Summary of
Chapter III “The United States” by Samuel P. Huntington, from The Crisis of
Democracy, Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral
Commission (A group formed by private citizens of Japan, Western Europe and
North America to foster closer cooperation on common problems.)
The main point of this article is
that an excess of democracy is responsible for the collapse of the Keynesian
state.
I. The Viability and Governability of American Democracy
Part one sets up
the central question to be answered throughout the chapter: “does an increase
in the vitality of democracy necessarily
have to mean a decrease in the governability of democracy?” (p. 64) The
democratic fervor of the 60’s, specifically greater participation and greater
equality in the political process, resulted in a substantial increase in
governmental activity and a simultaneous substantial decrease in governmental
authority. Government’s involvement in a broadening realm of activity called
into question its economic soundness; the simultaneous decrease in governmental
power has produced doubts about its political soundness.
According to
Huntington, the social impulse towards democracy in the 60’s has shifted the
balance of governmental power and limits on that power too far in favor of
personal liberties over governmental authority. Historically, this balance
shifts back and forth depending on the political circumstances. Huntington
questions whether a restoration of balance is possible without a reversal of
the democratic surge of the 60’s. This is because the “democratic impulse” (64)
shifted the relative balance between what he calls “input” and “output”
institutions of government. The declining input institutions (i.e. political
parties and the presidency) are political in nature and bring cohesion to
varying interests. The growing output institutions are bureaucratic in nature
and are concerned with putting in place and overseeing various reforms. How
profound these democratic trends are, and whether or not the existing political
system provides the means for resolving the contradictions they present,
depends on what caused them to begin with. Was the democratic fervor a
permanent result of “post-industrial society” and therefore common to all
advanced industrial countries, or was it a transitory consequence of social and
cultural upheaval, specific to the United States? Huntington suggests that it
is a mixture of all of the above.
Two major changes in the
size and substance of governmental activity have taken place since WWII: the
“Defense Shift’ ( a reaction to the external Soviet threat of the 1940’s,
enacted by top leadership officials) and the “Welfare Shift” (a reaction to the
democratic surge of the 1960’s, put in place by grass-roots movements and
popular demands). Between 1948 and 953, as a result of the Cold War build up,
government defense spending rose dramatically. After 1953, defense spending
steadily dropped until the mid-60’s when the Vietnam War caused defense
spending to rise temporarily. Between ’65 and ’74, total government spending
was in the form of transfer payments (welfare, Social Security, etc.) rather
than additional governmental contributions to the GNP.
Both
of these shifts illustrate the close ties between government activity and
public opinion. During the 1940’s and the early 50’s the American public
strongly approved massive defense and international affairs spending, with the
majority thinking spending in such sectors should be increased. During the
mid-60’s, at the peak of the democratic surge and of the Vietnam War, public
opinion changed drastically, becoming more favorable to spending for domestic
programs and wanting military spending reduced. Both of these periods of growth
in expenditures raise important concerns. After the Defense Shift during the
50’s and 60’s, government expenditures normally exceeded government revenue.
This was a major source of inflation which plagued the U.S. and most other
industrialized countries in the early 70’s. Inflation was one way of paying for
the new forms of government activity produced by the Welfare Shift. The fiscal
gap, a product of the expansion of social expenditures (and therefore of
democratic politics), had potentially destabilizing effects. The great
difference between these two spending shifts is that the Defense Shift was a
temporary response to an external threat and the spending level eventually
returned to where it had been. “The political basis of the Welfare Shift was
the expansion in political participation and the intensified commitment to
democratic and egalitarian norms which existed in the 1960’s.” (74) Because
beneficiaries of government subsidies have a vested interest in maintaining the
status quo, the Welfare Shift was open-ended and continuous.
“The recipients of
subsidies, particularly producer groups, have more special interest, are more self-conscious and
organized, and are better able to secure access to the political decision
points than the more amorphous, less-well organized, and more diffuse taxpaying
and consumer interests.”
1. The Democratic Challenge to Authority
“The
essence of the democratic surge of the 1960’s was a general challenge to the
existing systems of authority, public and private. . .In politics this meant a
decline in public confidence and trust in political leaders and institutions, a
reduction in the power and effectiveness of political institutions such as the
parties and the presidency, a new importance for the “adversary” media and
“critical” intelligentsia in public affairs, and a weakening of the coherence,
purpose, and self confidence of political leadership. (74, 76)
2. Decline in Public Confidence and Trust
“The democratic surge involved a more
politically active citizenry, which developed increasingly ideological
consistency on public issues, and which then lost its confidence in public
institutions and leaders when governmental policies failed to correspond to
what they desired. The sequence and direction of these shifts in public opinion
dramatically illustrates how the vitality of democracy in the 1960’s (as
manifested in increased political participation) produced problems for the
governability of democracy in the 1970’s (as manifested in the decreased public
confidence in government.)” (76)
The
racial, social and military issues at the heart of this polarization all raised
strong emotional reactions and left little room for moderation. A democratic
government, which by nature is based on compromise, left people on both sides
feeling let down. Such generalized alienation could work as a counter-force to
the democratic surge of the ‘60’s and produce a downturn in political participation.
This self-regulating cycle of interest and political disappointment could be
reinforced by the nature of the political issues of the 70’s, which are mainly
economic, less ideological and therefore less engaging to the general
electorate.
