I.M. Destler,
Leslie H. Gelb and
Our
Own Worst Enemy:The Unmaking
of American Foreign Policy,
Chapter II
From "Establishment" to "Professional Elite"
During the 1960s, a revolution was taking place in the structure
of
The men (and, rarely,
women) who run American foreign policy have always operated in a small
world, so the transformation was something
of a revolution in a teapot. But from this teapot came the ideas and actions
that shaped the great issues of war and peace. This transformation in
the 1960s and 1970s thus helped to unhook the
The anchor had been personified by men like Robert A. Lovett.
When he was named Deputy Defense Secretary on
A decade later, when President-elect John F. Kennedy was
searching for ballast for his young Administration, he invited Lovett down from
his Wall Street office for a chat in
Lovett was to serve in
various capacities on prestigious Presidential commissions on arms
control and intelligence during the 1960s. But mostly he stayed put in his Wall
Street firm of Brown Brothers, Harriman and Company. Years before, he had
married the daughter of one of the Brown brothers. Like so many of the old
policy establishment, he had all the right tickets for any marriage and any
position. At twenty-three, fresh from Yale, he had joined the Great War as a
pilot and won the Navy Cross. After the war, he had gone on to
Lovett was a man who
could look a fact in the face. Like his partners in the Truman Administration,
he continued to urge support for Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese nationalists
until it was clear that money would not
help, that Chiang's regime was hopelessly corrupt, and that the wave of the future was with Mao Tse-tung and his Communists. As hard as it was, the
bond of support for Chiang had to be cut, and Lovett was prepared to do it. He
showed the same kind of flexibility when it came to recognition of the new
state of
"Few men in the State Department were more coldly
pragmatic than Robert Lovett," wrote
Dan Kurzman in Genesis 1948. Drawing on
accounts of Mr. Lovett by his contemporaries, Kurzman
judged that Lovett had neither sympathy for
Zionism nor the Lawrence-like attachment for
Arabs so prevalent in the State Department. He had been persuaded that
If Robert Lovett was the prototypical man of the
Establishment, Zbigniew Brzezinski
seemed to embody the new Professional Elite. Like
so many key members of this new elite (Harvard professors like Henry A.
Kissinger and Stanley H. Hoffmann and Georgetown Center for Strategic
and International Studies pundits like Edward Luttwak
and Walter Lacquer), he was foreign born. Son of a Polish diplomat, a Harvard
Ph.D., Brzezinski first made his mark as a scholar.
His career pattern was the reverse of the Establishmen-tarian's;
he was to write first and serve in government later.
Power came to Lovett; Brzezinski
had to claw for it. Lovett, like most of his contemporaries, went far out of
his way to avoid making news or saying
anything catchy; Brzezinski, like his contemporaries,
wrote for effect and raced after headlines. Lovett was a man of little
or no theory and a lot of action. For Brzezinski and
the Elite, words, articles and theories
were the route of elevation. Lovett's power base was Wall Street; Brzezinski's were his ideas
and his ties to politicians.
In 1959, Harvard had one tenured opening for a young
professor of international politics. As was to happen often in Brzezinski's career, the mantle was placed on Kissinger. Brzezinski retreated to Columbia
University and began to climb a ladder parallel to, but always one rung
behind, Kissinger's. They both built reputations as scholars, though Kissinger's was more luminous. They both wrote articles
in magazines like Foreign Affairs, the organ of
the Council on Foreign Relations, but
Kissinger's always seemed to get more attention. They both derived their views from the school of power realists,
from the writings of Hans Morgenthau, a
Henry Kissinger was the first from the new elite to make it
to the top, now defined not just by power but by publicity as well. To be sure,
Walt W. Rostow, an MIT professor, was the
national-security assistant to President Lyndon Johnson, but his work was still
behind the scenes. Kissinger, under President Nixon, was to transform that position into de facto cabinet rank,
virtually the protocol equal of the Secretaries of State and Defense,
and soon more than the policy equal. Kissinger, protege
of the old Establishment, was to become the first powerhouse of the new elite,
the model.
Kissinger made Nelson
Rockefeller his base. He advised Rockefeller in his perpetual quest for the
Republican Presidential nomination. He ran a variety of foreign-policy
projects for the Council on Foreign Relations and the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund, one of which led in 1957 to his
path-breaking book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Brzezinski fastened onto David Rockefeller, head of the Chase Manhattan Bank. Together, in 1973 they
fashioned the Trilateral Commission, a kind of international Council on
Foreign Relations dedicated to fostering better relations among
The Trilateral Commission
was a club, and Brzezinski and David Rockefeller got to choose its members. They chose
the then virtually unknown
Nor would it have been surprising if Brzezinski
had gotten this post under almost any Democratic President. By the time
Carter's long-shot campaign was under way in 1976, almost every Democratic hopeful had been the beneficiary of
private conversations with the
It was not as if Brzezinski had to
break down the doors to meet the Democratic candidates. By the time he went to
them, they all wanted him. He gave them a kind of legitimacy, the most
important kind for the 1970s: expertise. Like his contemporaries who were
working in the same vineyard, he had met the politicians at conferences, dined
with them, sent them copies of his articles, and took their telephone calls to
provide quick advice for a comment to the news
media.
Like Kissinger, Brzezinski knew
how to talk to men of power, to appreciate politics, to combine the language of
scholarship and expertise with the world of power. He could explain problems
and ideas simply, put them in words that
politicians could use in speeches and television appearances, give them
a clever phrase to catch a headline. He understood their dilemmas, the need to
combine high moral purpose with
new-sounding approaches and phrases that could win elections. It was not
a waste of time for politicians to talk with this
professor.
Before Carter named Brzezinski to
be his White House national-security aide, he chose Cyrus R. Vance as Secretary
of State and Harold Brown as Defense
Secretary. No surprises here either. Vance, a Wall Street lawyer, was a man who
had held high office previously in the Pentagon. He was every inch the
safe and sound Establishmentarian, or so it seemed, despite the fact that he
had become a critic of the Vietnam War. Harold Brown, the former President of
the California Institute of Technology, former head of Pentagon research, and
Secretary of the Air Force during the Johnson administration, also was a
natural choice. But together, Brzezinski the
professor, Vance the Establishment lawyer with liberal views, and Brown the
technocrat were to mark the crossover point. With them, and the people they
brought with them, the revolution was complete. The new Professional Elite had
come of age.
