Crista
Lewis
1-24-02
Article: Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Presidency and
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991-92, pp.
120-137.
Main
Point:
In this article, Stephen
Ambrose provides a brief survey of American foreign policy between
1941-1991. Not only does he recount
the Presidency’s successes and blunders during the half-century, but he also
provides a commentary concerning the potential reasons that the United States
has not fully realized the objectives set forth by Roosevelt and Truman and the
founders of the United Nations to end the arms race or establish a semblance of
collective security. Through this
concise analysis of Presidential foreign policy, many lessons are
revealed:
(1)
Realism is always more effective than idealism concerning the achievement
of foreign policy goals.
(2)
In order to implement an activist foreign policy, a strong military
presence is necessary.
(3)
There is a fundamental dichotomy inherent in the Constitution between the
executive and legislative branches for control of international
relations.
(4)
During times of crisis, Congress has conceded activist foreign policy
roles to the President.
(5)
Consistency has been difficult to achieve in the realm of foreign policy,
but it is powerful when it occurs.
(6)
Open, meaningful debate and consensus among the President, Congress, and
the American public is essential to achieve policy success. Failures typically arise in those areas
in which there is inconsistency and confusion in policy.
Summary:
Below is a brief synopsis
of the happenings in foreign affairs and the successes and failures in
international relations during each President’s
administration.
Roosevelt/Truman:
Both Roosevelt and Truman
have been triumphant at extending the reach of American foreign policy and
articulating policy goals that have served as guides for future presidents to
follow and implement. Although their commitments abroad have built the
foundation of foreign policy for years to come, they have additionally been able
to convince the American public that the maintenance of democracy overseas is a
vital national interest.
Roosevelt’s successes include the defeat of fascism and communism in
Europe and militarism in Japan.
Subsequently, Truman organized NATO and crafted the Marshall Plan to
rebuild Western Europe after WWII.
Also, his Truman Doctrine committed the U.S. to contain communism
worldwide. His chief mistake was
drawing the U.S. into the Korean War without consulting Congress. Later he lost support in Congress and
among his constituency by vacillating in the way he conducted armed forces
during the war.
Eisenhower:
Through a joint
congressional resolution, Eisenhower was given the ability to use armed forces,
specifically in the Middle East, to assist any nation in the struggle against
assault from communist countries.
Like Roosevelt, he played a dominant role in foreign policy. During his administration, he agreed to
a ceasefire in Korea, decided not to become involved in Vietnam, supported coups
in Iran and Guatemala, forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, and
held down the defense spending.
Kennedy:
Kennedy desired to defend
freedom worldwide and was ready to “pay any price, bear any burden” to do
so. However, his actions abroad
failed to meet his initial objectives.
He supported an invasion of Cuba and retreated at a critical moment. After the Cuban missile crisis, he
entered into an agreement never to invade Cuba. In Vietnam, he supported the South
Vietnamese and escalated the conflict, but allowed the CIA to participate in a
coup to overthrow their President.
In his management of foreign policy, he never sought the advice of
Congress, but the legislature was willing to extend support because of the
tensions from the Cold War.
Johnson:
The Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution expanded the power of the presidency in Southeast Asia. At the outset, Johnson was opposed to
involvement in Vietnam, but eventually sent 550,000 soldiers and expanded the
war. Claiming never to never play politics with peace, he called a bombing halt
one week before his 1968 election.
The political waffling and mishandling of the Vietnam conflict
caused Congress to assert a more prevailing foreign policy role after his
stretch in office. The War Powers
Act was subsequently passed; this limited the President’s discretion to send
troops abroad without Congressional approval.
Nixon/Ford:
Nixon’s policy addressed
Southeast Asia and declared that communist aggression should be handled by the
Asian nations themselves. During his stint, he removed the United States from
Vietnam, opened the door to China, promoted detente with the Soviet Union, and
negotiated the first Cold War arms control agreement (SALT). The above actions
represented a reversal of the policies he advocated for twenty years. Further, no constituency ever emerged
behind his policies regarding the organization of diplomatic and trade relations
with China or easing of tensions with the Soviets, for he often negotiated in
secret.