3. The Decay of the Party System
Party
identification, voting along party lines and partisan consistency from election
to election have all declined in the ‘70’s. One result is that candidates have
to run as individuals, raise their own money and create their own
organizations, perhaps making them more beholden to special interests. Another
is that issues rather than party affiliation take the forefront in political
races. This decay of party politics may have arisen from the perception of
political parties as institutions; they were hurt in the general loss of
confidence in established institutions in the ‘60’s. Historically, a major
realignment of political parties has taken place approximately every 28 years,
accompanied by the signs of weakening listed above. It would have fit the
pattern for some party upheaval to have taken place in 1968 or 1972. Yet no new
coalition of groups stepped forward to create a new partisan majority, nor did
any such realignment seem likely. Perhaps this is evidence that the American
party system went through alignments, peaked, and is now in decline In defense
of this proposition, Huntington points out that in moving from industrial to
post industrial society, we are perhaps in need of a new form of organizing
political participation. What will that be? “The principal alternative in third
world countries is a military government. Do the highly developed countries
have a third alternative?” (91)
4. The Shifting Balance between Government and
Opposition
“The governability of a democracy
depends upon the relation between the authority of its governing institutions
and the power of its opposition institutions.” (91) During the 1960’s a
significant shift in the balance of power took place in the United States. The
power of the presidency declined while the power of Congress and the national
media increased significantly. This was in some ways a part of a larger trend
calling into question the legitimacy of all positions of power, particularly
those corrupted by politics. Congress and the courts began, during the late
60’s and early 70’s, to restrict the powers of the president. The War Powers
Act, the Budgetary Reforms Act, and limits on the president’s access to funds
are just a few examples. The decline in strong congressional leadership
indirectly weakened the presidency by making it harder to garner support, since
persuading key members could no longer guarantee broad backing. A weakened
cabinet resulted in much the same dilemma. In addition to having to grapple
with the dispersion of governmental power, the president also faced an American
public with newly diversified sources of power and a huge increase in the
variety of interest groups. These conditions made rallying popular support
complicated. The most important new source of national power was the media. “In
the ‘60’s, the network organizations. . . became a ‘highly credible, never
–tiring political opposition, a maverick third party which never need face the
sobering experience of governing.’” (99)
What
Huntington calls the “democratic distemper” is the paradoxical expansion of
governmental activity while governmental authority was in decline. The
expansion of governmental activity has produced budgetary deficits and a major
expansion of total governmental debt, contributing to the inflationary
tendencies in the economy. Such expansion has also raised issues of tax burden
and tax reform. The decline in governmental authority has reduced the
government’s ability to effectively deal with these problems. The general
decline in governmental authority, particularly the central leadership during
the early 70’s, allowed special interests to gain a strong foothold.
Politicians, due to the difficulty of achieving domestic political successes under
these conditions, have increasingly used achievements in foreign policy as a
way to appear effective in office. This “distemper” is also likely to encourage
economic nationalism in democratic societies, since a weak government would be
incapable of following liberal and internationalist economic policies. Such
“unilateralism could well weaken still further the alliances among the
Trilateral countries and increase their vulnerability to economic and military
pressures from the Soviet bloc.” (105) There is also the question of whether or
not, in a crisis situation, the government will have the necessary authority to
“command the resources and the sacrifices necessary to meet that threat.”
Ultimately, the author surmises that “the decline in the governability of
democracy at ho,e means a decline in the influence of democracy abroad.” (106)
The
democratic surge of the 1960’s was the immediate cause of this distemper. But
what caused the political involvement of the 60’s? The issues facing the nation
at the time (Vietnam, Watergate, stagflation) and how they were dealt with did
have some impact. Yet the reforms of the 60’s were underway before these
problems came to a head. Demographically, the youth population, the “global
baby boom” led the revolt againsst authority that characterized the decade and
created a chasm between themselves and their parents. The new values also had a
socio- economic angle, reflecting the emergence of a new better-off,
middle-class, suburban, post-industrial society. The increasing education
levels in the United States also contributed to the democratic surge, since
more education leads to greater political involvement, more liberal views and a
more ideological outlook. The increase in black “group-consciousness” (111)
played a role in their burst of participation. Huntington concludes that the
primary reason for the overwhelming trend toward democratic equality and
participation was nothing more than self-interest. Political events had made people
aware of the impact politics had on their everyday lives and they therefore
became more involved. “During periods of rapid social change. . .democratic and
egalitarian values of the American creed are reaffirmed.” (112)
VI. Conclusion: Toward a Democratic Balance
Moderation will solve the
crisis caused by an excess of democracy in two ways. The first way is to
recognize that there are situations where expertise and experience are better
ways of establishing authority than democracy. Secondly, it should be
recognized that the political marginalization of certain groups is not only
inevitable, but healthy in a democratic society. Too many participants simply
overwhelm the system and prevent it from functioning correctly. It is the
absence of traditional and aristocratic values that make democracy more of a
threat to itself in the United Staes than in either Europe or Japan. To extend
democracy into the future, we will have to recognize its limits.
At
first this article seemed dated, since it was written in 1975, and some of
Huntington’s dire predictions about the imminent collapse of democracy
obviously have not materialized. But some of his concerns seem very relevant to
current affairs, though the pendulum has swung to the other extreme. His
discussion of the delicate balance between government authority and personal
liberty touched a topic of debate right now (how much democracy are we willing
to give up in the fight against terrorism?) Power has refocused itself on the
White House and Cabinet. (Currently the White House has refused to reveal whom
they consulted with in meetings on energy policy. How far reaching will the
Home Security powers be?) Too much participation is no longer a problem, given
the high level of voter disenfranchisement (i.e. Florida election). Firm
support for programs geared towards social equality is no longer an issue
either (Bush’s desire to funnel social security taxes into private investment,
perhaps less likely to be put into place now that ENRON has illustrated how
risky that can be.) Political participation is low (the general mood on campus
is apathy, not passionate commitment to causes. All of this would be very
reassuring to Huntington- our society has not become too democratic for its own
good. Americans will remain governable.