It was an irony that Vance was to help usher in the new era.
He was, by birth, style, temperament,
character and career, an exemplar of the old Establishment. To many, it
seemed that Vance would be the natural successor
to John J. McCloy, the Wall Street banker and
confidant of Presidents, as the unofficial head of the Establishment. But
from the time when Vance left his post as Deputy to Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara in 1966 and returned to Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett, his law firm, something happened to him. His thinking about foreign
policy changed. He moved from safe centrist positions to a more liberal line, from being
a man whose career had defined the center to someone who would take the point
position on controversial
issues he cared about. As Secretary of State, he was to surprise almost everyone. Instead of using
his well-honed skills to shape centrist consensus as he had done in the past,
he became the point man in the Carter
Administration in arguing for arms-control agreements with the
But while his views
had moved leftward, his style and sense of values
and fair play remained very much of the
From reporters,
legislators and friends at the White House, it was clear that Brzezinski had already begun to position himself as the practitioner of Realpolitik in the administration,
painting Vance and his
subordinates as left-wingers. But Vance would not respond in kind. He would not
try to make alliances with Harold Brown or with key White House aides against Brzezinski. He would not call in newsmen to correct stories about him planted by Brzezinski
and his aides, nor would he
countenance his own aides doing that work for him.
Early on, a story
appeared in Time magazine attacking Brzezinski,
with the calumny ascribed to a State Department official. Vance called in the
assistant secretary suspected of the leak and said, "Did you do it?" The response was yes. "Don't do it
again," said the Secretary.
"That's the wrong way. It will only spread the poison and make it worse. I'll take the issues up with the
President. But I'm not going to talk to him about Zbig
or any bureaucratic nonsense. I'll talk to him about the issues. That's the way
to do it."
His
strategy worked for a time. He did have the President's ear, and most decisions
went his way in the first year. But the country was moving to the conservative side of the
foreign-policy debate, the White House wanted to bend in that direction, and Brzezinski was caricaturing his position. But by
temperament and conviction, Vance would
live by the gentlemen's rules from the old era—and eventually be hit by the new rules. He knew that their
policy differences were substantial. He did not want to recognize the
lengths to which Brzezinski and his allies would go in trying to win.
But Brzezinski,
Brown, their staffs, and Vance's aides were products of the new game
and the new rules. The people they brought in with them were at the very heart
of the new Professional Elite. By the dozens, they came in, to take over almost
every top position in the State Department, Defense Department and National
Security Council staff. There were scores more who were placed in lower-level
positions and in the critical special-assistant slots. To be sure, the Nixon
administration brought a number of Republican foreign-policy specialists into government in 1969 and removed a good many professionals
with Democratic connections. At the same time, however, many
professionals—civil servants and Foreign Service officers—were kept on. Henry
Kissinger's National Security Council staff was a blend of outside experts and
career professionals, Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives
alike, pro- and anti-Vietnam. Foreign Service officers also held their own in
many key State Department positions. The biggest turnover under Nixon occurred
in the Pentagon, where many civilian experts had constituted the hotbed of
opposition to the Vietnam War, and where McNamara's "whiz kids" had
done much over the years to alienate the
professional military.
The takeover by the new types in 1977 was not partial as it
had been in 1969; it was virtually total. More than one hundred critical
foreign-affairs positions were filled by people coming from outside government.
A sizable percentage were serving in the Executive
Branch for the first time.
Perhaps more important than numbers was the fact that almost
all the new policy makers were from the center, center-left and left on the
ideological spectrum. It was not just a physical turnover, but an intellectual
one. There was as much continuity as change in policy in the transfer of power
from the Johnson administration to the Nixon and Ford administrations. From
Ford to Carter, there was far more change than continuity. It represented a
takeover of the Vietnam War critics, advocates of arms-control agreements with
the Soviets, and those who felt strongly that the power of the
They came in especially at the Assistant Secretary rank. In
the State Department could be found Richard Moose as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management and later
Assistant Secretary for Africa; Richard C. Holbrooke
as head of Asian and Pacific Affairs; Douglas
Bennet to manage Congressional Relations; Anthony
Lake to run the policy-planning
staff; Leslie H. Gelb to manage political-military matters; Marshall Shulman to serve as Vance's special adviser for
Soviet affairs; Matthew Nimitz as Counselor; and
Daniel Spiegel as Vance's special assistant.
Harold Brown took as his key people: David McGiffert, a Washington attorney and former Under
Secretary of the Army in the Johnson administration, to be Assistant Secretary
for International Security Affairs, the
Pentagon's little State Department; Walter Slocombe, a Washington tax lawyer
and arms-control specialist who had worked on the Presidential campaign of
George S. McGovern in 1972, to oversee work
on strategic-arms-limitation talks with Moscow; Russell Murray, one of McNamara's "whiz kids," to be
Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis; and Lynn Davis, a Columbia specialist
in defense policy, to run the policy-planning staff. Later, Robert Komer, an NSC aide under Kennedy and Johnson, moved in
as Under Secretary for Policy.
Brzezinski filled his critical
White House billets with similar types: David Aaron, a former Foreign Service
officer and then aide to Senator (later
Vice-President) Walter F. Mondale, as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security;
Robert Hunter, a former aide to Senators Hubert Humphrey and Edward M.
Kennedy, for Western European Affairs,
Michel Oksenberg, a professor from the University
of Michigan, to be his China expert; William Quandt,
another professor from the University of Pennsylvania, as the main man "on
Middle East negotiations; and as Special Assistant Rick Inder-furth, a former member of the Church Committee staff that investigated wrongdoing in the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Paul C. Warnke was named by
President Carter as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Warnke, as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Johnson
Administration, had come to symbolize opposition to the Vietnam War from within
the government and advocacy of arms control.
At the beginning of the administration, Warnke
was in many respects the darling of the Carter foreign-policy team for his
outspokenness and courage. Later, when the public mood shifted rightward and Rrzezinski went on the attack against what he called
left-wing policies, Warnke became the main target of
the NSC staff. As his deputy, Warnke chose Spurgeon Keeny, an arms-control specialist from the agency in
the 1960s. John Newhouse, a foreign-policy writer with previous government
experience in the agency and the Senate, was selected as an Assistant
Director. Another was Barry Blechman, who had headed
the defense-studies staff at the Brookings
Institution.
