Norman Podhoretz, “The Present Danger,” NY Simon and Schuster 1980.

 

 

The Main Point

 

The basic argument of “The Present Danger” is that the United States is losing the leadership of the free world to the Soviet Union mostly because we don’t have the will to oppose, with force, Soviet infiltration of other countries. We lack the will because we consider ourselves to have been morally wrong in Vietnam.  As a result of our loss of confidence in our “moral and political leadership,” we are endangering our future.  Continued refusal to contain the Soviet Union will leave us with only two alternatives: surrender or war.

 

Summary

“The Present Danger” is divided into 2 sections.  Podhoretz begins the book with details of doctrines and policies of past American Presidents and how they worked and didn’t work.  Then Podhoretz offers his opinions on the way the country is moving because of these doctrines and policies and how we must learn from them. 

The Truman Doctrine and Containment

The Truman Doctrine was established in March 1947 as a program to aid Greece and Turkey from the threat of puppet regimes installed by Russians.  According to Truman, “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”  The Marshal Plan was established to reconstruct war-torn economies of Western Europe.  NATO formed in response to Communist dangers of invasion.  Containment became the word used for America’s political-military strategy of resistance during the Cold War. 

Mr. X

According to George F. Kennan, we could only stop the Soviets with equal force and things would not be “talked out of existence.”  There were two main views on how we would handle Communist Russia and “contain” them.  On the Left, people believed that “disarmament” and “understanding” was key, where as the Right believed that “rollback” and “liberation” was key.  The Korean War provided the backdrop for American ideals.  The war proved the seriousness of America to contain Communism.  Kennan believed that there was a national consensus that pulled the nation together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership.  It caused a “self-confident energy” that caused huge prosperity within the United States.  Life, opportunity, and production improved all across the country.  The question now was not whether to contain, but how?

Enter Vietnam

John F. Kennedy took another approach to containment.  He backed down from the Republican doctrine of “massive retaliation” which provided atomic war as the answer to Communist aggression, to his own approach of “indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution.  In his inaugural address, Kennedy said “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear and burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”  Kennedy’s invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs was considered an unfortunate blunder by an inexperienced president, but it was still considered to fall under “containment.”  Vietnam, however, was not.  The South Vietnamese, according to Hans J. Morgenthau, could not be saved with troops because we are unable to win in those conditions.  There were many ongoing debates about Vietnam: Are we guarding against the Soviets?  China? Local uprisings? Civil war?  These questions were followed by many more uncertainties.  The Vietnam War produced blood, American casualties, and worse off uncertainty, loss of clarity in United States policy.  America was supposed to be the big brother, but there was a loss of confidence in our abilities to provide moral and political leadership. 

Nixon Doctrine

Nixon took the opposite approach to Kennedy.  Nixon believed that America should sponsor other countries such as China and Iran with arms supply rather than fight with our own troops.  At this point, it was the only way Nixon could “contain” because of congress’ support for defense cutbacks and the post-Vietnam political climate.  Nixon opted for peace instead of confrontation in his containment.  The problem with this approach was that it assumed that any force other than America could contain the Soviet Union.  For example, Nixon believed that we could slowly pull our troops out of Vietnam and continue to supply the South Vietnamese with arms to “assume responsibility for the defense of their own country.”  Well it might have held up, but not only was the surrogate power unable to hold the line on it’s own, but we never even gave it a chance since the United States refused aid that it promised. 

The Arms Race

There was a developing pattern of Soviet advance and American retreat.  There was a definite changing in balance between the two superpowers.  The United States began to cutback on defense spending while the Russians began to triple United States production.  Fears rose of Finlandization: political and economic control over Western Europe, Japan, and ultimately even the United States. 

Mature Restraint

President Carter believed that there was no need for containment anymore.  He felt that military power was less useful as an instrument of policy.  An example supporting his theory would be Russians expulsion from Egypt.  Carter felt that it was no longer a conflict between east and west; rather it was a conflict between north and south.  Carter said “Historical trends have weakened the foundation of the two principles which guided our foreign policy in the past: a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable and that it must be contained. 

The Collapse of Carter’s Policy

The United States quickly found out that military power was still influential.  There were instances that pushed this fact.  A prime example would be the hostage situation in our embassy in Teheran where the United States was left in humiliating helplessness.  You can see “the contrast between the attack on our embassy in Teheran and the protection afforded to the Soviet embassy there when a group of protesters tried to storm it after the invasion of Afghanistan.”  “The retreat of American power has opened the way to soviet adventurism and expansionism.”  The invasion in Afghanistan had convinced Carter that it was still east versus west.  In any case, it was always still east vs. west because when we fought the north there was the chance of confrontation with the east. 

The Carter Doctrine

According to Podhoretz, deterioration of our forces and the Soviet buildup is our Present Danger.  Is it too late?  10 years of retreat might have allowed the Russians to advance their military, arms, and worse nuclear capabilities far past our own.  “If the Soviets decide for one reason or another to pause, there is a danger that the finally aroused American giant will once again be lulled back to sleep.”  Meanwhile, the Soviets would consolidate their gains, go on increasing and refining their arsenal, and wait for the window of opportunity to open even wider and lock itself permanently into position.” 

Finlandization

If Finlandization takes place, “a world in which the Soviet Union had the military power to seize control of the oil fields would be a world shaped by the will and tailored to the convenience of the Soviet Union.”  The New York Times: “Why…should we, at the risk of starting World War III, keep the Russians from displacing the present owners?  They might be more efficient producers, and they might save us money by eliminating the corruption that is an element of the present price.”