Thomas L. Hughes, “Up From Reaganism,”

Foreign Policy #44, Fall 1981

Main Point

The overall aim of this article is to inform the reader of the dangerous policies and decisions to which Ronald Reagan and his close associates (high ranking staff members) have committed themselves. The author, Thomas Hughes, does this in the context of America’s Western allies and their struggle in dealing with foreign policy obstacles such as the Soviet Union. Hughes outlines various policies put forth by the administration, which have, to an extent, alienated the allies of the U.S, and criticizes Reagan for failing to force his administration to confront foreign policy instead of concentrating on domestic issues.

Hughes introduces Reagan’s foreign policy strategy as relying heavily upon the support of the United States’ key allies; most notably Great Britain, France, and Germany. However, many of Reagan’s domestic decisions and policy announcements go directly against sustaining even a mildly coherent alliance with the other nations. Hughes describes the current state of issues as being a blur between international and domestic, and where “Citizens in many Western societies even find their viewpoints better represented by a Western leader other than their own.” Basically, the point being made is that the world’s boundaries are fading, its people are uniting under viewpoints rather than flags, and it is this meshing of various policy positions which Reagan can use for our benefit rather than for suspicion of other nations.

Compensatory Politics

This section begins juxtaposing the various world leaders of the Reagan era (himself, Thatcher, Mitterand, etc) with those of various previous ascendancies in power. Hughes notes that these leaders and their views could not possibly be more diverse, but describes this diversity and the key to bringing the Western alliance together. The U.S. and U.K. have policies further to the right than even the average conservative, whereas France leans quite far to the left. Though this dispersion of policy-thinking has strained relations, Hughes views this diversity as absolutely necessary to the survival of the West, and as a boon rather than bane to cooperation:

For an alliance to sustain itself under stress, it must reflect more than the grudging acquiescence of its less enthusiastic members. Its vitality and sustainability depend upon how broadly popular it can become, as opposed to how narrowly official – upon how deep and inclusive it can become, as opposed to how superficial or exclusionary.

The Political Window of Opportunity

The author begins this section by describing the opening months of Reagan’s administration as foreign policy deferral. While concentrating heavily on domestic issues (mostly economic,) Reagan has almost completely halted any serious decision making on foreign issues. This has been almost a mandate of the electorate, however, since foreign policy had almost no bearing on the 1980 election, nor was it pushed to the forefront by Congress or even the American people. This “grace period” has pushed forth some powerful legislation on the domestic front, however has caused some damage internationally, with his administration widely being seen as aloof to the situations and problem of not only allies but of adversaries as well.

Despite broad, unpractical policy guidelines put forth by Reagan up to this point, Hughes sees a political opportunity here: new governments have been elected in places such as Israel and other parts of the world, there is relatively little disruption in other Western nations, and Reagan still has an opportunity to influence (and be influenced by) other allies in their thinking.

The Negative Dynamic

Central to this section is the view that “on most issues central to an effective world strategy, Reagan will find that his old domestic allies can hurt while his new foreign allies can help.” Domestically, the friends who helped Reagan win on taxes and the economy are pushing him farther away from the necessary path of the international world. It is Reagan’s hot rhetoric on many issues that convinced other nations that the U.S. will not only not help the Western alliance, but will push a huge burden onto their shoulders as well.

In part it is the perceived nature of the Reagan revolution – radical, cumulative, and wholesale – which promotes allied anxiety. Fundamentals which have long underlain Western confidence in American policy suddenly have become subject to extremes of emphasis and extremes of de-emphasis: defense without détente; arms without arms control; stretch-outs leading to abandonment of international economic commitments with little apparent empathy for the human consequences; a palpable militarization of attitude approaching doomsday chic with little apparent interest in America’s traditional liberal values, or awareness of their universal appeal.

In general, Hughes criticizes the domestic decisions that Reagan has already made as having a profound negative impact on the possibility for an amiable relationship with the international community.

Ideology and Miscommunication

In general, the Western societies have not been ‘buying’ the policies that Reagan claims to believe in: the belief of Soviets being supremely evil, or even that government controls are the main hindrance to successful growth. When Reagan and the administration reiterate these ideas over and over again to the world, a little bit of confidence is chipped away from the image of American credibility. The problem is not as much with the actual policies and beliefs of America, but rather the hotheaded and irresponsible way in which they are delivered. Reagan saying that the Russians are willing to “commit any crime, to lie and cheat,” stirs up anger not just in the Soviet Union, but also all across the globe. These highly charged remarks and rhetoric has (up to this point) stood as a substitute for actual foreign policy, and now even America’s allies are beginning to cringe at their harsh tone.

Subcontracting Foreign Policy

The Reagan administration has now begun to ‘subcontract’ its work to a collection of new appointees who have attempted to gain for themselves a piece of the foreign policy pie. Not only is the world hearing mixed signals shouted at them from Reagan, but also many of his subordinates have been quoted (sometimes without authorization,) as outlining American policies to whoever will listen. This has created a string of ‘reactionary regimes’ across the world, whose only purpose is to listen to these American policy tidbits, and to act on them as quickly as possible.

This has caused great consternation among the entire world, for example, watching as South American generals being discouraged from mediation and instead seeking military victories over rebel groups. This reaction by various groups could come back to haunt the U.S. for ‘sponsoring’ the illegal actions of those around the world as coming straight from the mouth of the U.S.

Up From Reaganism

Hughes here lays out the essential problem with ‘Reaganism’ – we know he desires (and needs) the international communities’ support, but his domestic baggage has him heavily weighted down. If Reagan is to keep the Western alliance alive, he must learn that the far-right views supported so fanatically by his close domestic partners has very little sparkle to it outside of our borders. Hughes ends with this take on the current situation:

… the practical implications have to go beyond atmospherics and the promotion of cooperative dispositions to the activation of collaborative networks, to immersion in regular and frequent consultation, to receptivity to positive peer pressure and group suggestibility, as well as to joint problem identification and agenda setting.