Carter:
Support for human rights
initiatives had been good politics for Carter during his campaign, but the issue
made for awful policy, as it was directed against America's allies, who were
vulnerable to Carter's demands, rather than America’s adversaries. His idealism caused resentment in the
Soviet Union and contributed to Carter's failure to reach arms control
agreements. Once the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, his initial policy goals were
reversed. He reacted by placing an
embargo on grain and high technology exports to the Soviets. He withdrew SALT
II, an arms control agreement drawn up by Nixon and endorsed by Ford, from the
Senate ratification process and increased defense spending. When Carter left office, relations with
the Soviet Union were more strained with each side having more weaponry and less
commerce than before Carter assumed office. Nonetheless, Carter was instrumental in
negotiating the Camp David accords in 1979, the first peace treaty between
Israel and Egypt. His second main triumph was the Panama Canal treaty in 1978,
restoring full sovereignty over the canal to Panama. He also established full
diplomatic relations with China. Still, he failed entirely to achieve his stated
goals of “ending the Cold War, improving human rights, stopping the arms race,
and eliminating nuclear weapons.”
Reagan:
Reagan’s administration
was also replete with inconsistency.
He signed the first arms reduction agreement of the Cold War, but entered
office aiming for first strike capability.
Yet, even as he sought arms reduction along
with the Soviets, Reagan refused to accept
Gorbachev's demand that the United States stop its most expensive weapons
development program in history, the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI). Promising never to
pay ransom for hostages, he sold weapons covertly to the Iranian government for
their release. Reagan’s doctrine
was never formally stated, but his policies consisted of clandestine military
and economic support for anticommunist forces in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. However,
Reagan made some remarkable strides. By building up U.S. defenses, Reagan was
held to be responsible for the retreat of communism from central and eastern
Europe. This approach (“maintaining U.S. defenses and waiting for communism to
self-destruct”) was an integral part of the Truman
Doctrine.
Bush:
Like Reagan, Bush never
articulated his own doctrine. The
legacy he left behind was his opposition to unprovoked “aggression by one Arab
nation to another.” He also
encouraged Congress to vote for the equivalent of a declaration of war in the
Persian Gulf.
Analysis and Ongoing
Trends:
The perpetual
inconsistencies and swings in foreign policy during this time period can be
attributable to the erratic shifts in Presidential power. Only two of the ten Presidents served
more than two terms, and all were significantly different from one another in
terms of agendas, prior experience, and political affiliations. Further, in the Constitution, the
executive and legislative branches are given different, and often conflicting,
powers, which has manifested in a constant struggle over control of foreign
policy. The President’s “ability to
act…and answer questions later” has given him tremendous clout, especially
during the Cold War, in the execution of foreign policy. Yet, Congress has the ability to
investigate after the fact, as in the U.S. involvement in Vietnam or
Iran-Contra. Shifts in America’s
position in the world economy have also created relative disappointments in
foreign policy. Formerly, the U.S.
was able to leverage its creditor status and favorable trade balance to impose
economic sanctions in order to achieve international compliance with its foreign
policy objectives. Finally, the military balance was altered during
1941-1991. After WWII, the American
armed forces were immeasurably superior compared to the years ahead of the war
as well as the rest of the world.
Also, the U.S. had a virtual monopoly of the world’s nuclear
weapons. Despite Kennedy’s attempts
to amass enough weapons to permit the U.S. to win the arms race, Russia was able
to catch up. Meanwhile, the U.S.
cut back its number of conventional forces and armaments, and with the advent of
the all-volunteer force during Nixon’s administration, the number of members in
the armed forces decreased markedly.
Regardless of its nuclear capabilities, the U.S. was consequently mired
in its ability to exert world leadership because of its lack of military
personnel. Historically, the U.S.
was only able to exert influence where it has maintained armed forces on a
permanent basis. Despite the above
weaknesses and shifts in America’s foreign policy efforts, it is irrefutable
that the power of the Oval Office in the conduct of such policy abroad has
strengthened as a result of Roosevelt’s defeat of Nazism and the collective
efforts of the Presidents thereafter.