Jared Bernethy

Godfrey Hodgson, “The Establishment”, Foreign Policy, #10, Spring 1973.

 

The Main Point:

 

            The basic argument of this article is about the American foreign policy establishment and the causes of its demise.  As a result of the Vietnam War, the influences that the foreign policy establishment had over American foreign policy decision-making is basically dead.

 

Summary:

 

            The article begins by explaining about the American foreign policy establishment and its apparent members.  So what is “the establishment” and what kind of influences do the group have on overall decision-making regarding foreign policy.  First of all, “the foreign policy establishment consists of a self-recruiting group of men (virtually no women) who have shared a bipartisan philosophy towards, and have exercised practical influence on, the course of American defense and foreign policy.  I would add that to qualify for membership a man must have a reputation for ability in this field that is accepted by at least two of three worlds:  the world of international business, banking and the law in New York; the world of government in Washington; and the academic world, especially in Cambridge, but also in a handful of other great graduate schools.”  Secondly, in some critics’ eyes the establishment is partially responsible for the long and grueling Vietnam War.  But, in actuality it was this same war that lead to the breakup of the establishment over time.  By looking at five specific episodes or stages during this war period, one can see the dissolving unity and failing influence of the foreign policy establishment.

 

            Episode I:  The Rallying of the Paladins

 

            One major figure in the inner foreign policy councils of the Kennedy & Johnson Administrations was George Ball.  Ball openly gave several reasons of his “skeptical thoughts” of how the U.S. was handling issues and decisions regarding the Vietnam War.  Ball along with two other colleagues came up with a proposal, in effect, a deal between the Government and South Vietnam, which would allow the U.S. to withdraw from the scene.  But, this proposal of Ball’s was immediately shot down and branded unacceptable.  Then, “The President called in what amounted to a steering committee of its elderly statesman to pass on his policies, and in effect deal with a rebellion on the part of Ball.”  In 1965, the leaders of the establishment were united in support of the commitment in Vietnam.  Their views prevailed, and they supported the decision to escalate war.

 

            Episode II:  The Barons’ Revolt

 

            On January 31, 1968, the Vietcong struck in Saigon, resulting in the request for 206,000 troops to be sent into war.  At the time Clark Clifford was Secretary of Defense; he and some other highly important members of the establishment had changed their minds on the idea to support the escalation of war.  Thereafter, the group gathered with The President and “stripped him of his confidence” to win the war.  Again the leaders of the establishment prevailed in determining decisions about the war, only this time they were against any further escalation of the war.

 

            Episode III:  Cambodia, or the Insiders on the Outside

 

            Soon after the inauguration of Nixon, an establishment group met and together they hammered out a plan for peace in Vietnam.  Soon after, several of these members met with Henry Kissinger, but he wasn’t interested in their ideas.  A year later thirteen Harvard professors flew down again to talk to Kissinger.  They wanted “to communicate through him to the President that the invasion of Cambodia was in their opinion a disastrously bad foreign policy decision.”  Essentially, Kissinger told the group he would not take their side and would not speak with the President for them.  As a result, the establishment was stripped of its influence within the executive branch and reluctantly had to turn to Congress; but failed.

 

            Episode IV:  Home to Europe

 

            On May 13, 1971, the Mansfield Amendment, calling for a 50 percent cut in U.S. troop strength in Europe, was introduced in Congress.  The Amendment was generally conceded to have an excellent chance of passing in the Senate, but instead on May 20 the Mansfield Amendment was defeated.  This was because of the lobbying being done by some high-ranking members of the establishment.  Now the establishment could no longer say they were united, the “Old Guard” of the establishment wasn’t agreeing with the new younger members.  Some of the men said “once leaders of the establishment had been able to use the power of the Presidency to turn their ideas into national policy, now the President was using them.”

 

            Episode V:  Rejection of an Heir Apparent

 

            By May 1971, the establishment was bitterly divided on the issue of Vietnam, with some members still trying to “justify what had been done,” and others “tearing down the justifications.”  The issue had not only caused the divide of the establishment, “it had corroded the bonds of seniority, authority and respect which used to hold it together.”  The Vietnam War marks the time period that not only changed the direction of American foreign policy, but also its personnel.