Along with these established experts on traditional foreign-
and defense-policy matters came a number of people who were to be the experts in the new areas of diplomacy, people with
essentially political backgrounds. Vance chose Patt
Derian, a former
None of these Carter administration appointees stayed on in
the Reagan administration. Nor, with very
few exceptions, did career officers with any policy identification with
the Carter foreign-policy line. Instead, the right side of the new Professional
Elite came to power. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig,
Jr., Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and Richard
Alien, as head of the National Security Council staff, made a sweep that was
broader than the 1977 one, extending to Foreign Service officers and civil
servants. And just as the Carter
Administration had excluded conservatives, the Reagan team eliminated not only
those who might conceivably have any liberal and left leanings, but also those with moderate Republican tendencies.
Foreign Service officers who were being considered for lower-middle-level
positions in the State Department were summoned
for interviews by the political staff of the White House. This was unprecedented. But so was the commitment to
conservative ideology that characterized the new administration.
These feelings were so
strong that even experts with ties to former Secretary of State
Kissinger, hardly a liberal, were either prevented from getting jobs or were
made to pronounce their political and ideological allegiance to the new wave. Haig was permitted to make Lawrence S. Eagleburger, a
former Kissinger aide, his Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs. But the price was accepting William P. Clark as Deputy Secretary.
Haig's other appointments were
very much the mirror image of the Vance appointments. Paul Wolfowitz,
a Democrat with ties to conservative Senator Henry M. Jackson of
Weinberger's appointments went much further to the right, a
fact that was to lead to constant friction between the Defense Department and
the State Department, much as Carter's State Department and National Security
Council staff warred with each other.
Fred C. Ikle, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
under Nixon and President Ford, became Under Secretary for Policy. Richard
Perle, eminence grise to
Senator Jackson, and one of the most
formidable opponents of past arms-control treaties with the
Richard Allen won for his NSC staff the award for the
greatest ideological purity. He wanted all "Reaganauts,"
as those who had supported Mr. Reagan all along were known. His staff, even
within the Administration itself, gained low marks for competence but high grades for ideological devotion. Harvard Professor
Richard Pipes was put in charge of Soviet Affairs; he was regarded as
far to the right by even the most conservative members of the Administration.
Among the more moderate members of the
staff was Geoffrey Kemp, a
Two key symbolic figures were Eugene V. Rostow
and Jeane Kirkpatrick.
Rostow was named as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. He had been the chairman of The Committee on the Present Danger, a
powerful conservative lobby that pressed for increased military spending and
opposed the SALT II Treaty with the
Kirkpatrick was the anti-Derian, a
professor at
After the Carter and Reagan Administrations, the
transformation was complete. The Establishment had been submerged by both wings of the new Professional Elite. For more than
twenty years after World War II, the debate over American foreign policy
covered no more than an octave, and now it ran over the whole keyboard. The
narrow range that bounded the real choices for two decades first broke left
under Carter and then right under Reagan.
For all practical purposes, the Establishment center was
gone. The story of this transformation can be told in five parts: in the decline
of the Establishment and then of its club, the Council on Foreign Relations;
and in the ascent of new, more partisan "think tanks," of ideology, and of the Professional Elite itself.
The Decline of the Establisment
Typically for an informal institution, the Establishment
came into prominence just as its days of glory were drawing to a close. Richard
Rovere, with tongue firmly in cheek, revealed its
existence in an Autumn 1961 article in The American Scholar, then
expanded his diagnosis in the opening
chapter of his 1962 book, The American Establishment and Other Reports,
Opinions, and Speculations (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1962). He found that "there is an Establishment
in
British correspondent Godfrey Hodgson, writing in the Spring
1973 issue of Foreign Policy, reached
a similar working definition: "a self-recruiting
group of men (virtually no women) who have shared a bipartisan philosophy
towards, and have exercised practical influence on, the course of American defense
and foreign policy." Hodgson went on:
I would
add that to qualify for membership a man must have a reputation for ability in
this field that is accepted by at least two of three worlds: the world of international business, banking and the law in New
York; the world of government in Washington; and the academic world,
especially in Cambridge, but also in a handful of the other great graduate
schools and in the major foundations. And I would further suggest that this
group of men was in fact characterized, from World War II until the late 1960s
at least, by a history of common action, a shared policy of "liberal
internationalism," an aspiration to world leadership, an instinct for the
center, and the habit of working privately through the power of the newly
bureaucratized Presidency.
Foreign affairs was the peculiar
preserve of the Establishment. Almost anyone
could become involved in domestic politics. Positions in local, state,
and even federal government in the domestic area had been open to people of
virtually all backgrounds since the beginning of the Republic. But to be a
diplomat was something special. It required education, money, and time for travel.
Almost from the beginning of the Republic, foreign policy
was the glamour field—and more so into the twentieth century, when issues of
war and peace became paramount. For an ambitious young man playing for the
highest career stakes and for service to his government, there was nothing to
match it. The name of an Assistant Secretary of State might well be better
known to the readers of Time magazine and on the
Most prominent in the early twentieth century were Elihu Root, Secretary of War under William McKinley and
Secretary of State under Theodore
Roosevelt, and Henry Stimson, Secretary of State under
Herbert Hoover and Secretary of War under William Howard Taft and Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Others who followed them were not so well known to the public, but
were recognized by the powers that were in the
The Establishment was
white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, Ivy League,
and comfortably well-off. There was a relatively small
number of men competing for a
relatively small number of positions in the State Department or the
civilian sector of the military establishment.
There was a place for them in foreign policy; they were secure.
These men, when they were finished with their high
government positions, went back to their
banks and law firms. Back in private affairs,
they rarely wrote or gave formal speeches about foreign policy. Mostly, they supported whatever the President was
doing in foreign policy. If a President needed help in resisting some
politically motivated effort in foreign
affairs, he would call on them, regardless of party, to help. And they
did. They were always ready to heed the President's
calls to help preserve the pillars of postwar American foreign policy: to lobby Congress against a pullout
of American troops in
The Establishment, in many ways, gave the President what it
felt was his due. He alone had access to
all the facts, knew all the angles. The problem and the responsibility
were both his. He generally wanted to go in the direction of containment and
internationalism desired by the
Establishment. Who knew better than the President? Give him the benefit of the doubt. And the
Establishment did.
