Lawrence Bong

 

1-23-02

J. P. Leacacos, “Kissingers’ Apparat” and J. M. Destler "Can One Man Do?" Foreign Policy, #5, Winter 1971-72.

 

 

Main Idea:

In 1947 Congress created the National Security Council to advise the President of domestic, foreign, and military policies in regards to national security.  Kissinger was put in charge of this agency in 1969 and had centralized authority in the White House to advise President Nixon.  The method in which Nixon’s NSC staff operated is analyzed from two different perspectives, one from veteran Washington journalist John P. Leacacos and the other a Princeton researcher I. M. Destler.

 

John P. Leacacos

Summary:

 

The article begins by describing how the NSC has served President Nixon well.  Nixon had a habit of withdrawing in times when critical decisions needed to be made.  Often times this led to no action at all.  Kissinger was at the head of the NSC and advised Nixon on NSC affairs.  At this point in time the Vietnam policy is under close White House NSC supervision. 

 

WSAG:

 

Over the course of time Kissinger created several special units for unique tasks.  One of these special units is the Defense Programs Review Committee whose purpose is to keep the defense budget in line with foreign policy objectives.  Another special unit is the WSAG (Washington Special Actions Group) which is the operations center for sudden crises and emergencies.  This unit monitors developing situations which could affect US interests.  For example this unit monitored Soviet submarines in Cuba in 1969 during the Cuban missile crises.

 

Thirty Key Officials:

 

The NSC is composed of only 30 key officials who are the critical decision makers.  Another 300, at maximum, have a partial role in contributing to the decision making process.  Kissingers’ goal was to push the NSC into “better and better” performance.  The more effective the State became the less the White House would have to do.  The majority of Kissinger’s time is spent summarizing NSC studies to six pages or less for the President.

 

From Vigor to Rigor:

 

The Nixon Doctrine which began in mid-1969 symbolized a shift in foreign policy.  The doctrine shifted from a bipolar balance of world power to a multipolar balance of world power, greater emphasis on military reserves at home rather than troops abroad.  In the first weeks of the Nixon Administration Kissinger constructed the new NSC system which brought with it structured orderliness.  Kissinger felt that the previous NSC systems were too loose and lacked checks and balances.

 

The 138 Memoranda:

 

Kissingers’ developed a method of forcing his staff and the large bureaucracy to answer questions in detailed written memorandum form.  He refused to accept any memos if they were not adequately “rigorous.”  This process began in 1969 when he asked 26 questions on Vietnam.  More study assignments were given out on other foreign policy inquiries.  Many first drafts were returned to the authors for further work.  This eventually led to overkill in information in which all of the memorandums where unable to be read.

 

NSC Studies:

 

The most vital NSC studies involved nuclear weapons done in preparation for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union.  There were four US military guidelines for SALT (1) the need to retain a second strike capability; (2) the need for stable forces in a crisis, i.e., forces sufficiently safeguarded so as to be invulnerable to a sudden attack; (3) the requirement that the Russians not be allowed large leverage of inflicted damage; (4) adequate defenses against threats from third countries which have actual nuclear weapons or nuclear potential.  The Kissinger review examined the capabilities of all know weapons systems.

 

Two Weak Spots:

 

The NSC system has two key weak spots, one being international economics, and the other foreign intelligence.  One of Kissinger’s remedies in 1970 was to suggest the formation of a Council of International Economic Policy, which was created in early 1971 but it was never successful.  Lack of foreign intelligence was another weak spot that was Kissinger’s greatest disappointment.

 

 

I.M. Destler

The Shape of the System:

 

Kissinger’s plan was to concentrate on the general strategy and leave operations to the departments.  He devoted himself to broad policy.  His emphasis was on the problems of decision making.  The number and comprehensiveness of the studies of the NSC has created a serious “bureaucratic logjam.”

 

The Attrition of the Staff:

 

In February 1969 Kissinger’s staff had depth and was strong.  By September many people were leaving. Ten of the 28 men on the February staff were absent from the list issued on September 25.  By summer 1971 only about one quarter of Kissinger’s original 28 staff were still on board.  The inability to hold staff was a major failure on Kissinger’s part.  Many found it difficult to make contact with Kissinger.  Even the most important senior staff members were unable to contact Kissinger.

 

Can the National Security Assistant Manage Foreign Policy?:

 

Kissinger was inundated with pressures from all directions.  The pressure to serve Nixon effectively encouraged Kissinger and his staff to do more and more in-house, which increased the gap between the President and the bureaucracy.  Much of the problem was in Kissinger’s inability to delegate authority.  Nixon’s preference was handling issues through a small number of people rather than reaching out to the larger government.  The failures of the system reflect the fact that no one seems to be trusted by Nixon and Kissinger. 

 

Two Types of Issues:

 

The system tends to divide issues into two types-those that Kissinger can be involved, and those that he cannot.  The system’s weaknesses are a failure to deal with economic issues and general foreign policy.  These weaknesses would never have developed if issues like these could be controlled by Presidential “decisions.”