Rambo on the Barbary Shore

 

Midnight Notes #9, Midnight Notes Collective, Midnight Oil: Work, Energy, War

 

George Caffentzis

 

 

            The article discusses the consequences of the bombings in Nigeria, their U.S. precedents, and the resultant “arms for hostage” deals between U.S. and Iran. This discussion amplifies his point made in an earlier speech “Libya, Oil Price, and the U.S. Polled,” in which he discusses the necessity of the Libyan bombings and how the bombings were made possible.

Caffentzis explains the fall in the nominal price of oil in dollar terms had to be accompanied with the decline in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar, which would have otherwise caused the U.S. to fall into a recession.  The Saudi Arabians increasing oil production in late 1985 facilitated the drop in the price of oil, and since they are more dependent on the health of European and American markets than they are on the sale of oil, they were willing to allow the price to fall.

In the discussion of the decline of the U.S. dollar, the author attributes the decision, to allow the dollar to fall, to the conflict in South Africa. The bombings in South Africa began following a MOVE bombing in the U.S., which declared MOVE an urban terrorist group and thus deserving death. When the bombings persisted, the insurrections continued, leading to the depressing of the South African economy. As loans became due, the South African government declared a debt payment moratorium and the nation, in a state of emergency. Since the Reagan administration did not want the black struggle to escalate, this being the result should the administration decide to tighten South African capital, they decided instead to let the dollar fall, to enable the South African government more lenient repayment terms.

Although Saudi Arabia could decisively set the world price of petroleum in the short run, reactions from the two OPEC hawks, Libya and Iran, might not been favorable. While Libya was warned not to interfere with the Saudi price drop, Iran crafted a deal with the U.S. to purchase military equipment. Caffentzis calls it an “arms for oil price compliance” deal, not an “arms for hostage” deal as the Reagan junta would claim. However, while the “hostage situation” remains at standstill, oil prices continued to fall and arm shipments continued.

With respect to Nigeria and its debt, the IMF would grant a loan to Nigeria on conditions that Nigeria would devalue its currency, raise the domestic price of gasoline, and liberalize trade and foreign investment. The Nigerian government rejected the IMF loan as a result of boisterous local anti-loan demonstrations and anti-IMF protest. As the prices of oil began to fall, imports to Nigerian started to cease and tensions continued to rise as the IMF continued to pressure the Nigerian government. Finally the government adopted a Structural Adjustment Program, based on IMF conditions, this after several brutal killings.

In the discussion of the bombings on Tripoli and Benghaz, two problems may be identified. The author feels that Reagan’s elite explanation of this matter, that Libya was being punished for being the center of an international terrorist circle, may not be accepted. Secondly, he reasons why while the rest of the world disapproves of the attack, the U.S. expresses high approval ratings. The author claims that the definition of terrorism is impossible since a terrorist act, as defined by the U.S., is an act against U.S. interest. In contrast, this “terrorism” should be seen in terms of international oil prices. While Libyan and U.S. interest with respect to oil prices were always in agreement, 1981 marked the point in which the relationship turned antagonistic. Libyans wanted to raise the prices of oil while the U.S. wanted a stabilization of energy prices. The fact that the Libyans sat atop the oil does not give them ownership of the oil, and physical force would be used should there be an attempt to prevent prices from stabilizing.

In dealing with the second problem, which is the favorable attitude of the U.S. public to the raids, as measured by opinion polls, that could be interpreted as agreement to any future attacks. Since such polls are conducted by telephone or through mails, it assumes that those who participate have a residential address, have a telephone and are literate. However, following the recession years of 1980-1983, there was an increase in rates of homelessness, imprisonment, and illiteracy. Despite the increasing technology in communication, there is increasing isolation of the poor at the national and international level. In addition, Reagan has continually portrayed the situation in Libya as one that could be changed by highly technological, temporary military action, thus minimizing the loss of American life. The buying of such hi tech solutions has increased the U.S. deficit, and is ironically financed by the Third World of whom are targets of such hi tech weaponry. This is a result of moving production to where costs are minimized.

 

Summary by,

Michelle Lai