Fouad Ajami, “The Summer of Arab Discontent”, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990

The Main Point

This article charts the rise of Saddam, his motivations for invading Kuwait, and the various scripts through which he represented his aggression as a bid for a United Arab Nation, a bid which had been made twice before, most notably by Nasser of Egypt four decades ago. Relying on atavistic hatreds and nationalist/revisionist rhetoric, Saddam upset the existing Arab power structure, and forced the rich Gulf States to turn to American military support for a credible deterrent. Ajami determines that the very nature of Saddam’s bid to dominate the politics of the Arab/Muslim region doomed it to fail. It’s aggressive, blunt, and cruel nature forced the formation of a coalition to stop it.

Summary

Ajami charts the political rise of Saddam to a point at which he could place the third bid to dominate the Arab power structure (the first bid was Nassers, the second was Khomeini’s). Saddam’s bid was based upon rousing feelings of resentment and targeting them at the rich Gulf States (especially the Saudi’s) which enjoyed a positive (and for Saddam, a much too friendly and ‘polluting’) relationship with the west. Ajami discusses what Saddam’s revisionist bid had to offer to the various states and peoples which came onboard, then turns to an analysis of the Gulf states response. Condemned by popular Arab opinion and the fatwa’s (ruling opinions) of religious leaders, Saddam relied upon brute force to stake his claim to the Arab power structure. Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, which could not defend themselves from the Iraqi threat, were forced to turn to the west for support, a decision which was also sanctioned by religious leaders.

The Arab Geo-Political Situation

Ajami attributes much of the positive response to Saddams’ atavistic revisionism to the feeling in many Arab nations that they were being ‘left behind’. A growing feeling that the rest of the world was moving on, developing democratic and successful social structures while much of the Arab world was left with the worn trappings of an outdated communist social order. The envisioned unification of the Arab state was thus shaped in terms of an us/them conflict between the Arabic religious community and the western exploiters. Secondly, there has been a distinction between the Arabs of the north (Arab al-Shimal) and the Arabs of the gulf (Arab al-Kahlij). The Arabs of the north had oft been content to spare the Arabs of the gulf their political feuds in a political arrangement- the Arabs of the gulf were a source of resources and funding. With its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq ‘served a warrant’ on the old Arab order, and the failed states of the north, with their grievances and despotic rule, spilled southwards, destroying the cautious peace between the Arabs of the gulf and their impoverished neighbors to the north.

Saddam’s Scripting: Revisionism Revived

Saddam found a number of sources of support for his vision of a United Arab Nation, from Yemen to Beirut, to Algeria and Tunisia. Saddam utilized religious rhetoric, characterizing his annexation of Kuwait as subordinate to the higher goal of removing the American presence from Gulf lands. Thus the focus of Saddam’s invasion was essentially to rid the Arab lands of external power structures which would stand in the way of his ascent.

The Saudi Response

Popular opinion was not entirely on Saddam’s side however, as condemnations of his ‘perversion’ of Islam for his own purposes began to pour in from around the Arab world. The majority of religious leaders condemned his tyranny, and ultimately, sealed his fate. With the condemnation of his actions, the invitation of foreign forces to secure the safety of the threatened citizens of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was sanctioned. Saddam’s bid to drive the Americans out of Saudi Arabia had done exactly the opposite- it brought them there, more so, it brought them acceptance (if grudging) by the populace and Saudi rulers. The Gulf States were simply incapable of becoming garrison states overnight, and had to seek outside assistance. The American-led coalition was hastily put together, and in many eyes Saddam’s fight was not about a United Arab Nation, but just another tyrant engaging in power-grabbing behavior.

Summary by Justin Freeman