The Establishmentarians
were ideological, but their dogma was that of the center. Its members were
basically centrists and concerned primarily about methods and procedures. It
was almost more important to them how things were done than what things were
done. Thus, the way the Establishment framed its objective in the Vietnam War
showed a great deal about what really bothered them and why. The objective was
not simply to prevent a Communist takeover of
The basic ideology of the Establishment was set by two of
its most shining lights: Paul Nitze and George Kennan. The latter was considered not quite reliable,
perhaps because of his tendency to challenge assumptions. But his intellectual
strength and lucidity of expression still
made him a leading Establishment figure. The former was later to play a
leading role in the battles among the Professional Elite on arms control.
Together with Dean Acheson, they were the principal framers of the doctrine of
containment, of holding the spread of
Russian influence to
Prior to the Vietnam War, the only time their comfortable
world was disturbed was during the McCarthy period in the early 1950s. The
anti-Establishment Irish-Catholic, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy from
All this set the stage for the most conspicuous failure of
the Establishment: the war in
The Decline of the
Council
The Council on Foreign Relations was the embodiment of the Establishment. In 1961, Richard Rovere called its directors "a sort of Praesidium for that part of the Establishment that guides
our destiny as a nation." Conceived at
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to resist isolationism and promote
American involvement in the world, the organization was nurtured by the
internationally minded rich of
But it had been just before and during the war that the
members of its house on
John J. McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War for Air, is widely quoted
as having once said that whenever the War Department needed someone, "we
thumbed through the roll of Council members and put through a call to
It had all the earmarks of a conspiracy—a few
It was not as if Council members in these years had
identical views. They had their differences, sometimes spirited, over the tactics of dealing with
Whatever the internal
differences, it was a cozy world—until the Vietnam War started to heat up. The Council leadership scrambled to accommodate the critics of the war, first by
providing them an opportunity within
the walls of the Pratt House to speak their piece as guests, then later as Council members. In the
traditional manner of a sophisticated elite, their initial instinct was to
co-opt new leaders, to make them part
of the club. But the critics would not play by traditional rules; they
would not confine their policy objections to the paneled rooms of the Pratt House. The Council could no longer play its traditional role, that of containing differences, or settling matters behind walls, or working toward a consensus and
helping to recruit the officials who would govern by its precepts. The
more so because many of the Council lions
were being blamed by
Council troubles came uncharacteristically into public view
in the matter of William P. Bundy's
appointment as editor of Foreign Affairs Quarterly, which
the Council had published for fifty years. As Assistant Secretary of State for the
Ten years later,
insurgents won a different battle. As part of the opening-up process
triggered by the Vietnam War, procedures for electing the Council Board of
Directors had been democratized in 1972. Under a complicated formula, the
Nominating Committee would propose more names than the eight slots required;
usually nine to twelve. Others could be added to the list by petition. Valid
ballots had to include votes for at least eight candidates, to avoid bullet
voting for one or two candidates, and also to help insure the election of the best-recognized names. Under this
procedure, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was renominated as a Council Director
in 1981, one of nine names for eight slots. He had been the golden boy,
the star of the Council for two decades. But in the eight years he had ruled over American foreign policy,
he had also become the bete noire of many of
those hundreds of new Council members. In particular, the insurgents held him
personally responsible for the prolongation of the Vietnam War and its
extension into
The Council had other
travails. During his campaign for the 1980 Presidential nomination, George Bush
quietly resigned his membership. As a moderate Republican, he already
had one strike against him in conservative circles. His association with the
Council, long a symbol of appeasement and capitulationism for the right wing of
the party, was deemed to be a dangerous second strike. In the judgment of some of Bush's political advisers, the
resignation also made it easier for Ronald Reagan to choose Bush as his
Vice-President. (A year later, when ultraconservative Senator Jesse Helms
(Republican, North
Four years earlier, during the campaign of Jimmy Carter, his
closest political advisers showed they had no love for the Council either.
Writing in The New York Times Magazine on
But there was no consensus to be found or developed by the Council. The splits were too deep to be
reconciled by gentlemanly discourse. And the
By the early 1970s, the
Council was merely one of many foreign-policy
organizations. It remained the most prestigious, but was no longer the most influential. The new model was
the Brookings Institution.
The Ascent of New
Centers
Founded in 1927 by Robert Somers Brookings, another businessman
with a hunger to contribute to public policy, the institution on
The Brookings model was to be more emulated than that of the
Council. The
Brookings made a special effort to target Senators,
Congressmen and their aides. The Vietnam War had caused Congress to assert itself passionately and institutionally in the
foreign-policy-making process. With roll-call votes and committee
meetings, there was not time for them to go
to
It was Kermit Gordon's idea that what the people from
Congress wanted most was information and, above all, alternatives—new ideas for
which they might themselves get some attention. That meant hiring a
high-powered full-time staff of people who had the knowledge or knew where to
get it, who had experience in government, who knew how things worked. So,
Gordon went out and recruited Henry Owen, the former head of the State
Department's Policy Planning Council, and made him director of Brookings'
foreign-policy studies. Owen in turn hired people such as Edward Fried, an international
economist from the National Security Council staff; Morton H. Halperin, former head of policy planning for international
security in the Pentagon, and a former Kissinger aide at the White House; and
A. Doak Barnett, a prominent Columbia University China scholar.
The boldest move made by Gordon and Owen was to establish a
defense-policy staff, with financing from the Ford Foundation. For the first
time in
Another Brookings consumer in search of facts and
alternatives was the national news media. While the headquarters of almost all
major-media outlets remained in
The Brookings product
was self-consciously "balanced" and centrist. But Brookings
could not escape the fact that what it had to offer
was being done mostly by Democrats, former officials and scholars not
particularly sympathetic to President Nixon or conservative ideas. And no
matter how "balanced" and "centrist," the product was also an alternative. Nor could conservatives
escape the fact that Brookings, through its experts and their ideas, had found
a new formula for power.
And Brookings was
shortly joined on the activist, moderate-liberal side of the policy spectrum by
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. For decades, Carnegie
was based in
Perhaps the most important step that Hughes took was to
provide a home for a new quarterly called Foreign Policy. With managing editors John Franklin Campbell and then Richard C. Holbrooke, both former Foreign Service officers, the
magazine became a focal point for shaping
liberal alternatives to Kissinger foreign policy. Foreign
Policy became "the place" to publish critiques of Kissinger and
new ideas. Its principal themes became the guidelines for the Carter
Administration—reaching back to traditional humanistic American values rather
than Kissingerian balance-of-power diplomacy as the foundation of American foreign policy; emphasis
on new issues such as human rights, law of the sea, nuclear
nonproliferation, control of conventional arms; less emphasis on containing the
Soviet Union directly and more on shoring up the American position in Western
Europe, Japan and the developing world; and more attention to the economic and
political instruments of diplomacy.
