D. Garcia

ECO 357L

 

Semidetached Politics –

by Stanley Hoffman

 

I.                     Foreign affairs have all but disappeared from the campaign of 1984, becoming an illusion of public relations.  The most positive aspect of Reagan’s public relations being that it could have been much worse.  Bad public relations have been checked by a separation of reality from fantasy, as well as the domination of domestic concerns.  The American public remains unsuspicious as long as foreign affairs are brief and easy.

 

In four years the Reagan administration cannot claim a single foreign policy accomplishment.  This is of no concern to the public because the country has not suffered from a major disaster, i.e. national humiliation.  This allows the President to boast that we are at peace and that the country is “standing tall.”  However a further investigation into the effects of Reagan on friendly and neutral countries reveals disappointment.

 

In “standing tall” next to the Soviets, how much of their setbacks can be attributed to Reagan’s will or skill?  Both superpowers have found that their European allies are reluctant to give up the benefits of détente and that they are being used by the very same Middle Eastern clients that they were trying to use.

 

Reagan has been an excellent salesman, the success of his claim about his own leadership being a triumph of image over reality.  However, he is missing a sense of political strategy as well as a firm control of the operation of power.  He has a knack for reassuring people and downplaying defeats and failures that derives from his appearance as semidetached.  This administration has remained afloat due to a Russian-roulette aspect of decision-making and the central importance of second- or third-level bureaucrats.

 

II.                   Semi detachment becomes troublesome when skillful bureaucrats can too easily block directions and initiatives.  The President must establish his position as master of policy.  Over the next four year various problems will reemerge, the first being Soviet-American relations.

 

There are two obstacles to overcome, the rise in Soviet paranoia and the lack of serious proposals for a resumption of dialogue.  Both of which will move the two countries to “limited” nuclear wars.  In addition is the extension of this nuclear race into space, which risks undermining the foundations of nuclear deterrence and places the wrong military goals first.  Also, this “Star Wars” has been launched without a clear final objective. 

 

The second problem is that of regional and domestic conflicts caused by conditions of oppression.  This problem if further hampered by the prevalence of the need to appease the misgivings of our main allies in Soviet-American relations.  The administration’s preoccupation with the violations of human rights that are committed by communist or procommunist regimes will lead to continuing support for the status quo.

 

The third problem being that of the world economy.  The Reagan administration has thus far resisted many protectionist pressures.  An improvement would require a reduction of the US budget deficit and a comprehensive and long-term solution to the problem of third world debt. 

 

III.                 Those who hope for a second Reagan administration that follows a moderate course should keep those hopes fairly low.  Reasons for pessimism include the President himself and the inability or unwillingness of the public or the two parties to push the President in a moderate direction. 

 

What the public celebrates is the country’s regained success.  They do not share the traditional conservative values of Reagan, but are content with its results and half believe that these values may have something to do with them.  The outside world matters insofar as it causes pain or fear.  This ignorance allows the same skillful politicians to arouse public the public about perils to be eradicated quickly so that all can return to their pleasant dreams in safety.