Michael Ledeen, "How to Support the Democratic Revolution," Commentary, V.79, No. 3, March 1985.
Main Point: The United States foreign policy should be
directed at supporting other developing nations in their democratic
revolution. Ledeen’s focus is
mainly in Central America, where Nicaragua is under a totalitarian regime. “Our task is actively to encourage
non-democratic governments to democratize, and to aid democratic movements that
challenge totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.”
The United States’ “commitment to the universal value of democracy” causes them to not support a long-term friendship with repressive dictatorships. Critics feel that this characteristic hinders American foreign policy, one that is based on the “traditional conception of national interests.” However, Ledeen believes that the “spread of democracy is the most basic of our geostrategic interests.” Success of revolution equates to greater national security; failure less security.
Enemies feel threatened by free society.
Vitality of democracy, its appeal to human creativity, and the unlimited range it gives to human development, strike fear into the hearts of those whose power depends upon shackling free people and insisting upon a single "truth".
Therefore, Ledeen feels that the United States should and needs to challenge Nicaraguan totalitarianism. It is both a political principle as well as a strategic national interest.
Strategy
Good sense should not be abandoned when pursuing democratic revolution for other developing nations. Ledeen mentions the use of “strategic pause and wait-and-see” as methods to support democratic revolution. Ledeen notes:
Although we certainly prefer democratic regimes to anti-democratic ones, we should by now also have learned that many of the world’s worst tyrants (Stalin, for one) wrap themselves in the mantle of democracy, while some of those we have paved their countries’ way from dictatorship toward democracy.
Ledeen further notes, “American policy-makers and intellectuals concluded that forthright, universal support of the revolutions as a dangerous and counterproductive policy.” Ledeen explains “How can we continue to maintain close friendships with foreign leaders when we are simultaneously intruding into their internal affairs, trying to get them to dilute their authority and significantly change their political system?” Noted examples are of South Africa, with apartheid; or Marocs of Philippines. It is feared that this foreign policy will end up like Vietnam and Iran.
Ledeen attributes the past disasters as errors of judgment and omission. “Failure in past doesn’t mean we have to continue in the same pattern in the future.” Failure in Vietnam and Iran can be blamed on the “lack of courage and wisdom.” However, Ledeen notes that “intelligent ‘meddling’ is fully justified.” Ledeen’s justification is twofold, “If we encourage allies to become more democratic, it is in order to make their own governments more stable and our alliances more durable.”
Restraints
Ledeen mentions several inhibiting factors with regards of supporting democratic revolutions. One in particular lies within American domestic politics. He refers to the Left and the Right wings of politics and how they deal with the issue of repressive governments.
Left condemns out of hand
governments ranging from South Africa to Honduras to the Philippines while
tending to turn a blind eye to left-wing dictatorships and or actively to
support Marxist-Leninist guerilla movements like the FMLN in El Salvador or
SWAPO in Namibia.
In regards to the right:
As for the Right, it denounces Communist regimes while tending to take a benign view of even such extreme dictatorships of the Right as Pinochet’s Chile, Stoessner’s Paraguay and Argentina under the generals who preceded Alfonsin.
Ledeen concludes that both the Right and Left are wrong.
Right confuses alliances of convenience with principled, durable rapport. Left, however, is considered more damaging. Left devises abstractly moralistic standards of democracy that no country can live up to. And also exempts left-wing opponents.
Success of American supported democratic revolutions will be dependent on 1. The ability to discern realistically the difference between our friends and enemies. 2. Learn the difference between authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorships.
Undemocratic alies are authoritarian and our enemies are totalitarian dictatorships.
Ledeen argues that under authoritarian dictatorships, power is vested in an individual or a ruling group, and therefore if the group or individual were no longer in power, change is more likely to happen. Case in point, in Spain, “once Franco died, their system evolved to a full fledged western democracy.” On the other hand, totalitarian dictatorships, power does not rest on a single individual. Ledeen refers to the Soviet Union, “…with the death of Lenin, Stalin stepped forward, and after him there have been others, while the system has remained fundamentally unchanged.”
Ledeen makes a point that any credibility that the US could be dissipated if we do not support our words of revolution with action and support. And therefore it is pertinent that the US takes charge of Central America.
America has voiced against Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan power of Central America, however, we have not acted upon it. If we fail to act, our Cuban and Nicaraguan enemies will slowly set their conflict throughout the hemisphere.
This will only discourage others who are contemplating “taking up the struggle for democratic revolution.” Also, failure to act in Central Americal, will make the US lose credibility among other nations; causing other regimes not to listen to our advice. They will say, “If America cannot protect a nearby ally against Nicaragua, can it be expected to shelter a distant friend against the Soviet Union itself?” Therefore, Ledeen states,
We should remain true to our principles—supporting the democratic revolution in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, while thwarting and reversing the totalitarian advance, in order to persuade others to take risks for freedom and democracy.
--Chang, Gary