So as not to leave the
field to Brookings and Carnegie, conservatives borrowed the model and
joined the new scramble for influence with the Congress and press. The first
conservative to see and act on the need to compete with liberals in the world
of ideas and information in Washington was William Baroody,
Sr. In the late sixties and early seventies, Baroody
went to conservative leaders and businessmen
seeking funds for the expansion of the American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, of which he was president, into a conservative
Brookings. With his drive and their money, he succeeded. Like Brookings, it
would cover American politics and economics as well as foreign and defense
policy. Here, on the top floors of an
office building at Seventeenth and L Street, denizens of Capitol Hill
and the press corps could go to hear the arguments in favor of Nixon and Ford
policies, although Baroody was always careful to
present a variety of viewpoints.
Baroody's enterprise was less
book-oriented than Kermit Gordon's. He knew that Washingtonians were not great
readers. What they really wanted were facts and arguments to buttress their
political predilections. Conservatives also needed some bucking-up in a town
dominated by liberal ideas. They needed to be able to argue back. And Baroody gathered some conservative thinkers who could help
them out. Among the leading lights of AEI were Ben Wattenberg, a former aide to
Lyndon Johnson and coauthor of polling expert Richard Scammon;
Herbert Stein, former chief of Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers; and Irving
Kristol, guru of the so-called neoconservatives and
coeditor of The Public Interest Quarterly.
These men were less concerned
with the nitty-gritty details of the defense budget than were the Brookings
experts; they were big-picture men.
The conservatives still
needed a place that could compete on foreign-policy expertise. Into this
breach stepped David Abshire, the shrewd Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations in the early days of the Nixon administration,
to energize the moribund Georgetown Center for Strategic and International
Studies. The Georgetown Center had actually been formed in 1962, but its conservative
founders such as Richard V. Alien, later to become for a short while President Reagan's national-security
adviser, did not pay effective
attention to institution-building until the Brookings experiment proved irresistible. Over the years, Abshire was able to round up luminaries on the order of Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary
James R. Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. And Abshire, with his soft Southern twang and judicious manner,
was highly successful in creating superboards,
trustees, advisory groups, and the like, filled with conservatives who wanted
some contact with the world of foreign
affairs. For them and for an eager group of conservative legislators and
their aides, he put together an almost continuous program of conferences.
Again, the subjects were treated in a serious scholarly manner, as with
Brookings and AEI, but the slant was
moderately right of center.
Neither AEI nor the
Georgetown Center was sufficiently conservative to please the right wing of the
Republican party. They wanted organizations that
would make an unadulterated hard-line pitch— the Russians are coming, they're
already superior militarily to the United States, forget arms control and
concentrate on building up American armaments. Right-wing money and plenty of
it began pouring into places such as the Hoover War and Peace Institute at
Stanford, California, and the Heritage Foundation in Washington. With funds
principally from the Scaife-Mellon Foundation, a new
right-wing think tank was created in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with Washington offices, called the Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis. All of them
started producing reports and holding conferences and when it came to
financing, the liberals were no match for the conservatives.
Even before a number of Foreign
Policy's principal authors left to people the Carter Administration
and try to put their new ideas into effect, another journal had jumped into the
limelight to present the conservative alternative. Commentary magazine,
under the editorship of Norman Podhoretz, former socialist
and now a leader of the neoconservative movement, launched an all-out barrage
against the Carter team. Some of its heavy hitters were Edmund Luttwak and Walter Lacquer of the Georgetown Center and
Robert W. Tucker, a professor at John
Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in
Washington. The main lines of their critique were: America was becoming
overwhelmed by the "Vietnam syndrome"; there was a liberal unwillingness to see the world as it was (which, in power terms, required a relentless struggle
against the Soviet Union) and a hesitancy to use American power; the United
States had to rebuild its military strength and beware of letting arms
control lead to unilateral American disarmament; there should be less concern about traditional American ties with a Western
Europe falling inevitably into a position of moral and military
neutrality between East and West, a Europe becoming "Finlandized."
If Commentary provided
the ideas, the Committee on the Present Danger provided the action. Under the
leadership of Eugene V. Rostow and Paul H. Nitze, both
former high officials in the Johnson Administration, this group became
the most potent political force against the Carter foreign policy. The
Committee's special target was the
strategic-arms-limitation talks between Moscow and Washington. If any
one man can take credit for scuttling Senate ratification of the Treaty signed
in June 1979 it was Paul Nitze. And there was no
other group that contributed more high foreign-policy
officials to the Reagan Administration.
On the left, meanwhile,
the Institute for Policy Studies continued to provide support for
activist scholars who challenged many of the basic
assumptions of American foreign policy that mainstream liberals held dear.
By the middle 1970s the foreign-policy landscape was
littered with think tanks, conferences, reports, quarterlies and chaos. Think
tanks now provided homes and money for adversaries to wage perpetual war
against one another. Experts wrote competing articles for the op-ed pages of The
Washington Post and The New York Times, and otherwise extended
traditional battles within the bureaucracy by other
means.
The Ascent of Ideology
For a brief moment at the end of the Ford Administration and
the beginning of the Carter term, it
appeared as if the center-left and left
were ascendant. The Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign
policy was on the defensive, as much from attack by the right as by the
left. Most of the top spots on the Carter team went to Vietnam war critics, liberals. Much to the later woe of the White
House, conservative Democrats had been excluded by and large. Many of those excluded
worked against the Carter foreign policy through the Committee for a Democratic
Majority and the Committee on the Present Danger.
But the halcyon days of the liberal-left faded quickly under
the pressure of events, and the power and
money of the conservatives. By the
end of 1979, the momentum had shifted dramatically. The Soviet Union had
transported Cuban troops into the Horn of Africa. Vietnam, Moscow's key ally in
Asia, was fighting a savage war of repression in Cambodia. It did not matter
that Washington was now defending Somalia, the aggressor against Ethiopia in
the Horn of Africa and Moscow's friend for
more than a decade. Nor did it seem to make a difference that Washington
now found itself supporting the likes of
mass murderer Pol Pot in his battle against the
Vietnamese puppet government for the Cambodian seat at the United Nations. The fact remained that the Soviet Union was
gaining influence in new areas and exercising military power. It was
easy to portray the United States as doing
nothing about it. Above all, conservatives had succeeded in convincing
much of Congress and the national news media that the Soviet Union had gained military
superiority over the United States.
