David Seddon
Dear David:
Many thanks for your letter of January 26th. Sorry for the
delay in responding --it was due to other
obligations, not a lack of interest I assure you. I was in fact very interested
in your project and in the paper you
sent me. Your paper on
As you can tell from my Capital
& Class article --which prompted you to write to me-- my problem
with the radical literature on the debt crisis has been the degree to which it
has laid the blame (and thus the credit) for the crisis on capital and ignored
the popular struggles which precipitated the
crisis and have prolonged it --struggles which, it seems to me, provide the
only possible point of departure for
future opposition to austerity and source of alternative policies. Your proposal seems accented on the uprisings with
which people have responded to the austerity measures capital has used to respond to the debt crisis. As the description
stands, you don't emphasize the struggles which lay behind the debt
crisis and the need for austerity --something which
seems to me to be essential in order to understand the revolts themselves. On
the other hand, your paper on
After demonstrating in
the first part of the paper that the revolts were indeed essentially spontaneous
uprisings by those most hurt by the austerity measures (rather than the results
of plotting by political sects), you turn in
section 6 (p. 38+) to the question of the reasons which lay behind the austerity increases in food prices in
each of the countries. In the case of
The drop in export prices (oil and phosphate) was presumably due to the global recession (or at least the European recession if most Tunisian exports go to Europe) which, as I have argued in the C&C piece, was due to the global attack on inflation (i.e. wages) led by the United States whose tight money policies precipitated the recession. While there may be other factors particular to Tunisia (e.g., inability to protect export markets by lowering prices {as the Japanese did in the US during this period} due to struggles of workers in mining -?-), we can at least explain this aspect of Tunisia's economic difficulties in terms of the international cycle of struggles which led to global anti-inflationary policies. To what degree Tunisian workers were participants in that cycle needs to be made clear.
The drop in tourist
receipts may well be due to the same factor: the recession in
And to what do we
attribute the slow down in industrial growth? Probably at least in part, again to European recession, assuming
Stagnating agriculture? To what degree is this due to
government policies which while keeping down
the price of food to more powerful urban workers have decreased production incentives
to less powerful rural farmers? To what degree to government resistance to seeing
income flow into discontented agricultural regions in the South and Southwest?
You mention the seizure of Gafsa by dissidents --what was the source of disaffection?
What is the role of the 60,000 Tunisians who work in
Rising food imports?
Presumably these are a response both to the sources of agricultural stagnation at home and to the struggles of urban
workers for real wages. Those struggles have presumably resulted in both subsidized prices and greater availability
than would otherwise be the case (at the lower prices). Sounds a lot like
You also mention the "tacit acceptance of organised labour" --namely that the government had cut a deal with the union bureaucrats that their workers would be protected from price increases by wage increases. This would measure the relative power of such (industrial?) workers in the hierarchy of the working class as a whole --and reflect their past struggles. Such divisions and playing off of one group against others is standard in capitalism of course --divide and rule is the name of the game-- but the particular divisions always need to be explained as well as the degree to which they are effective or ineffective. If such concessions to industrial workers were also undermining investment in industry, then despite the costs to the poor in terms of the loss of an ally, they were hardly wise from the point of view of Tunisian capital as a whole.
In the case of Morocco you again locate the source of austerity in the country's economic difficulties: declining export prices (phosphates again), rising import prices (latter '70s), rising food imports, drop in tourist and immigrant worker remittances, "increasing Common Market competition," and "protectionism" and the cost of the war.
With respect to export
price drops, increasing food imports, and the drop in tourist receipts, I would ask again all the questions raised above about
The case of immigrant worker remittances is an interesting
one. What was the source of the drop?
Cutbacks in
Since you don't spell out what you mean by "increasing Common Market competition" or "protectionism" I'm not sure what questions to ask. But if the competition is price competition deriving from lower cost production, then what markets are we talking about. In general the explanation for shifts in competition can be sought in the changing class relations within competing units (be they firms or countries) and of course in general the greater power of European workers have forced capital to employ far more relative surplus value strategies [i.e., those raising productivity and permitting a reorganization of the work force that gives business more control] than in the Third World. But I think you need to clarify what you mean here.
As to the expenditures on the war, well certainly that war and the government's role in it is susceptible to a class analysis and hence to a grounding of that aspect of the government budgetary deficit in the dynamics of class struggle. Have you thought about this? Done it somewhere?
All of the above presumably explains the recourse made by Moroccan capital to external borrowing and the rise of its international debt --as well as the applicability of the typical IMF conditions to its 1983 agreement.
The wage increases to
organized labour need to be explained just as in the
case of
And what of the students
who helped ignite the explosion? Who are the students? Who are their teachers?
What has been going on in the schools and in the relation between the schools
and the larger social context? There have been a great many student
struggles in the 80s around the world from
In the case of the
You also mention the
stagnation of agriculture --the collapse of the breadbasket dream. All the
previous questions raised about agricultural policies
and food import policies in
You mention the rounding up of the homeless and unemployed
--what was their political role prior to the
revolts? To what degree do they occupy an
identifiable space (informal sector or what not) and constitute an autonomous force
within the class struggle, as they do in some places in
In the case of the
A fundamental difference
in the outcome of the revolts in the
Finally, a last question:
are you planning on updating this piece for the book? To take
into account the subsequent history? The war in the
I hope the above comments are helpful. I would, of course, love to hear what you think about the issues raised. As I said at the outset I like your project and your work --I hope you find my part of the discussion useful.
Now I want to request something from you: the footnotes to the piece you sent me. Also if, as I gather you do, you have the piece on a computer, could you send me a single-spaced version, preferably with the footnotes at the bottom of the page? (This is easy to do on my Mac, if you can't don't worry about it) I am already using your piece in a class of mine --Political Economy of International Crisis-- which includes a section on food crises, but I would like to be able to give the students the footnotes, and I would like to reduce the length to reduce the cost to them (thus the single-spaced request). Plus, of course, I would like to have the footnotes for my own edification and research.
Moreover, I would love to see any other material you have prepared for the book and would be happy to send you comments in return. Do you want me to correspond with you alone? Or if you send me the addresses of the other authors as well -- I can easily send them copies of my comments for their consideration.
Given that Capital & Class published my piece on the debt crisis, you might consider sending them something from your book --it would be a nice complement and might generate some more correspondents.
Enough for the moment, thanks again for writing. I hope to hear from you soon.
Sincerely,
Harry Cleaver