Christopher
Layne’s major thesis is that the guiding principle of the day, the “Reagan
Doctrine”, had to be rejected in favor of what he calls a “Real Conservative”
ideology. Real Conservatives, by
recognizing finite American foreign power and increasing deficits undermining
the economy, believed that they could reshape American foreign policies so that
it accomplished the goal of security while allowing economic
prosperity.
In the year of
1984, neoconservative Republicans lead by Reagan began to push for a new wave of
the global containment similar to that of pre-Vietnam Cold War administrations
(Truman, Eisenhower, JFK, LBJ).
Marked by a call for a dramatic increase in defense spending and military
intervention, the Reagan Doctrine could only be checked by, what Layne brands,
Real Conservatives. These Real
Conservatives believed in a more moderate approach to communism that reflected
their beliefs in the limits of U.S. foreign power and on frugal defense
spending.
Compared with the
dichotomies and dogma of the Reagan Doctrine, Real Conservatives believed that
the world was not engaged in “a Manichaean struggle between democracy and
communism” (75). Instead, argued
Real Conservatives, America’s position in the world was rather stable. The reinstatement of the Domino Theory
advocated by the Reagan Doctrine needed to be rejected for 3 reasons: high cost,
negative public opinion, and incorrect perceptions of world geopolitics.
The U.S.’s share
of world manufacturing output had fallen from ~50% in 1945 to 31.5% in 1980, yet
its military commitments under the Reagan Doctrine have actually grown. This means that America, while paying a
disproportionate share of the world’s defense without reaping the economic
reward of such a position, was outstripping its abilities to maintain
significant military power at all of its overseas interests. The Reaganites only solution to the
widening gap was to increase the defense budget to ward off the perceived “evil”
of communism, however, such a more would be fatal to the economy (which all
recognized as important as a policy tool).
Real Conservatives, on the other hand,
believed that both America’s need for security and economic prosperity could be
met. They proposed that a sort of
“Marshall Plan II” could be implemented to remilitarize Japan and Western Europe
in the same way that the original Marshall Plan reinvigorated their
economies. Then theses nations
could bear the burden of their own defense while still maintaining an
anti-communist position (in times of was collective defense would
occur).
The third world was one area over which
neoconservatives and Real Conservatives were particularly divided. The Reagan Doctrine made every battle
against communism of equal importance, whereas Real Conservatives realized that
certain places (especially parts of the third world) held no real value to
justify American intervention. Thus
Real Conservatives argued that the costs of third world interventions were so
high and produced so little benefit that they should be minimized unless there
were particularly motivating factors (such as U.S. credibility).
The one caveat to
Real Conservative third world policy is Central America. They argued that Central America must be
protected from Soviet interference.
However, Real Conservatives recognize that this position is mostly for
the image of the U.S. and not because of vital Central American
holdings.