The last point was a classic example of how the extremes managed
to manipulate public opinion through simple arguments and a one-sided statement
of the facts. Some on the left did it in the wake of Vietnam with the pitch
that economic and military aid to Third World
countries fighting insurgencies inevitably would lead to deepening
American commitment, and eventually to American combat involvement. The
argument was a reductio ad absurdum. It
meant that doing anything would later drag the United States into everything,
that no lines could be drawn, that there was no possibility of calibrating
policy. It would have meant abandoning virtually every Third World country
facing an insurgent challenge. It played to one of the deep-seated fears of the American people—fear of another Korean
or Vietnam war. It was also quite effective
politically.
The right was no
newcomer to distortions of its own about Soviet military power, but in
the 1970s it was to raise them to a new art form.
There was no denying the fact that, over the course of the preceding
fifteen years, Moscow had consolidated conventional or non-nuclear military
advantages in Europe and that it had achieved effective parity with the United
States in strategic nuclear power. The Soviet military budget had been
increasing steadily since Moscow's humiliation at having to back down during
the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. During this same period, the United
States was mired down in Vietnam and, in
its aftermath, leveled off military spending
in favor of domestic priorities. It was also true that Moscow had opened
up about a three-to-one lead over Washington in tactical aircraft, tanks,
artillery pieces and other conventional armaments; and it was true, too, that
Moscow had developed land-based intercontinental missiles of far greater
destructive power than their American counterparts.
But these simple and powerful facts told only part of the
story. In the first place, they took no
account of the overall geo-strategic situation, where the Soviet Union had to
face the prospect of adversaries on two fronts, NATO in Western Europe
and China to the east. Nor did the three-to-one bean counting include the
forces of America's allies on the scales. Nor did it reflect the well-known
intelligence judgment that Moscow knew that it could not count on most East
European forces in any conflict with the West and, indeed, Soviet troops would
be required to garrison these satellites during a war. Nor did it reflect
continuing American superiority in quality of weaponry, albeit this gap had
been closed in a number of areas. As for the fact of Soviet superiority in land-based
intercontinental missiles, that was counterbalanced by the fact that Washington
remained superior in the number of warheads, in less vulnerable strategic
submarines and in their long-range missiles, and in bombers. True, American
bombers were older than the latest Soviet models. But truer still, the U.S. Air
Force continued to regard our old B-52s as far better in both range and payload
than Soviet bombers
But it was easy for the right to make the charges, to state
the "facts" and let them speak for themselves. It was far harder for
its targets to put the more complicated situation in reasonable perspective. Television
and daily and weekly news publications gave more attention to the simple
accusations than to the complicated responses. For the accusations played on
deep-seated public fears after the humiliation of Vietnam.
The Carter Administration was on the defensive for its
liberalism almost from the beginning, even
though it contained several centrists in senior positions. Both Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Harold Brown were backers
of the Vietnam War, and both had good standing with conservative Democrats. Brzezinski also made it a point to hire several experts for his NSC staff who also had good conservative credentials—such
as Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, CIA strategic analyst Fritz Ermath, and Army Colonel William Odom. Brown, too, picked a
number of subordinates with conservative ties—such as R. James Woolsey, a
Washington attorney who was close to Democratic Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia,
and William Perry, a businessman from the California military-industrial world.
Woolsey was Under Secretary of the Navy and
Perry filled the number-three job in the Pentagon, Director of Research
and Engineering. These men were far from the kind of right-wingers who came to
people the Reagan Administration. But they leaned to the conservative side of
the ledger. Thus, even at the height of liberal-left power, Carter could not
govern without some conservative ballast. Reagan, on the other hand, saw no
need for cover to his left.
From World War I and the
Russian Revolution in 1917, it was always harder politically for the
left than for the right to hold sway in popular foreign-policy debates. The left
undertook the burden of arguing that the United States should make an effort to
get along with the new Communist giant, while the right was in the more comfortable
position of being skeptical, suspicious and hostile. These were attitudes
toward Communism more in keeping with American history and values. Communism
represented a kind of triple threat to America from the beginning. Even before
the Russian upheaval, the philosophical atheism in Communist doctrine rubbed a
religious American the wrong way. Even
before the revolution, but especially thereafter, the state control of
the economy inherent in Communism ran directly counter to the free-enterprise
ethic of America. And when Communism was harnessed to Russian nationhood and,
after World War II, to growing Soviet military might, it became a direct
security threat to the United States as well.
To make matters worse, Communism was seen also as a threat
from within, from subversives controlled by Moscow and dedicated to the
overthrow of the American government. Then anti-Communist fever subsided during the late 1930s and when the United States was
allied to the Soviet Union in World War II. But it came back with a vengeance in the late 1940s and early 1950s
during the heyday of McCarthyism.
The red scares and witch hunts came to be deeply ingrained
in the American psyche. Even tough-minded conservative Democrats like Dean
Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, and Paul Nitze,
Acheson's policy-planning chief, were
vilified as being too conciliatory
toward Moscow. And these were two men in the forefront of organizing the
NATO alliance and arguing for an American military response to North Korea's attack on South Korea in 1950. The cruel-est and most devastating epithet to hurl at someone's
career was to say that he was "soft on
Communism." By contrast, few if any were to lose political office or their
position in the Executive Branch for favoring
right-wing military dictatorships or American military buildup, or being anti-Communist.
While the liberal-left in
the Carter Administration could not govern without conservatives, the
conservative right in the Reagan Administration
thus could and did get along without any liberals. There is no doubt
that the spectrum under Carter that ran from Brzezinski
to Patt Derian or UN
Ambassador Andrew Young was far greater than the ideological distance under
Reagan that ran from Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. The striking feature of the Reagan team was its ideological purity.
White House political honchos who oversaw the appointments process in the
various departments even reached down to ensure purity in positions normally
free from politics. For example, anyone associated with the SALT II enterprise,
whether at the Foreign Service or the civil-service-expert level, was removed
from the strategic-arms negotiations under
Reagan
The policies of the Reagan Administration swung so far to
the right that they soon became vulnerable to political attack as well. A
conservative administration was one thing; but one that pursued a hard
anti-Communist line, one with uncompromising rhetoric that did not admit to prospects of serious
negotiations with Moscow, one that appeared hell-bent on an arms buildup
with disdain for arms control, went too far.
