Miss Caramellow R. Randle                                                          Mandate for Leadership

Economics 368-Cleaver                                             Chapter 11: The Department of State

January 28, 2002                                                                               By:  Jeffrey B. Gayner

 

Chapter Summary

            The intricacies of foreign policy are divided amongst many different organizations in the government.  The current system of foreign policy has been characterized as a “mess”, each presidency altering the State Department and other foreign policy issues in his own way (some less successful than others), while presenting alternate choices on handling foreign policy to the following administration.

            The Constitution allows for the power of foreign policy issues to be delivered dually between the executive and legislative branches.  Though Congress and the President “share” the functions of foreign policy, it is evident that in modern times, the President serves more often as the “foreign policy dictator”( in effect, the idea of the “President” actually encompasses the executive branches and his advisors).  Congress ultimately plays a passive role alternating or modifying foreign policy rather than choosing to accept or reject such policy.

            Each President has used different methods of establishing foreign policy and the consequent relations with other countries after World War II beginning with President Truman.  Truman established the National Security Council (NSC) in an attempt to establish order in foreign policy.  Nevertheless, Truman kept the NSC at arm’s length (as did many other presidents) and preferred to rely on key men in the Cabinet and the Department of State.  Under Eisenhower, the NSC was strengthened as the prime initiator for foreign policy.  The National Security Council as the process of foreign policy initiation was made simple, yet systematic and well organized.  However, Eisenhower, like Truman relied heavily on a few close and personal advisors for final words on policy initiation.  Upon Kennedy’s election, the Eisenhower system involving the National Security Council was dismantled.  He relied on a more traditional structure for policy execution as well as informal methods of coordination.  There were many similarities between t he Kennedy and Johnson years in office.  Johnson kept many of Kennedy’s foreign policy advisors as well as a mixture of tight control and loose organization.  However, Johnson’s term was a period of incoherence in public policy decision making that the Nixon Administration vowed not to maintain.  Richard Nixon, boasting of foreign policy expertise, created the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSC).  The NSSC was created with the intention of creating such a process as to select and utilize policy suggestions from several available options submitted via memorandum.  Nixon failed to create a better policy than his predecessors because, though his ideas were good, the excess of paperwork and a fading committee structure allowed for the dictatorship of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the staff he created to dominate the reigns of foreign policy.

            The problem of foreign policy has been debated for several years with the general conclusion being the “hugeness of the bureaucracy” and the difficulty of obtaining coherence within it.  The three major levels of concern include the Presidential level, the State Department, and Congress.  At the Presidential level, the criticisms range from the overgrowth of the government and its agencies to the ambiguity of the role of the National Security Council.  The Murphy Commission, one of the most comprehensive reviews of the foreign policy, made several recommendations including; the duties of the NSC to be run by one individual without any other assigned duties, and the inclusion of the Secretary of State in the NSC due to the increasing role of economics in foreign policy.  The State Department has been the focus of more foreign policy studies than any of the other agencies.  Each presidency has had  true intentions on integrating the State Department into foreign policy, but the current era of the State Department resulted from presidential frustrations with the State’s bureaucracy and the gravitation of decision making more at the White House.  The Murphy Commission insisted on lowering the participation of the State Department in foreign policy and incorporating other agencies.  It also recommended reforms for personnel of the State Department to “sharpen the economic and political skills”.  The third aspect of foreign policy includes Congress who has been considered to reak havoc to foreign policy by hampering and frustrating policy making.  Alternatively, dangers and opportunities are approaching, as Congressmen are now younger, smarter, well traveled, and more interested in world problems and less likely to succumb to their previous role and alternatively, to Presidential influence.  The Murphy Commission basically stated the simple suggestion of coordination between the two branches of government.

            Gayner’s focus lies on the Carter Administration and their inability to fair better than any of their predecessors in the area of foreign policy.  It is important to note that the Carter Administration is under the microscope here as the last office completed and many of the suggestions are geared towards the incoming Reagan Administration.  The Carter Administration failed to denote who was in charge of the conduct of U.S. foreign policy from the beginning.  Like other presidents of the past, Carter too, relied heavily on White House advisors over the State Department or the NSC.  It appeared that the conflicts between the State and NSC need to be resolved and the Murphy Commission had answers for that as well.  Under the three guidelines of leadership, coordination, and implementation, the Murphy Report as well as the Odeen Report made many recommendations many of which required the changing of staff for the NSC.  It was no surprise that the reports suggested that the President had supreme power and that only he and the White House could assume any real leadership possibilities.  Consequently, the report suggested three of the most legitimate choices, but it inevitably chose the one that would “optimize the U.S. foreign affairs bureaucracy”.  The choice was for the President to create a balance within the staff that would manage the system both efficiently and coherently using both the State and the NSC.  In this form, the NSC would serve primarily as a foreign policy “clearinghouse” with a limited, but essential role involving issues and decisions.  Due to the bilateral and long-term interests of the State Department, this agency would serve primarily as agency to monitor, oversee, and influence foreign activity, much different from the original role in U.S. foreign policy.  The Murphy Commission had several recommendations for Congress as well including, but not limited to, the initiation and development of an improved pattern of behavior.  Many other suggestions were included in the report.

            Gayner makes recommendations to all aspects of the foreign policy issues and includes every region of the world from Central America to Africa to Pacific-Asia and how these regions affect the United States.  In Central and Latin America, he discusses problems of Communism, human rights neglect, economic disparity, agrarian reform, military unity, security issues in Central America, private enterprise, energy, and the role of the Church is many South American countries.  The recommendation to all these problems results in the following

 

Send a clear signal to friend and foe that the U.S. does view Latin America with special interests and will resist soviet attempts, or by Cuban proxy, to expand its strategic interests in this hemisphere.  Muting human rights criticisms, encouraging trade and the expansion of the private sector, and supporting responsible rightists who seek social progress in their countries under their direction.

 

In Africa, Gayner refers to the problems of economic underdevelopment, an enormous debt, and tribal boundaries and violence.  He also considers race problems, urbanization, and fluctuating commodity prices.  Here the suggestion lies in the discouragement of emigration of the educated and trained elite unless deemed absolutely necessary as well as the adoption of policies to assist in stabilizing Africa economically and politically.  In the Pacific-Asian rule, Gayner noted that the new administration should “reevaluate and redefine its role”.  The problems include constantly breaking agreements, disagreements on human rights policy, and soviet expansionism.  Though many recommendations were given here, mostly in response to each individual country, the main idea is to

Pragmatically work with China, but our principle partners in the area must be Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN states.  They provide the most durable and reliable economic, political, and military force in the area.

 

            It is evident in the realm of foreign policy that the role of the State Department should be the first to be altered because its small size makes it an easy and quick target.  An administration desiring to change the direction of policy must first initiate changes in key positions to force alterations down the lines.  It is apparent that reorganization needs to filter through the ruins of the Carter Administration as many of these personnel likely still believe in the present foreign policy forum. Though “housecleaning” should be initiated in the White House, it is imperative that the State Department remain relatively unchanged as to allow for continuity in procedural operations.