Miss Caramellow R.
Randle
Mandate for
Leadership
Economics 368-Cleaver Chapter 11: The Department of State
Chapter Summary
The intricacies of foreign policy are divided amongst many different organizations in the government. The current system of foreign policy has been characterized as a “mess”, each presidency altering the State Department and other foreign policy issues in his own way (some less successful than others), while presenting alternate choices on handling foreign policy to the following administration.
The Constitution allows for the power of foreign policy issues to be delivered dually between the executive and legislative branches. Though Congress and the President “share” the functions of foreign policy, it is evident that in modern times, the President serves more often as the “foreign policy dictator”( in effect, the idea of the “President” actually encompasses the executive branches and his advisors). Congress ultimately plays a passive role alternating or modifying foreign policy rather than choosing to accept or reject such policy.
Each President has used different methods of establishing foreign policy and the consequent relations with other countries after World War II beginning with President Truman. Truman established the National Security Council (NSC) in an attempt to establish order in foreign policy. Nevertheless, Truman kept the NSC at arm’s length (as did many other presidents) and preferred to rely on key men in the Cabinet and the Department of State. Under Eisenhower, the NSC was strengthened as the prime initiator for foreign policy. The National Security Council as the process of foreign policy initiation was made simple, yet systematic and well organized. However, Eisenhower, like Truman relied heavily on a few close and personal advisors for final words on policy initiation. Upon Kennedy’s election, the Eisenhower system involving the National Security Council was dismantled. He relied on a more traditional structure for policy execution as well as informal methods of coordination. There were many similarities between t he Kennedy and Johnson years in office. Johnson kept many of Kennedy’s foreign policy advisors as well as a mixture of tight control and loose organization. However, Johnson’s term was a period of incoherence in public policy decision making that the Nixon Administration vowed not to maintain. Richard Nixon, boasting of foreign policy expertise, created the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSC). The NSSC was created with the intention of creating such a process as to select and utilize policy suggestions from several available options submitted via memorandum. Nixon failed to create a better policy than his predecessors because, though his ideas were good, the excess of paperwork and a fading committee structure allowed for the dictatorship of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the staff he created to dominate the reigns of foreign policy.
The problem of foreign policy has been debated for several years with the general conclusion being the “hugeness of the bureaucracy” and the difficulty of obtaining coherence within it. The three major levels of concern include the Presidential level, the State Department, and Congress. At the Presidential level, the criticisms range from the overgrowth of the government and its agencies to the ambiguity of the role of the National Security Council. The Murphy Commission, one of the most comprehensive reviews of the foreign policy, made several recommendations including; the duties of the NSC to be run by one individual without any other assigned duties, and the inclusion of the Secretary of State in the NSC due to the increasing role of economics in foreign policy. The State Department has been the focus of more foreign policy studies than any of the other agencies. Each presidency has had true intentions on integrating the State Department into foreign policy, but the current era of the State Department resulted from presidential frustrations with the State’s bureaucracy and the gravitation of decision making more at the White House. The Murphy Commission insisted on lowering the participation of the State Department in foreign policy and incorporating other agencies. It also recommended reforms for personnel of the State Department to “sharpen the economic and political skills”. The third aspect of foreign policy includes Congress who has been considered to reak havoc to foreign policy by hampering and frustrating policy making. Alternatively, dangers and opportunities are approaching, as Congressmen are now younger, smarter, well traveled, and more interested in world problems and less likely to succumb to their previous role and alternatively, to Presidential influence. The Murphy Commission basically stated the simple suggestion of coordination between the two branches of government.
Gayner’s focus lies on the Carter Administration and their inability to
fair better than any of their predecessors in the area of foreign policy. It is important to note that the Carter
Administration is under the microscope here as the last office completed and
many of the suggestions are geared towards the incoming Reagan
Administration. The Carter
Administration failed to denote who was in charge of the conduct of
Gayner makes recommendations to all aspects of the foreign policy issues
and includes every region of the world from
Send a clear signal to friend and
foe that the
In
Pragmatically work with
It is evident in the realm of foreign policy that the role of the State Department should be the first to be altered because its small size makes it an easy and quick target. An administration desiring to change the direction of policy must first initiate changes in key positions to force alterations down the lines. It is apparent that reorganization needs to filter through the ruins of the Carter Administration as many of these personnel likely still believe in the present foreign policy forum. Though “housecleaning” should be initiated in the White House, it is imperative that the State Department remain relatively unchanged as to allow for continuity in procedural operations.