The principal argument of this article is that the G-7 (along with the former Soviet Union as a consulting member, thus G-7.5) represents the most effective forum of discussion and means of management to cope with the problems encountered in post-Cold War international relations.

The article commences by discussing the composition and purpose of the G-7. It proceeds to elaborate on the two principal tasks in contemporary international relations in which it is engaged: limiting the concept of national sovereignty and supporting the evolution of the state system. It discusses the unique roles of Germany and Japan and concludes by addressing the issue of sovereignty and self-determination.

The G-7.5 is the group of seven industrial nations (i.e. Germany, Japan, Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States + Russia as a consulting member and attended by a representative of the European Community) that meets annually at summits officially dedicated to economic matters. With the end of the Cold War and its “bipolar superpower” politics, the G-7 offers a more effective alternative to the “global town hall of the United Nations”. The group does not operate according to any set procedures but handles events on a case-by-case approach. It attempts to reach collective decisions based on the ‘shared’ values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and sound economic management. The group employs a “multilateral approach” and “preventive diplomacy” to handle international relations.

Contemporary international relations are characterized by evolving notions of national sovereignty and the state-system. Two ideas are currently challenging the traditional idea of sovereignty: ‘cooperative intervention’ (i.e. generally temporary joint efforts on the part of a group of nations to bring about military and/or humanitarian aims inside another sovereign nation) and ‘supranationalism’ (i.e. permanent, regulated pooling of resources and authority). The move towards supranationalism (e.g. the consolidation within the European Community) involves a voluntary forfeiture of state sovereignty in exchange for a collective capacity to handle problems that no single state could hope to overcome. This cooperation among the great powers (e.g. G-7) provides a less chaotic alternative to a world of shifting alliances (i.e. that so devastated Europe in WWI). It is also a more practical solution to the impossible attempt by one nation to police the world (i.e. the United States).

There is now a noticeable shift toward granting more importance to economic power over military power. This trend has led to a shuffling of the power pyramid. Although it remains a military power, Russia has been largely marginalized due to the collapse of the Soviet economy. As a consequence of WWII and the constitutional restrictions the Allies imposed, Germany and Japan are now “troubled with the anomaly of being economic giants but political dwarfs”. Neither nation wants to be isolated, yet neither is sure how or to what extent they want to become involved in the international arena.

Germany has the advantage that it is already a member of various organizations that formulate and execute collective policy (e.g. NATO and the EC). German military involvement remained minimal to non-existent, to the continued relief of much of Europe largely due to its internal focus following reunification. Where one of its member organizations fail to provide it with a collective stance (e.g. absence of a common foreign policy for the EC), Germany has begun to make policy on its own (e.g. sanctioning self-determination in Yugoslavia). Although it is only beginning to assert itself, Germany appears to be prepared to take on its responsibility of contributing to world order.

Japan is rather different. Until recently it has operated under the assumption that it was contributing to world order by not interfering in the affairs of others. It has become increasingly uncomfortable with the G-7 as it has moved from strictly addressing economic concerns (e.g. energy management, inflation, and economic growth). This isolationism has diminished through its unique participation in various high councils. It has been content to remain largely financial contributors (e.g. second biggest donor to the UN and largest donor of aid development). Although the constitutional prohibition against sending troops abroad continues to be debated, many are pleased to avoid incurring the expense of maintaining a large military.

Sovereignty and Self-Determination

Increasingly the tandem goals of ‘territorial integrity’ of the state and ‘self-determination’ of its people, long thought to be inseparable are appearing to be contradictory. “Two opposite trends are creating a paradox of statehood”. For example, as the EC increasingly pools sovereignty to reap the collective good, other forces are simultaneously at work to divide sovereign authority among significant ethnic communities (e.g. Scottish, Welsh, Basque, and Breton pursuit of greater autonomy). This trend toward increased regionalism and ‘national identity’, would prove lethal if it were to explode in the Third World where sates are often purely artificial constructs (i.e. the legacy of arbitrary colonial administrative units, which failed to take ethnic nationality into question).

Increasingly it becomes clear that any strengthening of international order will involve cooperative intervention, as intervention by an individual nation would create suspicion and as public opinion continues to increase in importance (e.g. public demands for intervention in humanitarian cases: e.g. human rights violation). Although the UN Security Council has more legitimacy, China’s veto power and the absence of Germany and Japan’s economic and political power impose serious restrictions on its efficacy. The G-7.5 is informal enough to endow it with greater flexibility (i.e. a necessary component in the ever-shifting conditions of the world stage) and is sufficiently established to encourage much of the world to adopt its policies.