The transnationalization of civic participation, the reinforcement of “citizen diplomacy”, and the growing various cross-border coalitions is a powerful common denominator for U.S.-Mexican relations that may improve the power unbalance between the two countries.

Governments, domestic interest groups, and cross-border coalitions

Both U.S. and Mexican governments think FTA is critical for the expansion of multilateral trade agreements from the viewpoint of Uruguay Round, the need of the Salinas Administration to demonstrate that the hardships by Mexico’s economic adjustment program will create economic gains, a desire to move into a position from which they can better compete with other regional trading areas, and a scarcity of economic alternatives in Mexico. However, there are some institutions in U.S. such as the Office of the U.S. Special Trade Representative, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service which are not so enthusiastic for the Bush Administration’s NAFTA objectives and a U.S.-Mexico FTA. Moreover, in Mexico, the Mexican publics don’t seem to believe easily that FTA fosters competing and economic benefits to them.

In 1990s, since domestic interest groups launched contacts with the U.S. and Mexican governments and beyond the channels, the dawn of tension in the later bilateral relationship can be said to occur from within the ranks of domestic interest groups in both countries. In both countries, these groups might be regionally-based as groups organized along the border around the issues of the environment, immigration, trades, and so on. U.S. and Mexican administrations are compelled to expand their contacts with these groups to connect their activities.

Combining their policy with potential cross-border coalitions and fostering the relations with various NGOs come to be essential for each government’s, which will help each government manage the bilateral relationship. Moreover, increasing public’s interests and knowledge about these issues will lead to the more solid relationship.

Coalition-Building

Relatively little public attention was paid at the rapid developments in FTA and opposition to the extension of fast track authority was slow to establish. As the reasons of this slow procedure, at first, the negotiators didn’t encourage a public debate causing more complex negotiating task by introducing more interest bargaining. Besides, Congress was not involved enough in the issue in its early stages. Secondly, many of the non-governmental entities which could promote public debate were relatively new actors so that they could not be prepared yet for political battle. Thirdly, the period leading to deadline for fast track postponement was uncertain and volatile as well as the U.S. economic recession. Thus there were many unanswered questions about the situation in which the agreement would be negotiated.

Anti-Fast Track of FTA

U.S. officials had pressured Mexico that the agreement was already done because the Mexican government was a obstacle for economic integration of both countries, so the need for bargaining about the concerns of labor, environmental, agricultural, consume and human rights groups was undervalued. In late October 1990, U.S. and Mexican negotiating officials still didn’t include issues such as the environment and labor rights in the FTA talks. Mexico’s chief negotiator stated that FTA would be an agreement on “trade issues”, which means it is limited to “goods and services”.

Thus, FTA was needed to embrace a “social charter” that would refer to “fundamental labor, health, environmental and political polity differences”, as well as to consider the Mexican political system in the direction for democratization. At the same time, the U.S. Congress was showing a growing interest in the evolution of the FTA.

However, the January in 1991 forum caused opposition to the fast track for FTA negotiations. Not only were there are lots of various interests represented, but also the audience of over 400 considering the United Nations’ deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Representatives of organizations concluded, however, that such a move was not matured enough and that was better that the national movements remain formally apart. In Mexico, although Hispanic business organizations and the congressional Hispanic Caucus were for fast track, the groups such as MALDEF(the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund), LULAC(the League of United Latin American Citizens), and the National Council of La Raza were not in official positions early on in the issue.

In fact, approval of fast track didn’t seem possible unless the Administration indicated the interest on the opposition in the areas of environmental, workers’ rights, health, and safety standards. From January 15 to June 1, with deadline for fast track extension, opposition toward both fast track and the FTA has accelerated.

The affects of the Anti-Fast Track

Some environmental and labor groups had livened their activities up by late March 1991 and they made the process of the FTA complex, created connections across three countries, and showed the vulnerability of national decisionmakers. As their activities became active, various social actors were involved and the agreement’s agenda broadened.

Environmentalists in the U.S. and Mexico strengthened their connection. Such anti-fast track coalition led to an increasing desperation of the agreement. The Mexican Administration started to show a commitment to environmental protection, as they knew that the environmental criticism of the FTA will become one of the reasons to prevent the prospects for fast track approval.

As well as environmentalists’ influence, various groups acting through three countries basically affected the negotiation for first track. Opponents eventually could succeed in including their opinions into the negotiation despite the approval of fast track in Congress.

Because of a FTA negotiation and its fast track, the NGO participants could have their issues with a broader network with a variety of groups, express their points of view, search for alternative strategies, and find financial support for their efforts. There were various groups including NGOs which acted individually and collectively. The strategy followed by those in all three countries was to expand participation through broader circles of inclusion.

The debate over fast track was important for the participants in the cross-border coalitions since various groups were included into the policy process. They are in the process of trust-building, information-sharing, and networking among groups, sharing a wide range of subjects of concern with the U.S. and Mexican governments.

These groups’ activities during the debate for fast track showed the vulnerability of policymakers toward the actions of non-governmental actors as NGOs. Governments had to consider national, binational, and trinationl coalitions, so Fast track decision were one of examples of cross-border coalitions’ power to encourage comprehensive discussion and to promote arguments of the citizenry of three countries.

The relationships between the governments and cross-border coalitions will change as a FTA’s negotiation proceeds. As these groups have their new relations with each government, the cross-border coalitions will have more power on the policymakers and the negotiations for fast track. Policymakers in the U.S. and Mexico will try to find the political support of these coalitions to strengthen their power on the negotiation. The more they become important, the more they will have the power on breaking up or improving the management of U.S.-Mexican relationships.