The news media and Congress have usually felt comfortable with a
right-of-center foreign policy. Whatever their personal philosophical and
political orientation, they have generally found
a moderately conservative foreign policy to be politically unassailable.
The media and Congress also held their peace in the first
year of the Reagan administration, waiting to see how far the new team would
go. But by the second year Reagan too was paying a price for his foreign policy. Slightly more than midway
through his first term, public-opinion polls began to show that while Reagan's
overall popularity was once again on the rise,
his conduct of foreign affairs was being greeted with wide disapproval. For
example, a New York Times-CBS news poll conducted in March 1983 showed
that by about two-to-one the respondents agreed with Reagan's description of
the Soviet threat, but that by about three-to-one they disagreed with his
strategy for dealing with it. Even in the wake of the popular Grenada invasion, there was broad concern about
the state of United States-Soviet
relations.
That said, there remained no doubt that Carter's perceived
soft-line policies were much more injurious
to him politically, in his first three years, than were Reagan's
perceived hard-line policies. Even before the fiasco of Americans held hostage
by Iran and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, foreign policy was already a political noose for Carter. This
was so despite the fact that before the end of the third year of his
administration he had put together the Panama Canal Treaty, the SALT II treaty,
normal relations with China, and the Camp David accords between Israel and
Egypt, and had helped to achieve a
settlement in Rhodesia. At a comparable time in his administration,
Reagan had failed to produce a single concrete accomplishrnent
of comparable significance. The lesson not lost on political leaders or
foreign-policy experts was that the American people and political system still
preferred to err on the side of what they saw as toughness than on the side of
weakness.
The Ascent of the Professional Elite
The swings of the
foreign-policy pendulum, from Nixon to Carter to Reagan and then seemingly away
from Reagan did not occur simply because the liberal left and the
conservative right were having at each other. Nor did the rise of the New Elite
occur only because of the fissures caused by the Vietnam War. The volatility in
the small world of the foreign-policy maker and expert was a reflection of
larger changes taking place in the country. The United States itself was
undergoing a metamorphosis that was, in turn, transforming the political
culture, including the foreign-policy subculture.
American society and
politics were becoming democratized, leveled, fragmented and
specialized. Establishments and entrenched power brokers of almost every kind
were becoming less in tune with the times,
less relevant and less effective.
The two world wars, the Depression, labor unions, and more
nearly equal access to education had all contributed to making Americans more
middle class and more equal than ever before. But economic sameness did not produce uniform political views. Despite the
reassertion of ethnic loyalties, Americans looked more like one another in
dress and lived more like one another in their homes, but they still did not
think like one another. There was a spectacular rise in the number of special-interest groups and single-issue groups, and an
increase in their power. In the process, the sense of the general or public interest was being submerged, and it was
this larger sense that had given the old Establishment some of its
leverage.
There were virtually no more captains of industry or
Hollywood moguls or big-city bosses. Giant industries had become too complicated
for one-man rule, and the giants who used to run them were being replaced by
accountants and salesmen and money managers. By
the middle 1960s Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago was the last of the big-city
bosses, and when he died in 1976, no one could take over his once awesome
machine. City leaders had all they could do to hold onto their own jobs,
let alone command the reins of the city as in years
past. By 1970, there were lots of fingers on the buttons of industry,
entertainment and politics.
The changes in the
culture and economy generally preceded and foreshadowed the changes in the
political arena. As has been noted, the trend toward Presidential
primaries accentuated the hold of party
activists and extremists. The process of fragmentation was nowhere clearer than in Congress. The committee
chairmen died off or had their wings clipped by backbenchers demanding
more power and possessing the votes to make
their demands stick. The assertion of Congressional authority against
the President was followed rapidly by
individual legislators establishing their own authority outside the committee
structure. Instead of a few committee chairmen, Presidents had to
consult dozens of different legislators on hundreds of different issues in order to build a coalition to get a bill enacted or
a foreign initiative sustained.
With these changes in society and politics generally came
the new Professional Elite in foreign policy. With Vietnam, with the growing importance of economic issues, with the domesticization of foreign affairs, politicians and
press needed to know more and say more
about international events. The political stakes in foreign policy were
high, and so was the demand for foreign-policy expertise. And so the old
Establishment was thus infiltrated, transformed and subsumed by the new broader
grouping, a compound of professors, lawyers,
think-tank experts, foundation executives, businessmen, Congressional aides and journalists. At their top
is a smaller group of a few hundred wielders of power and ideas,
jockeying to influence policy and to obtain
the senior positions of government.
The seventies and eighties thus brought a demand for
advocates not adjudicators, experts not generalists, full-time professionals
not persons looking for an avocation,
ideological loyalists and not simply good
party men, and people who could operate in the public domain with words
and symbols and not just the insider with committee skills. And these
qualities, with all their advantages and disadvantages, were what the new class
had to offer.
The Elite, like the
Establishment, still came mostly from the best schools—Harvard, Yale,
Princeton—but now also from places like Tufts' Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, the University of Chicago and the
University of Virginia. They still came mostly from the Northeast, but
increasingly from elsewhere. Many of the new breed did not come from the
wealthy and privileged backgrounds of their predecessors either.
But what differentiated the Elite most from the
Establishment was that they were full-time foreign-policy professionals. Their
rise has altered the rules of the game for seeking power, and even the way the
government operates in managing our foreign affairs. Most of them chose not to join businesses and law
firms to go home to after government. If they were not in government,
they would mostly be outside in the think tanks and universities or, even if in
business, still at conferences working on foreign policy, writing about foreign
policy, and talking to journalists about foreign policy. And all the while,
they would be waiting to return to government, in a higher position than last
time.
As full-timers, they were also experts. Modern foreign
policy was highly complex and technical. The government had become deeply
involved in trade and international monetary policy, and a specialized
background was needed for an understanding of these fields. Arms control called
for a certain amount of scientific knowledge and a keen grasp of concepts.
