Joe Stork and Martha Wenger, “From Rapid Deployment to Massive Deployment”
Middle East Report, January-February 1991
This article tracks the evolution of foreign policy in the arena of the Persian Gulf. With such a volatile and unpredictable region of third world countries, and in an area of extreme US interest in gulf oil, America continuously adapted and redesigned policy from little involvement financially and militarily, to more involvement that anyone had imagined as the stakes for each round increased.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated in 1943 that “The defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States.” Since that time all doctrines of intervention from the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine have had the Persian Gulf and its oil at the center of their sights. In 1969, domestic US opposition to the Vietnam War forced President Nixon to design an intervention doctrine that would in a sense “change the color of the corpses.” Instead of sending US troops the US would arm local powers to police Third World regions critical to US interests. The most important of these regions was the Persian Gulf, and Iran was chosen to play the surrogate roll. Throughout much of the 1970’s the surrogate strategy of the Nixon Doctrine seemed to be sufficient. Billions of dollars in arms was sold to the shah of Iran and 50,000 US advisers helped expand and train an army there. In 1979 however the shah was overthrown in a revolution and radically changed American strategy in the region.
Since Iran was the main “pillar” of Americas strategy in the region, the loss of this “Friendly” regime presented many complications. Other candidates we’re Saudi Arabia who couldn’t play a role even comparable to Iran’s and had internal unrest of their own between North and South Yemen. Israel was America’s second choice but their political liabilities limited their usefulness. This compelled Washington to devise a progressively more costly strategy for direct US intervention.
President Carter marked the transition to the “new era of rapid deployment” in his last state of the Union Address, January 1980. “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” It should be noted that when Carter spoke these words the Rapid Deployment Force was more of a state of mind that a reality. No country in the Gulf was willing to host a headquarters.
Saudi Arabia did assume a key role under the Carter Doctrine, which required not armies but bases in the Persian Gulf region. By 1978, 675 US military personnel and 10,000 civilian employees were building military installations in Saudi Arabia. Many of the Arab countries were reluctant to link themselves with the chief western power and main ally of Israel, so US took two tracks to accomplish their goal of airfields and support facilities. One was publicly speaking out about their reluctance to collaborate, and the other was a more discreet behind the scenes approach.
The key was Saudi Arabia, and after Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980, Saudi Arabia’s fears of an expanded campaign gave America leverage to gain even more collaboration. The greatest advantage was the sale of five AWACS planes and a system of bases with stocks of fuel, parts and munitions. This increased the US ability to rapidly and effectively reinforce more than any other conceivable improvement.
In 1983, the Pentagon elevated Persian Gulf contingency planning by transforming the Rapid Development Force into a separate military command called Central Command, or CENTCOM. Central Command now had the authority to requisition up 350,000 troops. President Bush inherited both the apparatus and the mission for US military intervention in the Gulf from his predecessors, but the next stage in this struggle for control in the Persian Gulf was unanticipated. US cooperation with Iraq from the mid 1980’s through the early 1990 appeared secure. Saddam Hussein’s regime seemed to be fairly reliable. After Iraq invaded Kuwait however, US had to do a serious reversal of policy gears.
US scenarios were all based on offenses that might come from the Soviets or Iran, not Iraq, and even the bases in Saudi Arabia were functionally based on these tasks. The Bush administration intervened militarily in order to offset Iraq’s ability to dominate the Gulf politically after the successful and unchallenged victory in Kuwait. The expected direct involvement of US troops in the Persian Gulf was anticipated to reach a shocking 430,000 forces. The enormous deployment of troops, whether or not there was in fact a war, helped to undermine the legitimacy of the monarchies it aimed to protect, which only will continue to increase pressure for even further intervention.
“This costly and dangerous intervention can be traced back to the CIA’s successful covert intervention in Iran in 1953 that overthrew the elected regime of Muhammad Mossadeq and brought the shah back to power.” It shows a little about the evolution of US policy as we note how one intervention lead invariably to another. Iran was used against Iraq in the 1970’s, and Iraq against Iran in the 1980’s. Each intervention required a great investment and a greater risk than the one before it.
-Erick Frazier