useful account of the Extreme Right-Wing which connects more moderate conservative forces to hate-mongering, death dealing fascist groups around the world. This is the ugliest side of the American, indeed of the world’s, political spectrum in the realm of foreign and domestic policy.

Paul Gottfried and Thomas Fleming, The Conservative Movement, Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988.

This is an overview of the Right-Wing from within but on its Right-wing flank. Gottfried is a senior editor of the Moonie journal The World and I, Fleming is the editor of Chronicles, a Right-wing/neo-conservative publication. In this book they survey the post-World War II history of the "conservative movement" from the Old Right through neo-conservativism to the New Right.

Jerome L. Himmelstein, To The Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. See the Epilog "American Conservatism in the Bush Years".

This is a useful overview of the status of various parts of the Right-wing conservative movement at the beginning of the Bush Administration.

Flora Lewis, "The 'G-7.5' Directorate," Foreign Policy, No. 85, Winter 1991-1992, pp. 25-40.

Using the G-7 as a point of departure, Lewis surveys international attempts to reformulate new concepts of national sovereignty and supranational global management.

Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order: The Bush Administration may have a brand-new doctrine of power," The New Yorker April 1, 2002.