Everything was connected with everything else, and everything seemed to have a
domestic angle or a domestic impact. Trade issues affected jobs, arms control
affected the military budget, and grain sales abroad to friendly and unfriendly
nations helped to set the profit margins of American farmers. Efforts to prevent
the spread of nuclear capabilities necessitated technical knowledge of nuclear
energy, international trade and domestic energy needs. The part-time cadre of
Establishmentarians could not stay on top
of such issues. They were quickly outpaced by the full-timers and came
to depend on them for advice.
The Establishment had sought power in Congress and the Executive
Branch—but quietly, in the back rooms. The Elite sought influence more openly
and over a wide range of foreign-affairs issues, courting the news media, and vice versa. Its members were sought by
newsmen and legislators for the ideas they had to offer in challenging administrations.
When a new party came to power, they were available to oppose.
It was not only ambition, of course, that drove them to
write on and debate the issues. Ideas matter, and the
views of most of the experts were deeply and sincerely held. Some, like Stanley
Hoffmann showed little inclination to parlay a luminous academic reputation into a job in Washington. But many more denizens
of the Elite prepared and positioned
themselves for official jobs during the whole of their professional
careers. It was done through timing—knowing when
to speak at a meeting, when to look for a new job, when to turn down a job that might be too visible, perhaps, or
one that might type its holder too
much. It was done by having former government service as a badge to point to,
and by proving oneself on the outside by running a foundation, chairing a meeting, making the circuit of conferences,
being among those in the "little groups" that were assembled to
advise the candidates, having thoughtful articles printed in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Commentary, and the op-ed pages of The Washington Post and
The New York Times, helping Senators and Congressmen write their speeches, and operating through the social
connections known in Washington as "friends."
The writing game was
itself revolutionary. With rare exceptions, Establishmentarians did not
put their ideas down on paper, even in Foreign
Affairs. It was totally against
their ethos, a kind of intellectual indulgence of doubtful taste. Gentlefolk
appeared in the newspapers only three times: at birth, marriage (once), and
death. Much like that of the Foreign Service
officer, their attitude was that foreign policy was less a matter of
ratiocination and planning than getting in there and seeing what the
problems were, of flexibility. But to the Professional Elite, words and books
and articles were the very currency of
their lives. An article was the way of announcing one's existence and
showing the colors, of being talked about and asked to meetings and conferences.
Words and writings were also the link between the Professional
Elite and the politicians. Politicians had
become full-time performers and needed endless lines to deliver on a variety of
complex subjects. And they needed respectability too. Reporters always
wanted to know whom a politician had talked
to in preparing his opus. Who were his authorities? His own
staff aides were not sufficient; recognized authors and former government
officials had to be named.
And politicians were the ticket to power for the
Professional Elite. Getting top jobs in an administration was no longer a
matter of someone thumbing through the membership list of the Council on Foreign Relations. One of the best ways was to
have the backing of a politician whose support was needed by the new
President.
This, in turn, made the Professional Elite more partisan
than their Establishment predecessors. To be sure, Establishmentarians were
Democrats and Republicans. But in as many cases as not, the party label had
been secondary, and they were ready to serve Republicans and Democrats alike. Now nonpartisanship was a sign not of
objectivity, but of lack of commitment. Partisans came first when rewards
were distributed, and so many stood in line that little was left for people who
saw both good and bad in what was going on.
The ink wars and partisan battles led to an atmosphere of
highly competitive unfriendliness within the Professional Elite, as compared to
the gentlemanly forms of disagreement within the Establishment. Grudges were
bound to emerge in the Elite. Its members were putting their egos on the line
with every page they wrote, and when they
were attacked, arguments inevitably ensued. Not only did they criticize
one another, but it became common practice to caricature an adversary's view.
Professional politicians might have been able to shrug off such things as just
business, but not intellectuals. Thus, personal animosities added a bitter edge
to everything else. Motives were always being questioned, and no one in the opposing
camp was to be given the benefit of the doubt. For those out of power, it meant
getting back in. It meant not giving the President an inch.
The Establishment was in the main willing to go along with
the President, whatever his political
affiliation, and even if his views differed in some measure from their
own, but the Professional Elite were unwilling to lend
their support to an administration unless its policies agreed in nearly full
measure with their own views. Even when in power, it was not easy for many of
the Elite to compromise with their
ideological cousins. For all of its ideological homogeneity as seen from the outside, internecine warfare
within the Reagan Administration was every bit as intense as in the Carter
Administration. In part, this had to do with the traditionalist tug of
the Foreign Service officers who held key
positions in the Reagan State Department. But the deeper reason had to do with
the new breed of foreign-policy experts. Precisely because they were
more ideologically committed than their predecessors, they were far less
tolerant of differences even among their
confreres.
In general, the
Establishmentarians were used to adjusting conflicting
opinions and beliefs, and they were experienced at it. It was a natural
thing to do, among those for whom, by philosophical temperament, one view was
essentially as good as another as long as it was
somewhere near the center. In contrast, members of the Professional
Elite were not so comfortable with compromise and adjustment, because they felt
more passionately the "truth" of their views. And unlike their
predecessors, who had been part of organizations, partnerships and systems for
their entire careers, many of the Elite had been intellectual loners, working
essentially by themselves.
The net effect was
to make American foreign policy much more rigid and riddled with contradictions
than before. Once in power, Presidents and their acolytes from the Elite
neither wanted to walk away from their rhetoric as challengers nor found it
easy to do so. True believers were always there to hold their feet to the fire.
And when Presidents did alter untenable policies because of the press of
realities and politics, they left a large residue of contradiction. For example, Reagan was never able to successfully
explain to America's allies why it was unacceptable for them to sell industrial
goods to the Soviet Union, while it was permissible for the United
States to sell Moscow grain.
The net result of
the transformation from the Establishment to the Professional Elite was the
destruction of the foreign-policy center.
It was the center that served as the sea anchor against the tides of popular
passion, as a wall against extreme views and sharp breaks and lurches in the
conduct of American foreign policy. With its demise, there was little to
prevent wild swings in policy. And a President or Presidential candidate who might want to
stay somewhere in the middle of the debate found it harder to mobilize
support.
Traditionally, power
in the politics of foreign-policy making resided
in the center. As on a chessboard, whoever controlled the middle squares
won the game, and the main battles in American politics were for the center
squares. But where there was once power, there was now closer to a void. The
extremes were dominating on issues such as human rights or relations with the Soviet
Union or military spending or the handling of nuclear nonproliferation. The
strength was at or near the extremes, and the Presidents and the Professional
Elite who had led in those directions had to go there to find support